Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV24803, Date: 2024-10-31 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV24803 Hearing Date: October 31, 2024 Dept: 28
Having
considered the demurring papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On August 1, 2022, Plaintiffs Sloan Bella (“Sloan Bella”), John Bella, and Jason Bella (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed this action against Defendants Wheels In Motion, Inc. (“Wheels”), Gail Ward Chase (“Chase”), Kadee Installation, Inc. (“Kadee”), ASV Inventions, Inc. (“ASV”), and Does 1-50 for negligence, premises liability, and products liability.
On July 18, 2024, the Court dismissed ASV without prejudice at Sloan Bella’s request.
On August 7, 2024, Chase filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Wheels, ASV, and Roes 1-20 for indemnity and contribution.
On September 6, 2024, Kadee filed a demurrer. The demurrer was set for hearing on October 31, 2024. Plaintiffs did not file an opposition.
No trial date is currently scheduled.
PARTY’S REQUEST
Kadee
asks the Court to sustain the demurrer.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Demurrer
“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
* * *
“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible. . . .”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).)
In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading”].)
“For
the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer
admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate
facts alleged, but not conclusions, deductions, or conclusions of facts or
law).” (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal.
Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2024) ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25,
emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).)
“[A] demurrer should not be sustained where a plaintiff can cure a defective
complaint by amendment or where the pleading, liberally construed, can state a
cause of action.” (Jager v. County of
Alameda (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 294, 297.)
"A demurrer may be filed to one of several causes of action in the complaint, without answering the other causes of action." (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:34.1, p. 7(l)-19.)
“ ‘To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.’ ” (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:40, p. 7(l)-21, quoting C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
B. Premises liability and negligence
“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.)
“Landowners under California law are required to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition.” (Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 654, 663 (Williams), citing Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674.) “The underlying principle, set forth in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), is that “‘[e]veryone is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . .’” (Ibid.) This rule “‘establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.’” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1083 (Vasilenko); see Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 214.)
“A defendant's control over property is sufficient to create a duty to protect owed to persons using the property.” (Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 487, 497, citing Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1162, 1166; Soto v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 168, 177 (Soto) [“the rationale being that whoever has the means to control the property can take steps to prevent the harm”].) “Conversely, absent any control of the property, a defendant cannot be held liable for a dangerous condition on that property.” (Ibid., citing Cody F. v. Falletti (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1241 [“ ‘[t]he law does not impose responsibility where there is no duty because of the absence of a right to control’ ”]; Soto, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 177; Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1084 [generally, there is no right to control another's property].)
“ ‘ “ ‘Courts ... invoke[ ] the concept of duty to limit generally “the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act ....” ’ ” ’ ” (Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 663, quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) “Our Supreme Court has explained that an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714 must be “ ‘ “ ‘clearly supported by public policy.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) “Courts look to what are commonly called ‘the Rowland factors’ in determining whether policy considerations favor such an exception.” (Ibid., citing Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) “These are “ ‘ “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Rowland [v. Christian (1968)] 69 Cal.2d [108,] 113, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 [(Rowland)].)’ ” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.)
In considering the Rowland factors, the court “determine[s] ‘not whether they support an exception to the general duty of reasonable care on the facts of the particular case before us, but whether carving out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy.’ ” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 629.)
In addition, “[c]ausation is an essential element of plaintiff’s complaint.” (Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 126.) “Causation may be determined as a question of law if reasonable minds would not differ.” (Ibid.) “If causation is lacking, the complaint cannot stand.” (Ibid. [“the trial court’s ruling of lack of causation disposes of the entire complaint and suffices to affirm summary judgment in favor of defendant”].)
