Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV14641, Date: 2024-11-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV14641    Hearing Date: November 5, 2024    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

On May 3, 2022, Plaintiff Lori Manby (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Target Corporation (“Target”) and Does 1-100 for negligence, premises liability, and failure to warn of unsafe conditions. 

On August 18, 2022, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant Global Building Services, Inc. (“Global”) as Doe 1. 

On September 20, 2022, Target filed an answer. On September 28, 2022, Global filed an answer. 

On June 3, 2024, Target filed a motion for summary judgment.  The motion was set for hearing on November 1, 2024.  On October 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition.  On October 25, 2024, Target filed a reply.  The Court continued the hearing to November 5, 2024. 

Trial is scheduled for April 9, 2025. 

PARTIES’ REQUESTS 

Target asks the Court to grant summary judgment. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion. 

TARGET’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

Overruled: 1

Sustained:  2

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.   Summary judgment 

“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar)) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) 

When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.”  (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.) 

“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.”  (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.) 

In addition, a party moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must support the motion with “a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Parkview Villas Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2006) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 (Parkview Villas), quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).) The party opposing the motion must file with the opposition papers “a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts that the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).)  If either party fails to comply with the applicable separate statement requirement, that failure may in the court’s discretion constitute a sufficient ground to decide the motion adversely to the offending party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(1), (3).)  

In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) 

B.   Premises liability and negligence 

The elements of a premises liability claim are a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.  (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.) 

“ ‘ “Generally, one owes a duty of ordinary care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others....” ' [Citation.]” (Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 411 (Salinas), quoting Padilla v. Rodas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 742, 747 (Padilla).) “ ‘Civil Code section 1714 sets forth the general duty of a property owner toward others: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” The application of this provision entails an inquiry as to “whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable [person] in view of the probability of injury to others....” [Citations.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 411-412, quoting Laico v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 649, 659 (Laico).) “A landowner ‘ “ ‘has an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and therefore must inspect them or take other proper means to ascertain their condition. And if, by the exercise of reasonable care, he would have discovered the dangerous condition, he is liable.’ ” ’ [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 412, quoting Portillo v. Aiassa (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1134.) 

“ ‘An exception to the statutory rule of liability for failure to use ordinary care in the management of one's property requires clear support in public policy.’ ” (Salinas, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 412, quoting Laico, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659–660.) “ ‘ “In the case of a landowner's liability for injuries to persons on the property, the determination of whether a duty exists, ‘involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid., quoting Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club of Chula Vista (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 419, 430.) “ ‘Foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily the crucial considerations, but in a given case one or more of the other Rowland factors may be determinative of the duty analysis.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.) “The existence and scope of a defendant's duty is a question of law for the court's resolution.” (Ibid., citing Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 488; Padilla, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) 

DISCUSSION 

A.   The complaint 

The complaint alleges the following: 

On May 8, 2020, Plaintiff slipped and fell on a liquid substance while walking in the parking lot/structure located at the Redondo Beach Target at 1601 Kingsdale Avenue, Redondo Beach, California, 90278.  As a result, Plaintiff sustained injuries.  Target and Doe defendants owned and/or maintained and were responsible for maintaining the premises.  Their failure to do so caused Plaintiff’s damages. There were no warning signs at or near the liquid substance which might have alerted Plaintiff to its presence. 

B.   Undisputed facts 

Upon entering the parking structure, Plaintiff drove her car towards the back wall of the parking structure, away from the entrance doors to the Target store, where there would be fewer people.  The back wall is lined with curb stops. There is space between the curb stops and the back wall where Plaintiff would walk back and forth to get exercise. At the time of Plaintiff’s accident, she was walking in the area between the white line in front of the curb stops and the back wall. 

After Plaintiff parked her car, she exited her car and started walking towards the wall that had a silver panel.  Plaintiff was walking slowly and surveying the area to make sure it was safe to walk there.  Plaintiff did not see anything on the ground.  The area where Plaintiff was walking was well lit. 

As Plaintiff approached the wall, she turned around with the intention of walking back towards her car.  Plaintiff fell as she turned around.  While she was walking towards the wall, she never saw anything sludgy or any other substance on the ground.  As she was walking towards the silver panel, she did not see any puddles. 

While Plaintiff remained on the ground after her fall, she did not look around to see what, if anything, she may have slipped on. 

Plaintiff did not report her accident to Target on the date of the accident. 

After going to Urgent Care, Plaintiff went back to the parking garage to see what caused her to fall.   In the parking garage, Plaintiff could not pinpoint where her accident occurred because there was nothing on the floor/ground that she could identify as causing her to slip or trip.  Plaintiff did not see any dirt or sand.  She saw nothing she thought could have caused her to fall.  Plaintiff felt the darkened area on the concrete depicted in Exhibit “D” with either her foot or hand and determined it was just an old dry stain of the concrete. 

C.   Target has carried its initial summary judgment burden 

Target asks the Court to grant summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot identify a dangerous condition that caused her accident. 

Target has presented evidence that, on the day of her accident, Plaintiff did not see any dangerous condition that caused her to fall.  Despite walking slowly and surveying the well-lit area, Plaintiff did not see anything on the ground and did not see anything sludgy or any puddles or any other substance on the ground.  When Plaintiff returned to the scene after visiting Urgent Care, Plaintiff still could identify nothing that caused her to slip and fall such as dirt or sand.

Target has carried its initial burden on summary judgment of showing Plaintiff cannot prove that a dangerous condition existed.  The burden shifts to Plaintiff. 

D.   Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact 

Plaintiff did not oppose any item in Target’s separate statement of undisputed facts and did not present her own statement of undisputed facts.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3) [“Failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may constitute a sufficient ground, in the court’s discretion, for granting the motion”].) 

Plaintiff asks the Court to deny Target’s motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s deposition testimony.  (Plaintiff also argues that her medical records raise a triable issue of fact but the Court has sustained Target’s objection to the records because Plaintiff has not authenticated them.) 

Despite the lack of a separate statement, the Court has exercised its discretion to review Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and concludes that it raises a triable issue of fact.  While Target emphasizes that Plaintiff did not see anything on the ground which might have caused her to fall, Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she had “sludge” on her clothes after she fell.  A trier of fact could infer that, even though Plaintiff did not see a sludgy substance on the ground before or after the accident, a sludgy substance caused her to fall because it was on her clothes after she fell. 

In its reply, Target argues that (1) only speculation could connect the “sludge” to Target and (2) Target did not have actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition.  But Target moved for summary judgment on the theory that Plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a dangerous condition.  Whether Plaintiff can show Target is responsible for the sludge on Plaintiff’s clothes or had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition are issues that go beyond the scope of Target’s motion. 

The Court denies Target’s motion for summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court DENIES Defendant Target Corporation’s motion for summary judgment. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.