Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV01539, Date: 2025-03-04 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV01539 Hearing Date: March 4, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On January 13, 2022, Plaintiff Francisco Ramirez (“Ramirez”) filed this action against Defendants Dena Holdings, LLC (“Defendant”) and Does 1-25 for premises liability.
On March 8, 2022, Defendant filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Roes 1-50 for equitable comparative indemnity apportionment of fault, total equitable indemnity, equitable implied indemnity, and declaratory relief.
On August 15, 2023, the Court granted Ramirez’s motion to amend the complaint to replace the fictitious name “Francisco Ramirez” with Plaintiff’s true identity. The Court also denied without prejudice Defendant’s motion to dismiss Ramirez’s complaint under the unclean hands doctrine, finding that “while Defendant has presented sufficient evidence that Plaintiff provided false information and filed the case under a false identity, Defendant has not established analogous case law (prong 1) or the relationship of the misconduct to the claimed injuries (prong 3).”
On August 22, 2023, Plaintiff Pascual Cotiy Tambriz aka Pascual Coty Tambriz aka Francisco Ramirez (“Plaintiff”) filed a first amended complaint against Defendant and Does 1-25 for premises liability.
On September 25, 2023, Defendant filed an answer to the first amended complaint. The answer asserted, among other things, the affirmative defense of unclean hands.
On November 14, 2023, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication. The motion was set for hearing on January 10, 2025. On December 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On January 3, 2025, Defendant filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to March 4, 2025.
Trial is scheduled for April 23, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Defendant asks the Court to grant summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion.
DEFENDANT’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
The evidence to which Defendant objects is not material to the Court's disposition of Defendant's motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary judgment or summary adjudication
“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.)
“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.” (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)
In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)
B. Premises liability
“The elements of . . . a premises liability claim are . . . : a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.)
“ ‘ “Generally, one owes a duty of ordinary care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others....” ' [Citation.]” (Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 411 (Salinas), quoting Padilla v. Rodas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 742, 747 (Padilla).) “ ‘Civil Code section 1714 sets forth the general duty of a property owner toward others: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” The application of this provision entails an inquiry as to “whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable [person] in view of the probability of injury to others....” [Citations.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 411-412, quoting Laico v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 649, 659 (Laico).) “A landowner ‘ “ ‘has an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and therefore must inspect them or take other proper means to ascertain their condition. And if, by the exercise of reasonable care, he would have discovered the dangerous condition, he is liable.’ ” ’ [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 412, quoting Portillo v. Aiassa (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1134.)
“ ‘An exception to the statutory rule of liability for failure to use ordinary care in the management of one's property requires clear support in public policy.’ ” (Salinas, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 412, quoting Laico, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659–660.) “ ‘ “In the case of a landowner's liability for injuries to persons on the property, the determination of whether a duty exists, ‘involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid., quoting Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club of Chula Vista (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 419, 430.) “ ‘Foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily the crucial considerations, but in a given case one or more of the other [Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108] factors may be determinative of the duty analysis.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.) “The existence and scope of a defendant's duty is a question of law for the court's resolution.” (Ibid., citing Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 488; Padilla, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)
C. Unclean hands
“The [unclean hands] doctrine demands that a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he seeks a remedy. He must come into court with clean hands ... or he will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim. The doctrine of unclean hands requires unconscionable, bad faith, or inequitable conduct by the plaintiff in connection with the matter in controversy. Unclean hands applies when it would be inequitable to provide the plaintiff any relief, and provides a complete defense to both legal and equitable causes of action. The plaintiff's misconduct must be of such a prejudicial nature that it would be unfair to grant him the relief he seeks in court. Whether the defense applies in particular circumstances depends on the analogous case law, the nature of the misconduct, and the relationship of the misconduct to the claimed injuries. The defense applies only where it would be inequitable to grant the plaintiff any relief. The decision of whether to apply the defense based on the facts is a matter within the trial court's discretion.” (Bank of America, N.A. v. Roberts (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1400.)
“Although the venerable unclean-hands defense has been described in many iterations, courts have developed and now consistently apply a ‘three-pronged test to determine the effect to be given to the plaintiff’s unclean hands conduct. Whether the particular misconduct is a bar to the alleged claim for relief depends on (1) analogous case law, (2) the nature of the misconduct, and (3) the relationship of the misconduct to the claimed injuries.’ ” (Padideh v. Moradi (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 418, 426, quoting Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 979.) “As to the second prong – the nature of the misconduct – a plaintiff’s actions giving rise to the unclean-hands defense ‘need not be a crime or actionable tort. Any conduct that violates good conscience, or good faith, or other equitable standards of conduct is sufficient to invoke the doctrine.’ ” (Ibid.) On the third prong, the unclean hands “must relate directly to the transaction concerning which the … complaint is made. It must infect the cause of action involved and affect the equitable relations between the litigants. Still, the defense ‘goes beyond the justification for filing the […] suit; unclean hands concerns the far broader questions of a party’s misconduct in the matter.” (Ibid.)
“[T]he improper conduct must be ‘in the particular transaction or connected with the subject matter of the litigation that is a defense.’” (Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 282.) “The question is whether the unclean conduct relates directly ‘to the transaction concerning which the complaint is made,’ i.e., to the ‘subject matter involved’ and not whether it is part of the basis upon which liability is being asserted.” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 681.)
