Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV23016, Date: 2024-10-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV23016 Hearing Date: October 30, 2024 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On July 18, 2022, Plaintiff Evelyn Garcia (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Qing Hua Dong (“Dong”) and Does 1-100 for motor vehicle tort.
On January 6, 2023, Dong filed an answer.
On February 15, 2023, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant Joseph Michael Gamgene as Doe 1 (“Gamgene”).
On June 22, 2023, the clerk entered Gamgene’s default. On January 2, 2024, the Court set aside Gamgene’s default based on the stipulation of Plaintiff and Gamgene. On December 27, 2023, Gamgene filed an answer.
On August 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to quash Dong’s deposition subpoena for production of records from GRS Funding. The motion was set for hearing on September 19, 2024. On September 6, 2024, Defendants Dong and Gamgene (“Defendants”) filed an opposition. On September 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to October 30, 2024.
Trial is currently scheduled for January 17, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Plaintiff asks the Court to quash the deposition subpoena for production of records which Dong served on GRS Funding (“GRS”).
Defendants ask the Court to deny the motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides:
"(a) If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.
"(b) The following persons may make a motion pursuant to subdivision (a): (1) A party. (2) A witness. (3) A consumer described in Section 1985.3. (4) An employee described in Section 1985.6. (5) A person whose personally identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1798.79.8 of the Civil Code, is sought in connection with an underlying action involving that person’s exercise of free speech rights."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (g), provides in part:
“(g) Any consumer whose personal records are sought by a subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action in which this subpoena duces tecum is served may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum. Notice of the bringing of that motion shall be given to the witness and deposition officer at least five days prior to production. The failure to provide notice to the deposition officer shall not invalidate the motion to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum but may be raised by the deposition officer as an affirmative defense in any action for liability for improper release of records.
* * *
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3, subd. (g).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a), provides:
“(a) Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)
For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)
When a party seeks discovery which impacts a person’s constitutional right to privacy, limited protections come into play. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.) The protections cover a person’s personal and financial matters. (Ibid.) The court must balance competing rights — the litigant’s right to discover relevant facts and the individual’s right to maintain reasonable privacy — in determining whether the information is discoverable. (Ibid.)
“ ‘[W]hile the filing of a lawsuit may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of associational privacy, the scope of such “waiver” must be narrowly rather than expansively construed, so that plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from instituting lawsuits by the fear of exposure of their private associational affiliations and activities.’ [Citation.] Therefore, . . . an implicit waiver of a party’s constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff’s claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842; see ibid. [“On occasion [a party's] privacy interests may have to give way to [the] opponent's right to a fair trial. Thus courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery”].)
“[A]lthough in seeking recovery for physical and mental injuries plaintiffs have unquestionably waived their physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges as to all information concerning the medical conditions which they have put in issue, past cases make clear that such waiver extends only to information relating to the medical conditions in question, and does not automatically open all of a plaintiff's past medical history to scrutiny.” (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 849 [trial court erred by placing “absolutely no limit on defendant's efforts to obtain wholesale disclosure of each plaintiff's lifetime medical history”].) “[P]laintiffs are ‘not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific [physical,] mental or emotional injury’; while they may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.” (Id. at p. 864, fn. omitted.)
“Even when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy. [Citation.] The scope of any disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed, drawn with narrow specificity, and must proceed by the least intrusive manner. [Citation.]” (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014.)
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
The complaint alleges that on January 13, 2020, on the 105 Freeway in El Segundo, County of Los Angeles, California, Defendants negligently operated a motor vehicle, injuring Plaintiff.
B. The subpoena for medical records
On July 24, 2024, Dong served a deposition subpoena asking GRS for the following:
“Complete billing records, pertaining to the neck, back, thoracic outlet; arms, legs, radiculopathy and headaches from 01/13/2010 to the present, including but not limited to any records/documents that may be stored digitally and/or electronically: charges, explanation of benefits, payments, adjustments, write-offs, balances due, and itemized billing charges pertaining to any and all care, treatment, and/or examinations. All billing emails between physicians and the patient, including secure messages.
“All documents relating to the contractual relationship between a third party purchaser of any medical liens or accounts receivable, including but not limited to factoring companies, and the facility this request is directed to, including all documents disclosing the purchase price of any medical liens or accounts receivable related to services rendered to the claimant listed below as a result of the accident of the incident date(s) listed below pertaining to the neck, back, thoracic outlet; arms, legs, radiculopathy and headaches from 01/13/2010 to the present.
“All documents regarding any compensation received and/or to be received by the facility this request is directed to for services rendered or to be rendered to the claimant listed below as a result of the accident of the incident date(s) listed below pertaining to the neck, back, thoracic outlet; arms, legs, radiculopathy and headaches from 01/13/2010 to the present.
“Claimant: Evelyn Garcia.”
C. Plaintiff’s motion to quash
Plaintiff asks the Court to quash the deposition subpoena, arguing it is overbroad, seeks information that is irrelevant to the case, and violates her privacy rights and the privacy rights of third parties.
D. Defendants’ opposition
Defendants argue the deposition subpoena appropriately seeks information about the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s claimed medical expenses, a potential issue at trial. According to Defendants, information about the purchase of Plaintiff’s medical liens is discoverable because it is relevant to determining the reasonable value of the medical services which Plaintiff received. Defendants also dispute Plaintiff’s contention that the subpoena violates her privacy rights.
E. Analysis
The Court has considered the parties’ arguments and weighed Plaintiff’s privacy rights against Defendant’s right to seek discoverable information. The Court concludes that the subpoena is overbroad to the extent that it requests responses “from 01/13/2010 to the present . . . .”
Defendants assert that they seek information only about the reasonableness of the medical expenses that Plaintiff incurred due to Defendants’ negligence. The Court therefore limits the time period covered by each request in the subpoena to the period from January 13, 2020 (the date of the accident) to the present. Defendants have not argued or shown that pre-accident billing records or other documents will provide discoverable information about the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s post-accident medical expenses.
In addition, the Court limits the deposition subpoena to include only documents and information involving Plaintiff's medical treatment for injuries resulting from the January 13, 2020 accident.
With these limitations, the Court finds that the subpoena does not violate Plaintiff’s privacy rights. Therefore, in all other respects, the Court denies the motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff Evelyn Garcia’s motion to quash the deposition subpoena which Defendant Qing Hua Dong issued to GRS Funding on July 24, 2024 as follows:
The Court limits the time period of each request in the deposition subpoena to the period from January 13, 2020 to the present.
The Court limits the deposition subpoena to include only documents and information involving Plaintiff's medical treatment for injuries resulting from the January 13, 2020 accident.
In all other respects, the Court DENIES the motion.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.