Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV26585, Date: 2025-01-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV26585    Hearing Date: January 3, 2025    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

A.   Case number 22STCV26585 

On August 16, 2022, Plaintiff Rosalio Cibrian, Jr. (“Cibrian”) filed an action against Defendants Saul Arevalo, Valos Towing and Does 1-25 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. (Case number 22STCV26585.) 

On October 21, 2022, Defendants Saul Arevalo (“Arevalo”) and Velos Towing, Inc. (erroneously sued and served as Valos Towing) (“Velos”) filed an answer. 

On November 3, 2023, Arevalo and Velos filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Dario Alvarenga (“Alvarenga”) and Roes 1-10 for indemnification, contribution, declaratory relief, and property damage.  On January 2, 2024, Alvarenga filed an answer to the cross-complaint. 

B.   Case number 22STCV27761 

On August 25, 2022, Alvarenga filed an action against Defendants Arevalo, Valos Towing, Does 1-10, the remaining employees and agents of Valos Towing, and Does 11-100 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. (Case number 22STCV27761.) 

On February 24, 2023, Arevalo and Velos filed an answer. 

C.   The Court relates and consolidates the cases 

On December 29, 2023, the Court found that case numbers 22STCV26585 and 22STCV27761 are related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a).  Case number 22STCV26585 became the lead case. The cases were assigned to Department 28 of the Spring Street Courthouse for all purposes. 

Also on December 29, 2023, the Court consolidated the cases for all purposes based on the parties’ stipulation. Case number 22STCV26585 remained the lead case. 

D.   Post-consolidation proceedings 

On July 3, 2024, the Court granted Alvarenga’s motion for a determination that the settlement between Cibrian and Alvarenga was made in good faith. The Court dismissed all pending and future claims against Alvarenga by the parties served with the motion (to the extent those claims arose from the facts giving rise to this case), including cross-complaints for equitable indemnity. 

Trial is currently set for April 3, 2025. 

E.   This motion 

On April 19, 2024, Arevalo and Velos (“Moving Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment of Alvarenga’s complaint.  The motion was set for hearing on January 3, 2025.  Alvarenga has not filed an opposition. 

PARTIES’ REQUESTS 

Moving Defendants ask the Court to grant summary judgment of Alvarenga's complaint. 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

          Moving Defendants refer to a request for judicial notice but no request for judicial notice is included in their moving papers.  “Any request for judicial notice must be made in a separate document listing the specific items for which notice is requested . . . .”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(l).)  Moving Defendants do not appear to have made their judicial notice request in a separate document.  The Court denies the request. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.   Summary judgment 

“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar)) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) 

When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.”  (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.) 

“ ‘ “[A] defendant moving for summary judgment based upon the assertion of an affirmative defense ... ‘has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense’ .... If the defendant does not meet this burden, the motion must be denied.” [Citations.]’ ” (Shiver v. Laramee (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 395, 400 (Shiver), quoting Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 467-468.) “ ‘[T]he burden shifts to the plaintiff to show there is one or more triable issues of material fact regarding the defense after the defendant meets the burden of establishing all the elements of the affirmative defense. [Citations.]’ ” (Ibid., quoting Jessen v. Mentor Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1484.) 

“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.”  (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.) 

In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) 

B.   Negligence

‘The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ ” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) 

DISCUSSION 

A.   The complaint 

Alvarenga’s complaint alleged that on August 29, 2020, at the intersection of Roscoe Boulevard and Louis [sic] Avenue in Los Angeles, Defendants negligently, carelessly, recklessly, unskillfully, unlawfully, tortiously, wantonly, and wrongfully entrusted, permitted, managed, serviced, repaired, inspected, maintained, operated, controlled and drove their vehicle, causing a collision between Plaintiff’s vehicle and Defendants’ vehicle and injuring Plaintiff. 

B.   Undisputed facts 

The incident occurred on August 29, 2020 at or near the intersection of Louise Avenue and Roscoe Boulevard.  At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was driving his vehicle northbound on Louise Avenue with the intention of turning left onto Roscoe Boulevard.  A tow truck was approaching southbound on Louise Avenue. 

The intersection of Roscoe Boulevard and Louise Avenue is controlled by a standard red, yellow green light.  There is no left turn arrow for Louise Avenue traffic wanting to turn left onto Roscoe Boulevard. 

When the light turned green, Plaintiff drove into the intersection and stopped. Plaintiff saw Arevalo’s tow truck approaching southbound.  Believing that Arevalo was going to turn right, Plaintiff proceeded with his left turn. Plaintiff believed Arevalo’s truck was approaching in a right turn only lane. The impact occurred in the intersection. 

C.   Moving Defendants have not carried their initial burden on summary judgment 

Moving Defendants argue the Court should grant summary judgment because Alvarenga “cannot establish any fact or produce any evidence that DEFENDANTS committed any act or omission which would support plaintiff's causes of action against DEFENDANTS.”  (Motion p. 3.)  Moving Defendants point to Alvarenga’s deposition testimony that he saw Arevalo’s tow truck approaching from the other direction with a green light while Alvarenga was preparing to make his left turn without the benefit of a left-turn arrow.  According to Moving Defendants, this evidence establishes as a matter of law that Alvarenga violated a Vehicle Code provision requiring left-turning vehicles to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic. 

While Moving Defendants’ evidence supports their defense, it does not negate the possibility that Alvarenga could present evidence supporting his claim that Arevalo was negligent and that Arevalo’s negligence caused or contributed to the accident.  Alvarenga is not required to present such evidence unless Moving Defendants carry their initial burden on summary judgment of showing that Alvarenga cannot present evidence supporting his claims.  Moving Defendants have not carried this burden. 

The Court denies the motion. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Saul Arevalo and Velos Towing, Inc. (erroneously sued and served as Valos Towing). 

Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.