Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV00867, Date: 2025-05-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV00867 Hearing Date: May 30, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
A. Prior proceedings
On January 10, 2022, Plaintiff Howard D. Mack III (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants West Coast Dental Services, Inc., dba Choice Dental Group of Hawthorne and Does 1-50 for general negligence and premises liability.
On September 18, 2023, Defendant West Coast Dental Administrative Services, LLC, dba Choice Dental Group (erroneously served and sued as West Coast Dental Services, Inc., dba Choice Dental Group of Hawthorne) (“Defendant”) filed an answer.
On October 26, 2023, Defendant filed a notice of errata stating its correct name is Cohen Sedgh, Manavi, & Pakravan Dental Corporation dba Choice Dental Group (erroneously sued and served as West Coast Dental Services, Inc. dba Choice Dental Group of Hawthorne).
On May 7, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel.
Trial is currently scheduled for July 15, 2025.
B. These motions
On March 7, 2025, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was set for hearing on April 18, 2025. Plaintiff did not file an opposition. The Court continued the hearing to May 30, 2025.
On April 14, 2025, Defendant filed two motions for evidentiary, monetary, issue, and/or terminating sanctions. The motions were set for hearing on May 30, 2025. Plaintiff did not file an opposition.
PARTY’S REQUEST
Defendant asks the Court (1) to grant judgment on the pleadings and (2) to impose evidentiary, monetary, issue, and/or terminating sanctions on Plaintiff.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
A. Legal standard
1. Judgment on the pleadings
Code of Civil Procedure section 438 provides in part:
“(b) (1) A party may move for judgment on the pleadings.
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“(i) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
"(ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.
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“(2) Where a motion is granted pursuant to this section with leave to file an amended complaint or answer, as the case may be, then the court shall grant 30 days to the party against whom the motion was granted to file an amended complaint or answer, as the case may be.
“(3) If the motion is granted with respect to the entire complaint or answer without leave to file an amended complaint or answer, as the case may be, then judgment shall be entered forthwith in accordance with the motion granting judgment to the moving party. . . .”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1)(B), (d), (h)(1), (h)(2), (h)(3).)
‘‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and [thus] attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 274.) “In reviewing the motion, [the Court] deem[s] true all properly pleaded material facts, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law, and [the court] may also consider judicially noticed matters. [Citation.]” (Bear Creek Master Assn. v. Southern California Investors, Inc. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 809, 817.)
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings lies where the court can take judicial notice of a prior action between parties as the basis for collateral estoppel (or res judicata) in the present action.” (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2024) ¶ 7:294, p. 7(l)-95 (Cal. Practice Guide).)
A motion for judgment on the pleadings “normally lies only for defects fully disclosed on the face of the pleading under attack or by matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Declarations or other extrinsic matters are improper. Therefore, the judge hearing the motion cannot consider discovery admissions or other evidence controverting the pleadings. Rather, the pleading under attack must be accepted as true.” (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:322, pp. 7(l)-99.)
2. Negligence and premises liability
“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)
3. Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5
Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 provides in part:
“In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for commencement of legal action exceed three years unless tolled for any of the following: (1) upon proof of fraud, (2) intentional concealment, or (3) the presence of a foreign body, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, in the person of the injured person. . . .”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.)
4. Code of Civil Procedure sections 335 and 335.1
Code of Civil Procedure sections 335 and 335.1 provide:
“The periods prescribed for the commencement of actions other than for the recovery of real property, are as follows:
(Code Civ. Proc., § 335.)
“Within two years: An action for assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.)
B. The complaint
The complaint includes the following allegations:
On January 9, 2020, Plaintiff was having dental x-rays taken at Defendants' business located at 12730 Hawthorne Boulevard, Unit D, Hawthorne, California 90250 (“premises”) when the x-ray machine/equipment fell onto Plaintiff, injuring him.
Defendants’ careless, negligent, reckless, and unlawful conduct in regards to maintaining, operating, patrolling, servicing, facilitating, inspecting, and/or controlling the premises was the legal, direct, and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Defendants created this dangerous condition and/or failed to take remedial action to remove the dangerous condition and failed to warn Plaintiff of the existence of the dangerous condition despite their knowledge of its existence, exposing Plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm. Defendants were negligent, careless, and reckless in failing to take reasonably proper actions to maintain the premises, which resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries.
