Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV09970, Date: 2025-02-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV09970    Hearing Date: February 21, 2025    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

A.   Prior proceedings 

On March 22, 2022, Plaintiff Rosa Reyes (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Diamond Valley R.V. Park, LLC, Diamond Valley RV Park LLC dba Diamond Valley RV Resort, Kelly Mac, and Does 1-50 for general negligence, intentional tort, and premises liability. 

On January 3, 2023, Defendant Kelly Mac dba Diamond Valley RV Resort (“Resort”) filed an answer. 

On June 21, 2024, the Court granted Resort’s motion to continue the trial and continued the trial from July 22, 2024 to October 29, 2024, with discovery and related dates to be based on the new trial date. 

On July 30, 2024, the Court granted Resort’s motion to continue the trial and continued the trial from October 9, 2024 to April 8, 2025. 

On November 5, 2024, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant Southern California Edison Company as Doe 1 (“Edison”).  On February 10, 2025, Edison filed an answer. 

On December 18, 2024, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant Light of this World Electric Corp. as Doe 2. 

Trial is currently scheduled for April 8, 2025. 

B.   This motion 

On June 25, 2024, Resort filed and electronically served a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, to be heard on February 21, 2025.  On January 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition.  On February 14, 2025, Resort filed a reply.  

PARTIES’ REQUESTS 

Resort asks the Court to grant summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion. 

RESORT’S AND PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

          Denied. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.   Summary judgment and summary adjudication 

“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar)) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) 

When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.”  (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.) 

“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.”  (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.) 

In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) 

B.   Negligence and premises liability 

 “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.) 

“Landowners under California law are required to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition.”  (Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 654, 663 (Williams), citing Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 (Ann M.).)  “The underlying principle, set forth in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), is that “‘[e]veryone is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . .’” (Ibid.)  This rule “‘establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.’” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1083 (Vasilenko); see Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 214.) 

“ ‘ “ ‘Courts ... invoke[ ] the concept of duty to limit generally “the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act ....” ’ ” ’ ” (Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 663, quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) “Our Supreme Court has explained that an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714 must be “ ‘ “ ‘clearly supported by public policy.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) “Courts look to what are commonly called ‘the Rowland factors’ in determining whether policy considerations favor such an exception.” (Ibid., citing Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.)  “These are “ ‘ “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Rowland [v. Christian (1968)] 69 Cal.2d [108,] 113, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 [(Rowland)].)’ ” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) 

In addition, “[c]ausation is an essential element of plaintiff’s complaint.”  (Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 126 (Christoff).)  “Causation may be determined as a question of law if reasonable minds would not differ.”  (Ibid.)  “If causation is lacking, the complaint cannot stand.”  (Ibid. [“the trial court’s ruling of lack of causation disposes of the entire complaint and suffices to affirm summary judgment in favor of defendant”].)

In considering the Rowland factors, the court “determine[s] ‘not whether they support an exception to the general duty of reasonable care on the facts of the particular case before us, but whether carving out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy.’ ”  (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 629.)  

C.   Open and obvious conditions 

“As a general rule, an owner or possessor of land owes no duty to warn of obvious dangers on the property.”  (Christoff, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 126.) “There is no duty to warn of an obvious danger but the possessor of land does have a duty to warn an invitee not only of conditions known by him to be dangerous but also of conditions which might have been found dangerous by the exercise of ordinary care.  [Citation.] The invitor may assume that an invitee will perceive that which would be obvious to him through the ordinary use of his senses.  [Citation.]” (Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 20, 27.) 

“Foreseeability of harm is typically absent when a dangerous condition is open and obvious. [Citation.] ‘Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.’ [Citation.] In that situation, owners and possessors of land are entitled to assume others will ‘perceive the obvious’ and take action to avoid the dangerous condition.” (Montes v. Young Men’s Christian Assn. of Glendale, California (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140 (Montes), quoting Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447 (Jacobs).) 

A defendant may owe a duty of care even where a dangerous condition is open and obvious, “when ‘it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g., when necessity requires persons to encounter it).’ ” (Montes, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140, quoting Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 122 (Osborn).)  “In other words, ‘the obviousness of the condition and its dangerousness ... will not negate a duty of care when it is foreseeable that, because of necessity or other circumstances, a person may choose to encounter the condition.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Jacobs, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 447.) 

