Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV09097, Date: 2025-01-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV09097    Hearing Date: January 2, 2025    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

On March 15, 2022, Plaintiff Amran Noorzay (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Mohammed Bodrul Alam (“Alam”), Jubeda Sultana (“Sultana”), Jakob Lee Usher (“Jakob Usher”), and Does 1-25 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. 

On May 4, 2022, Jakob Usher filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Alam, Sultana, and Roes 1-10 for equitable indemnity, comparative fault, and declaratory relief. 

On May 25, 2022, Alam and Sultana filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Jakob Usher and Roes 1-30 for indemnification, apportionment, and declaratory relief. 

On June 22, 2023, Alam and Sultana amended their cross-complaint to include Cross-Defendants Justin Usher as Roe 1 and Zachary Rose as Roe 2. 

On February 21, 2024, the Court found that this case (number 22STCV09097) and case number 23VECV02762 are related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a).  Case number 22STCV09097 became the lead case. The cases were assigned to Department 28 at the Spring Street Courthouse for all purposes. 

On November 12, 2024, Jakob Usher filed a motion for determination of good faith settlement.  The motion was set for hearing on January 2, 2025.  No opposition has been filed. 

Trial is currently scheduled for May 9, 2025. 

PARTY’S REQUEST 

Jakob Usher asks the Court to find that his settlement with Plaintiff, Alam, Sultana, and Alexandra Von Winckelmann was made in good faith. 

LEGAL STANDARD  

Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 provides in part: 

“(a) (1) Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors, upon giving notice in the manner provided in subdivision (b) of Section 1005. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may shorten the time for giving the required notice to permit the determination of the issue to be made before the commencement of the trial of the action, or before the verdict or judgment if settlement is made after the trial has commenced. 

“(2) In the alternative, a settling party may give notice of settlement to all parties and to the court, together with an application for determination of good faith settlement and a proposed order. The application shall indicate the settling parties, and the basis, terms, and amount of the settlement. The notice, application, and proposed order shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service. Proof of service shall be filed with the court. Within 25 days of the mailing of the notice, application, and proposed order, or within 20 days of personal service, a nonsettling party may file a notice of motion to contest the good faith of the settlement. If none of the nonsettling parties files a motion within 25 days of mailing of the notice, application, and proposed order, or within 20 days of personal service, the court may approve the settlement. The notice by a nonsettling party shall be given in the manner provided in subdivision (b) of Section 1005. However, this paragraph shall not apply to settlements in which a confidentiality agreement has been entered into regarding the case or the terms of the settlement. 

“(b) The issue of the good faith of a settlement may be determined by the court on the basis of affidavits served with the notice of hearing, and any counteraffidavits filed in response, or the court may, in its discretion, receive other evidence at the hearing. 

“(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. 

“(d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue. . . .” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subds. (a), (b), (c), (d).) 

In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 (Tech-Bilt), our Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts must consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section 877.6: “a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.” 

The evaluation of a settlement is “made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.”  (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.) 

DISCUSSION  

In City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251 (City of Grand Terrace), the Court of Appeal observed: 

“[O]f the hundreds of motions for good faith determination presented for trial court approval each year, the overwhelming majority are unopposed and granted summarily by the trial court. At the time of filing in many cases, the moving party does not know if a contest will develop. If each motion required a full recital by declaration or affidavit setting forth a complete factual response to all of the Tech-Bilt factors, literally thousands of attorney hours would be consumed and inch-thick motions would have to be read and considered by trial courts in an exercise which would waste valuable judicial and legal time and clients' resources. It must also be remembered that Tech-Bilt was decided on a contested basis. We are unaware of any reported decision which has reversed an uncontested good faith determination and we, therefore, conclude that only when the good faith nature of a settlement is disputed, it is incumbent upon the trial court to consider and weigh the Tech-Bilt factors. That is to say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient.”  (City of Grand Terrace, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 1261.) 

Here, Jakob Usher has submitted a barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith and a brief background of the case.  No opposition has been filed.  Therefore, the Court grants the motion. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court GRANTS Defendant, Cross-Complainant, and Cross-Defendant Jakob Lee Usher’s motion for a determination that his settlement with Defendants, Cross-Defendants, and Cross-Complainants Mohammed Bodrul Alam and Jubeda Sultana and with Alexandra Von Winckelmann was made in good faith.  The Court dismisses all pending and future claims against Defendant, Cross-Complainant, and Cross-Defendant Jakob Lee Usher by the parties represented by counsel served with this motion (to the extent those claims arise from the facts giving rise to this case), including cross-complaints for equitable indemnity. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.