The x-ray machine/equipment at the premises constituted a dangerous condition for lack of maintenance, repair, inspection, training and/or supervision that injured Plaintiff.
C. Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
1. Professional negligence under MICRA
Defendant asks the Court to grant judgment on the pleadings because Plaintiff has alleged professional negligence by a medical provider. Defendant appears to contend that, because Plaintiff has pleaded facts that constitute professional negligence, the Court should grant judgment on the pleadings against Plaintiff's complaint which alleges these facts but labels them negligence and premises liability claims.
But “[i]t is not necessary that the cause of action be the one intended by plaintiff. The test is whether the complaint states any valid claim entitling plaintiff to relief. Thus, plaintiff may be mistaken [about] the nature of the case, or the legal theory on which plaintiff can prevail. But if the essential facts of some valid cause of action are alleged, the complaint is good against a general demurrer.” (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:41, p. 7(l)-22; see Templo v. State (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730, 735 [a motion for judgment on the pleadings “is equivalent to a demurrer”].) Therefore, even assuming (but not deciding) Plaintiff’s claim is better viewed as one for professional negligence under MICRA, that fact alone does not entitle Defendant to judgment on the pleadings.
Defendant observes that “ '[a]ny distinction between "ordinary" and "professional" negligence has relevance primarily when the Legislature has statutorily modified, restricted, or otherwise conditioned some aspect of an action for malpractice not directly related to the elements of negligence itself.' ” (Motion p. 6, quoting Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 998.) However, Defendant does not contend that any of MICRA’s restrictions bar Plaintiff’s suit.
Instead, Defendant argues the Court should not allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint by “replead[ing] his claims as professional negligence” because “such claims would be time-barred” under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, MICRA’s statute of limitations. (Motion p. 10.) Defendant’s argument is based on the incorrect assumption that Defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because Plaintiff asserted claims for ordinary negligence and premises liability rather than professional negligence. In fact, as explained above, Defendant has not shown that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. Similarly, Defendant has not asserted that Plaintiff’s action is time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5.
2. Statutes of limitation
Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims are time-barred. “Except as provided by other statutes [citation], a 2-year statute of limitations applies to suits for ‘assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.’ ” (K. Banke & J. Segal, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial—Statutes of Limitations (Rutter 2025) ¶ 4:300, p. 32, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.)
According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s claims are barred under the two-year statute of limitations because the complaint alleges Plaintiff was injured on January 9, 2020 but Plaintiff did not file the complaint until January 10, 2022. In fact, January 10, 2022 was within the two-year limitations period. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the two-year period ended on January 8 or 9, 2022, those days were a Saturday and Sunday, respectively. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 12a, subd. (a) [“If the last day for the performance of any act provided or required by law to be performed within a specified period of time is a holiday, then that period is hereby extended to and including the next day that is not a holiday. For purposes of this section, ‘holiday’ means all day on Saturdays, all holidays specified in Section 135 and, to the extent provided in Section 12b, all days that by terms of Section 12b are required to be considered as holidays”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 10 [holidays include Sundays].)
The Court denies Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
II.
Defendant’s
motions for evidentiary, monetary, issue, and/or terminating sanctions
A. Legal standard
1. Monetary, issue, evidentiary, and terminating sanctions
Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 provides in part:
“To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose the following sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process:
“(a) The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. The court may also impose this sanction on one unsuccessfully asserting that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process, or on any attorney who advised that assertion, or on both. If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.
“(b) The court may impose an issue sanction ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses.
“(c) The court may impose an evidence sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence.
“(d) The court may impose a terminating sanction by one of the following orders:
“(1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process.
“(2) An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed.
“(3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party.
“(4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party.
“(e) The court may impose a contempt sanction by an order treating the misuse of the discovery process as a contempt of court.
“(f) (1) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), or any other section of this title, absent exceptional circumstances, the court shall not impose sanctions on a party or any attorney of a party for failure to provide electronically stored information that has been lost, damaged, altered, or overwritten as the result of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information system.
“(2) This subdivision shall not be construed to alter any obligation to preserve discoverable information.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.)