Courts have found it was foreseeable that a plaintiff would “choose to encounter” an obviously dangerous condition when the plaintiff’s employment required him to walk across an area to complete his work.  (Montes, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140, citing Osborn, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 109–110, 123; Florez v. Groom Development Co. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 347, 358–359.) In addition, the court in Martinez v. Chippewa Enterprises, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185, “determined there was a practical necessity for the plaintiff to walk across wet pavement because the pavement was the ‘principal if not sole access way from the street to defendant's building, which housed a government office serving the public.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Jacobs, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447–448.) 

DISCUSSION 

A.   The complaint 

The complaint alleges the following: 

On August 8, 2021, at 344 N. State St., San Jacinto, CA 92583, Defendants negligently, carelessly and recklessly maintained and operated their place of business and/or common areas, causing Plaintiff to trip and fall.  Plaintiff was picking up items from the ground when she slipped on loose dirt and fell into a nearby trench, sustaining injuries. 

Defendants acted in a joint venture and/or enterprise, and/or in an employee-employer, agent-principal, or some other relationship which caused Plaintiff’s injuries and damages. 

Defendants owned, managed, maintained, controlled, used, operated, supervised, inspected, and/or repaired the property involved in this incident, adjacent property, improvements, and/or fixtures thereon, and/or component parts thereof, in a negligent, careless, reckless, unlawful, defective, and/or dangerous manner which were used in a foreseeable manner involving unreasonable damages and/or risk not reasonably apparent, without adequate warning, which caused Plaintiff’s injuries and damages. 

B.   Undisputed facts 

Plaintiff lived in a recreational vehicle (“RV”) at the Diamond Valley RV Resort located at 344 N. State Street, San Jacinto, California 92583 (hereafter “Park”).  Hugo Cordova owned the RV located on space 143 at the Park. 

On August 8, 2021, Plaintiff fell while walking from her RV to the rear of RV space no. 143. 

For over two years before the accident, Plaintiff knew there was a trench located near the electrical hookup on Space 143.  Plaintiff knew that her RV’s electricity was connected to the electrical hookup near the open trench at the rear of the RV space.  Plaintiff had not used the electrical hookup before the accident.  Plaintiff’s brother Hugo had used the electrical hookup before the accident. 

Although trash would accumulate in the area in the back of the RV where Plaintiff fell, before the day of the accident Plaintiff did not pick up the trash in this area. 

As Plaintiff was picking up some plastic bottles in the rear of the RV space near the open trench, she fell.  The lighting conditions were not a factor in causing the accident. 

The trench where Plaintiff fell was not located on a pedestrian walkway or sidewalk. There were no picnic tables or chairs used for leisure.  The open trench was located between RV space 143 and an empty space at the Park. 

The construction of the open trench near RV space 143 had begun about two years before the accident. 

C.   Resort’s motion 

1.    Resort has carried its initial burden of proving the allegedly dangerous condition was open and obvious, shifting the burden to Plaintiff 

Resort has submitted evidence that, after a power outage, Plaintiff walked to an electrical box near the open trench to turn the power back on.  According to Resort, Plaintiff walked near the open trench even though she had been aware for two years of its presence and had tried to avoid the area. Indeed, Resort asserts that before the day of the accident, Plaintiff “never went into the area at the rear of the RV space near the open trench.”  (Resort’s P&A pp. 9-10.)  Noticing empty plastic bottles on the ground near the trench, Plaintiff tried to pick them up but slipped and fell into the trench. 

The Court finds that Resort has carried its initial burden on summary adjudication, shifting the burden to Plaintiff. 

2.    Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact 

In opposition, Plaintiff has submitted evidence raising a triable issue concerning whether it was “ ‘foreseeable that, because of necessity or other circumstances, a person may choose to encounter the condition.’ ”  (See Montes, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140.)  The evidence shows that a power outage had caused the RV where Plaintiff was staying to lose power, leading Plaintiff to walk toward the electrical box that was located near the open trench in an attempt to restore power to the RV.  Resort had built the open trench “in order to improve the electrical lines from the main circuit box to the individual circuit boxes used by the owners of the RVs renting those spaces” (Resort’s P&A p. 10), suggesting that Resort was aware of the risk of power outages.  This evidence and the inferences drawn from it, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff (see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843), raise triable issues of fact concerning the "necessity" exception to the "open and obvious" rule. 

The Court denies the motion. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court DENIES Defendant Kelly Mac dba Diamond Valley RV Resort the motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.