DISCUSSION
A. The first amended complaint
The first amended complaint includes the following allegations:
On October 2, 2020, Plaintiff was injured when he slipped on a liquid substance and fell down a flight of stairs at Defendant’s apartment complex located at 416 S. Union Avenue, Los Angeles, 90017 (“premises”). Defendant negligently owned, maintained, managed and operated the premises.
B. Defendant has not carried its initial summary judgment burden
Defendant argues that the Court should grant summary judgment because Plaintiff’s “unclean hands” prevent him from prevailing on his complaint as a matter of law. Defendant has presented evidence that Plaintiff (1) used the false name “Francisco Ramirez” in the complaint, (2) used the false name in discovery responses and falsely denied that he had ever used any other names, (3) used a false date of birth in discovery responses, and (4) used the false identity to obtain the medical treatment for his alleged injuries.
Defendant has also presented evidence that Plaintiff (1) used false Social Security numbers and (2) used a false identity to obtain Medi-Cal benefits to which he was not entitled.
In addition, Defendant identifies what it calls “inconsistencies and perjurious statements” (Motion p. 10) in Plaintiff’s deposition testimony.
In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that (1) in the Court’s August 15, 2023 ruling on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court concluded that Defendant’s evidence did not establish that Plaintiff acted with unclean hands as a matter of law and (2) Defendant has presented no new evidence or arguments. (Opposition pp. 12-13.)
In reply, Defendant contends that the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment are “two wholly separate motions filed at different stages of the litigation.” (Reply p. 6.) Defendant asserts: “The Court’s prior ruling merely allowed Plaintiff to attempt to remedy his faults by amending his Complaint to include his true name. This Motion for Summary Judgment demonstrates that notwithstanding Plaintiff’s eventual admission of his ‘true name,’ his action must still be barred. Plaintiff also properly notes that the original Motion to Dismiss was ruled on without prejudice, explicitly permitting these issues to be brought before the Court again. As Plaintiff’s own Opposition notes and relies on, further discovery has progressed since the original Motions. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims that this Motion is somehow barred, is wholly unfounded. As demonstrated herein and the moving papers, even amending to include Plaintiff’s ‘true name’ has not changed the applicability of the Doctrine of Unclean Hands in this action.” (Reply p. 6.)
2. Analysis
In the Court’s August 15, 2023 ruling, the Court described Defendant’s evidence supporting its unclean hands argument as follows:
“Defendant’s grounds for moving to dismiss this action are that Plaintiff, whose true name is Pascual Cotiy Tambriz (‘Tambriz’), engaged in fraudulent conduct when he filed this lawsuit under the fraudulent identity of ‘Francisco Ramirez,’ who was ‘made up’ by Tambriz, and is a person that does not exist. (Cordova Decl., Exh. D, 12:4-22, 13:3-18, 16:3-10, 96:15-20.) In response to discovery, Tambriz represented that the only name he had ever used was Plaintiff’s name. (Id., Exh. B.) At deposition and in response to discovery requests, Plaintiff admitted to making up Plaintiff’s identity, which includes a false birthdate and social security number, in order to receive Medi-Cal benefits. (Id. Exh. D, 12:4-22, 13:3-18, 16:3-10, 96:15-20.) He further admitted to falsifying at least one social security number on his employment records and receiving payments. (Id.)” (Footnotes omitted.)
* * *
“Defendant contends that Tambriz’s claim is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands because Tambriz admitted that he committed actual fraud when he created a false identity and used that same identity to file the instant lawsuit. Defendant further argues that it has been put on notice of a Medi-Cal lien for treatment related to alleged injuries from the incident under the name of Francisco Ramirez. Moreover, Defendant contends that Plaintiff will not be able to meet his burden as all the evidence ‘is under a separate identity with no legal or authorized ties to Pascual Tambriz.’ (Motion at pg. 11.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s deposition testimony ‘is riddled with additional inconsistencies that cannot be reconciled,’ including when he started using the fake name, who lived with him, and his current employment status. (Motion at pgs. 6-8.) ‘As Plaintiff’s damages in this matter are inextricably intertwined with his continued fraud, to allow Plaintiff to proceed with this matter would not only allow his fraud to continue but potentially reward Plaintiff for his actions by allowing him to additionally recover in a court of law.’ (Motion at pg. 11.)” (Footnote omitted.)
The Court concluded that, “while Defendant has presented sufficient evidence that Plaintiff provided false information and filed the case under a false identity, Defendant has not established analogous case law (prong 1) or the relationship of the misconduct to the claimed injuries (prong 3).” The Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice.
Based on the Court’s August 15, 2023 ruling and the evidence presented in support of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court again finds that Defendant has “provided false information and filed the case under a false identity,” satisfying prong 2 of the test for establishing unclean hands. However, Defendant has not presented any new evidence or argument that carries its initial summary judgment burden on prongs 1 or 3 of the unclean hands test (analogous case law and the relationship of the misconduct to the claimed injuries).
Because Defendant has not carried its initial burden on summary judgment or summary adjudication of showing that the unclean hands doctrine bars Plaintiff’s case, the Court denies Defendant’s motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Defendant Dena Holdings, LLC’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.