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiffs’
complaint
The
complaint alleges in part:
On July 29, 2020, while riding a motorcycle on De Soto Avenue in Chatsworth, California, Keith Bella (“Decedent”) lost control of the motorcycle and slammed into a mailbox on property located at 10538 De Soto Avenue, suffering traumatic and fatal injuries. The mailbox had been intentionally and improperly mounted on the property by the property’s owner, Chase, and/or Kadee. The mailbox was improperly installed because, instead of the mailbox easily breaking when Decedent’s motorcycle struck it, as it is supposed to do, the mailbox stood rigid and firm, causing Decedent’s death.
The complaint’s second cause of action asserts a claim for “Wrongful Death and Survival Action Sounding in Premises Liability” against Kadee.
B. Kadee’s demurrer
1. Failure to state a cause of action
Kadee asks the Court to sustain its demurrer because the complaint “fails to identify [Kadee’s] involvement and/or relation to the subject incident, let alone facts necessary to support a finding of liability against it.” (Demurrer p. 4.)
Fairly read, the complaint alleges that (1) Kadee improperly installed the mailbox on Chase’s property, causing it to remain rigid rather than breaking when Decedent’s motorcycle struck it, (2) because of the mailbox’s rigidity, Decedent suffered fatal injuries in the collision, and (3) Kadee owed a duty of care to Decedent.
Kadee argues that the complaint does not assert facts supporting the allegation that it owed Decedent a duty of care. The complaint alleges that Kadee owed a duty of care to “all reasonably foreseeable people, invitees and, guests including [Decedent] . . . . to own, keep safe, in a reasonable manner.” (Complaint ¶ 23.) “The sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pleaded state a valid cause of action—not whether they are true. Thus, no matter how unlikely or improbable, plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on a demurrer.” (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:44, pp. 7(l)-25 to 7(l)-26; see id., ¶ 7:45, p. 7(l)-26 [“The question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these unlikely allegations, or possible difficulties in making such proof, is of no concern in ruling on a demurrer”].)
Therefore, in ruling on Kadee’s demurrer, the Court
does not consider (1) whether Plaintiffs can prove it was reasonably
foreseeable that someone would ride a motorcycle into Chase’s mailbox, (2)
whether Plaintiffs can prove that Kadee negligently installed the mailbox, or (3)
whether Plaintiffs can prove that Kadee’s negligent installation of the mailbox
caused Decedent’s fatal injuries. The
Court considers only whether the complaint alleges these facts. The Court finds that, liberally construed, it
does.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the complaint,
liberally construed, alleges facts that state a claim against Kadee. (See Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:41, p.
7(l)-22 [“It is not necessary that the cause of action be the one intended by
plaintiff. The test is whether the
complaint states any valid claim entitling plaintiff to relief. Thus, plaintiff may be mistaken as to the
nature of the case, or the legal theory on which plaintiff can prevail. But if the essential facts of some valid
cause of action are alleged, the complaint is good against a general demurrer”
(original emphasis].)
2. Uncertainty
Kadee also asks the Court to sustain the demurrer because the complaint contains “vague and ambiguous allegations” that “fail to apprise [Kadee] of the legal and factual bases for Plaintiffs’ claim for premises liability,” rendering the complaint uncertain. (Demurrer p. 4.)
“A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her.” (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:85, p. 7(l)-44.)
Kadee argues the complaint is uncertain and ambiguous because (among other things) it alleges that Chase “and/or” Kadee “owned or possessed” the property where the accident took place (Complaint ¶ 25) while also alleging that the mailbox belonged to Chase (Complaint ¶ 24).
The
Court has reviewed the complaint and the demurrer and finds that, despite some areas which the parties can clarify through discovery, the complaint is
sufficiently clear to permit Kadee to submit a responsive pleading.
CONCLUSION
The Court OVERRULES Defendant Kadee Installation, Inc.’s demurrer to the second cause of action in the complaint filed by Plaintiffs Sloan Bella, John Bella, and Jason Bella. The Court ORDERS Defendant Kadee Installation, Inc. to file an answer within 10 days of the hearing on the demurrer. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).)
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file proof of service of this ruling within five days.