2. Sanctions for failure to comply with Court order compelling responses to inspection demands
Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300, subdivision (c), provides in part:
“If a party then fails to obey the order compelling a response [to a demand for inspection], the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (c).)
3. Sanctions for failure to comply with Court order compelling responses to interrogatories
Court of Civil Procedure section 2030.290, subdivision (c), provides in part:
“If a party then fails to obey an order compelling answers [to interrogatories], the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).)
4. Terminating sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders
A violation of a discovery order may support the imposition of terminating sanctions. (See Collison & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1620.) Terminating sanctions are appropriate when a party persists in disobeying the court's orders. (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 795-796 (Deyo).)
A terminating sanction is a "drastic measure which should be employed with caution." (Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 793.) "A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction." (Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279-280 (Mileikowsky).)
B. Discussion
On March 13, 2025, the Court (1) granted Defendant’s motion to compel Plaintiff’s responses to request for production of documents, set one, and ordered Plaintiff to serve verified code-compliant responses to the request for production of documents without objections by March 24, 2025 and to produce the documents, electronically stored information, and/or other things requested without objections by March 24, 2025, (2) granted Defendant’s motion to compel Plaintiff’s responses to special interrogatories, set one, and ordered Plaintiff to serve verified code-compliant responses to the special interrogatories without objections by March 24, 2025, (3) granted Defendant’s motion to compel Plaintiff’s responses to form interrogatories, set one, and ordered Plaintiff to serve verified code-compliant responses to the form interrogatories without objections by March 24, 2025, (4) granted Defendant’s motion to deem admitted matters specified in requests for admission, set one, served on Plaintiff and deemed the matters admitted, and (5) granted Defendant’s request for sanctions on the motion to deem admitted matters specified in requests for admitted and ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant $427.50 in sanctions by April 14, 2025.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s March 13, 2025 order (1) to serve verified code-compliant responses to request for production of documents, set one, without objections and to produce the documents, electronically stored information, and/or other things requested without objections by March 24, 2025 and (2) to serve verified code-compliant responses without objections to form interrogatories, set one, by March 24, 2025.
Based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s order, Defendant asks the Court to impose terminating sanctions on Plaintiff and dismiss the case. In the alternative, Defendant asks the Court to impose evidence or issue sanctions “precluding Plaintiff from offering any evidence of any and all information that was to be provided by Plaintiff” in response to Defendant’s request for production of documents and form interrogatories.
Defendant has shown that Plaintiff violated one discovery order. Defendant has not shown that sanctions less severe than dismissal would be ineffective in producing compliance with the discovery rules. (See Mileikowsky, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 279-280.) The Court therefore denies Defendant's request for terminating sanctions.
The Court also denies Defendant’s request for issue or evidence sanctions because an order “precluding Plaintiff from offering any evidence of any and all information that was to be provided by Plaintiff” in response to Defendant’s request for production of documents and form interrogatories would be vague and difficult to enforce.
Instead, the Court orders Plaintiff to comply with the Court’s March 13, 2025 order by June 13, 2025.
Defendant asks the Court to award monetary sanctions of $1,740.00 on each motion based on eight hours of attorney time at a rate of $210.00 per hour at one $60.00 filing fee. Counsel spent four hours to prepare each motion and anticipated spending two hours to review any opposition and prepare a reply, one hour to prepare for the hearing, and one hour to attend the hearing.
The Court awards Defendant a total of $960.00 in sanctions based on four hours of attorney time and two filing fees.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Defendant West Coast Dental Administrative Services, LLC, dba Choice Dental Group’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The Court DENIES in part and GRANTS in part Defendant West Coast Dental Administrative Services, LLC, dba Choice Dental Group’s motions for evidentiary, monetary, issue, and/or terminating sanctions as follows:
The Court DENIES Defendant’s requests for evidentiary, issue, and terminating sanctions.
The Court GRANTS in part Defendant’s requests for monetary sanctions and orders Plaintiff Howard D. Mack III to pay Defendant $960.00 by June 30, 2025.
The Court ORDERS Plaintiff Howard D. Mack III to comply with the Court’s March 13, 2025 order by June 13, 2025.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.