Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV22080, Date: 2024-01-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV22080 Hearing Date: March 22, 2024 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On July 8, 2022, Plaintiffs Jose Dennis Callejas Reyes (“Plaintiff”) and Eileen Reyes filed this action against Defendants Milestone Haulers Inc LSE, Ivan Rodriguez, and Does 1-50 for negligence and negligence per se.
On September 8, 2022, Defendants Milestone Haulers Inc. (erroneously sued and served as Milestone Haulers Inc LSE) and Rodriguez (“Defendants”) filed an answer.
On October 5, 2022, the Court dismissed Plaintiff Eileen Reyes with prejudice at Plaintiffs’ request.
On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for an order quashing Defendants' subpoena for production of records issued to Infinity Insurance Company ("Infinity") and for sanctions, to be heard on January 16, 2024. On January 2, 2024, Defendants filed an opposition. On January 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to March 22, 2024.
Trial is currently scheduled for May 6, 2024.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Plaintiff asks the Court to quash Defendants’ subpoena for records served on Infinity and to impose monetary sanctions on Defendants.
Defendants ask the Court to deny the motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides:
"(a) If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.
"(b) The following persons may make a motion pursuant to subdivision (a): (1) A party. (2) A witness. (3) A consumer described in Section 1985.3. (4) An employee described in Section 1985.6. (5) A person whose personally identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1798.79.8 of the Civil Code, is sought in connection with an underlying action involving that person’s exercise of free speech rights."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (g), provides in part:
“(g) Any consumer whose personal records are sought by a subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action in which this subpoena duces tecum is served may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum. Notice of the bringing of that motion shall be given to the witness and deposition officer at least five days prior to production. The failure to provide notice to the deposition officer shall not invalidate the motion to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum but may be raised by the deposition officer as an affirmative defense in any action for liability for improper release of records.
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(Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3, subd. (g).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a), provides:
“(a) Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)
When a party seeks discovery which impacts a person’s constitutional right to privacy, limited protections come into play. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.) The protections cover a person’s personal and financial matters. (Ibid.) The court must balance competing rights — the litigant’s right to discover relevant facts and the individual’s right to maintain reasonable privacy — in determining whether the information is discoverable. (Ibid.)
DISCUSSION
A. Complaint
The complaint alleges that on April 1, 2022, Plaintiff was driving his vehicle at or near the intersection of Washington Boulevard and Telegraph Road in Los Angeles County when Defendants negligently drove, operated, controlled, maintained and/or entrusted their truck, causing a collision that injured Plaintiff.
B. Subpoena
On November 14, 2023, Defendants issued a subpoena to Infinity requesting the following records:
“ANY AND ALL INSURANCE RECORDS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO REPORTS, CORRESPONDENCE AND MEMORANDA REGARDING JOSE DENNIS CALLEJA REYES. DOB: October 12, 1962, SS#: UNKNOWN, CLAIM #: 22123622769, DOI: 6/29/22, 2016 Mercedes 350, VIN: WDDHFSKB4GB271774.”
C. Legal issues
1. Attorney-client privilege
Plaintiff asserts the subpoena violates the attorney-client privilege because information in an insurance company’s claims file is subject to the privilege. Plaintiff relies on the rule that “communications made by an insured to his ‘ “liability insurance company, concerning an event which may be made the basis of a claim against him covered by the policy, is a privileged communication, as being between attorney and client, if the policy requires the company to defend him through its attorney, and the communication is intended for the information or assistance of the attorney in so defending him.” ’ ” (Scripps Health v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 529, 535 (Scripps), quoting Travelers Ins. Companies v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 436, 448-449.)
“[T]he party claiming the attorney-client privilege as a bar to disclosure has the burden of showing that the communication sought to be suppressed falls within the parameters of the privilege.” (Scripps Health v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 529, 533 (Scripps); accord, Soltani-Rastegar v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 424, 426 (Soltani-Rastegar).)
Plaintiff has not carried this burden. He has not presented evidence that the subpoenaed materials include any communications by Plaintiff to Infinity that were intended for the information or assistance of the attorney whom Infinity would provide to defend Plaintiff from a potential claim against him. (Cf. Scripps, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 535 [“Here, undisputed evidence revealed that Scripps’s corporate in-house counsel declared that the occurrence reports are confidential records prepared by Scripps employees under its risk management plan . . . and pursuant to the directive of its legal department”]; Soltani-Rastegar, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 426 [“In opposing the discovery request, petitioners submitted declarations explaining that their statements were made in confidence to CSAA agents ‘for the sole purpose of defending’ them against claims brought by those involved in the accident”].)
2. Work product protection
Plaintiff also argues the subpoena violates the attorney work product doctrine, but he provides no substantive discussion or authority on this point and the Court considers the argument waived.
3. Privacy and overbreadth
“ ‘[W]hile the filing of a lawsuit may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of associational privacy, the scope of such “waiver” must be narrowly rather than expansively construed, so that plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from instituting lawsuits by the fear of exposure of their private associational affiliations and activities.’ [Citation.] Therefore, . . . an implicit waiver of a party’s constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff’s claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842; see ibid. [“On occasion [a party's] privacy interests may have to give way to [the] opponent's right to a fair trial. Thus courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery”].)
“Even when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy. [Citation.] The scope of any disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed, drawn with narrow specificity, and must proceed by the least intrusive manner. [Citation.]” (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014.)
Plaintiff argues the subpoena for "[a]ny and all insurance records, including but not limited to reports, correspondence and memoranda regarding [Plaintiff],” is so overbroad and all-encompassing it seeks private and documents which would not be related to any litigation.” According to Plaintiff, the subpoena is not limited in time or scope.
However, as Defendants observe, “the information requested [in the subpoena] is tailored to address the subject incident . . . .” (Opposition p. 5.) The subpoena specifies that it is seeking information about a June 29, 2022 incident involving Plaintiff (claim number 22123622769).
The Court has weighed the need for this limited discovery against Plaintiff’s privacy rights and concludes that the subpoena is not overbroad and does not violate Plaintiff’s privacy rights.
4. Notice under Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (g)
Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s counsel ultimately received notice of the subpoena and met and conferred about the subpoena with Defendants’ counsel.
Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants’ service of the subpoena on Plaintiff’s counsel’s former address affected his ability to respond to the subpoena. On these facts, service of the subpoena on Plaintiff's counsel's former address did not invalidate the subpoena.
5. Insurance Code
Plaintiff asserts: “Insurance company files regarding an insured or a claimant are protected by the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act. (See California Insurance Code section 791.01 et seq.) Moreover, under California Insurance Code section 791.13, disclosure of any personal or privileged information gathered or received in connection with an insurance transaction is restricted.” Plaintiff does not elaborate on this argument.
Insurance Code section 791.13 provides:
“An insurance institution, agent, or insurance-support organization shall not disclose any personal or privileged information about an individual collected or received in connection with an insurance transaction unless the disclosure is:
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“(g) Otherwise permitted or required by law.
“(h) In response to a facially valid administrative or judicial order, including a search warrant or subpoena.”
(Ins. Code, § 791.13, subds. (g), (h).) Here, Defendants issued a facially valid subpoena, authorizing the disclosure.
The Court denies the motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Plaintiff Jose Dennis Callejas Reyes’s motion to quash the subpoena served by Defendants Milestone Haulers Inc. and Ivan Rodriguez on Infinity Insurance Company.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.