Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV27565, Date: 2025-02-11 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV27565    Hearing Date: February 11, 2025    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

On August 23, 2022, Plaintiff Ellen Komm (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Trader Joe’s Company (“Defendant”) and Does 1-50 for general negligence and premises liability. 

On October 17, 2022, Defendant filed an answer. 

On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff and Defendant filed a stipulation to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action for willful failure to warn. 

On July 1, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.  The motion was set for hearing on October 29, 2024. The Court continued the hearing to December 13, 2024 based on the parties’ stipulation.  On November 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition.  On December 6, 2024, Defendant filed a reply.  The Court continued the hearing to February 11, 2025. 

Trial is scheduled for March 17, 2025. 

PARTIES’ REQUESTS 

Defendant asks the Court to grant summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion. 

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need only rule on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) 

PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS         

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are not material to the Court’s disposition of Defendant’s motion. 

DEFENDANT’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

Objections to Zaretsky Declaration: The objections are not material to the Court’s disposition of Defendant’s motion. 

Objections to Habbas Declaration: The objections are not material to the Court’s disposition of Defendant’s motion. 

Objections to Komm Declaration: The objections are not material to the Court’s disposition of Defendant’s motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.   Summary judgment 

“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) 

When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.”  (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.) 

“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.”  (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)  

In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) 

B.       Negligence and premises liability 

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.) 

“ ‘ “Generally, one owes a duty of ordinary care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others....” ' [Citation.]” (Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 411 (Salinas), quoting Padilla v. Rodas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 742, 747 (Padilla).) “ ‘Civil Code section 1714 sets forth the general duty of a property owner toward others: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” The application of this provision entails an inquiry as to “whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable [person] in view of the probability of injury to others....” [Citations.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 411-412, quoting Laico v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 649, 659 (Laico).) “A landowner ‘ “ ‘has an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and therefore must inspect them or take other proper means to ascertain their condition. And if, by the exercise of reasonable care, he would have discovered the dangerous condition, he is liable.’ ” ’ [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 412, quoting Portillo v. Aiassa (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1134.) 

“ ‘An exception to the statutory rule of liability for failure to use ordinary care in the management of one's property requires clear support in public policy.’ ” (Salinas, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 412, quoting Laico, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659–660.) “ ‘ “In the case of a landowner's liability for injuries to persons on the property, the determination of whether a duty exists, ‘involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid., quoting Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club of Chula Vista (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 419, 430.) “ ‘Foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily the crucial considerations, but in a given case one or more of the other [Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108] factors may be determinative of the duty analysis.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.) “The existence and scope of a defendant's duty is a question of law for the court's resolution.” (Ibid., citing Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 488; Padilla, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) 

DISCUSSION 

A.   The complaint 

The complaint alleges the following: 

 On September 15, 2020, Plaintiff was at the Trader Joe’s located at 23741 Calabasas Road, Calabasas, CA 91302 to get groceries.  Defendant owned the store.  Plaintiff was exiting the restroom when she slipped and fell on water outside the restroom, sustaining injuries. Plaintiff did not see the water beforehand and no warning signs indicated the water was there. 

Defendants were negligent because they failed to uphold their duty to maintain and manage their premises to prevent any foreseeable risks of harm and/or danger to any of their patron/invitees on the premises.  Plaintiff was a business invitee and was injured as a result of Defendants' negligence and the negligence of their employees. 

Defendants controlled the area of the premises and should have known that other people would be walking within or around the bathroom area where Plaintiff fell.  Defendants should have foreseen that water on the floor near the restroom, a high foot traffic area, would pose a substantial risk of injury and a tripping hazard. Defendants further took no steps to prevent the condition of the water on the floor despite having sufficient time to do so and/or gave no warnings of the condition of the water despite having actual and/or constructive notice of the condition that they reasonably should have discovered upon reasonable inspection. 

Defendants negligently supervised, hired and retained their employees.  Defendants are required to supervise and train their employees to prevent a dangerous condition from existing on its property. An employee improperly trained and supervised was a serious risk of injury to Plaintiff and other guests visiting the property. If Defendants had properly supervised, hired and trained their employees, they would have instructed their employees to prevent and/or provide warning of the condition. 

B.   Undisputed facts 

Plaintiff had been to the Trader Joe’s grocery store prior to the incident and would go there whenever she needed groceries.   

On the day of the incident, Plaintiff came by herself to the Trader Joe’s grocery store at approximately 9:00 or 9:15 a.m.  On entering the store, Plaintiff grabbed a shopping cart and started looking for the restroom located in the back of the store.  Plaintiff does not recall placing any items in her cart. 

The incident occurred in the bathroom hallway area of the Trader Joe’s grocery store, which was located at the rear of the store.  Plaintiff used the second of two restrooms located on the left side of the hallway which were available to customers and employees at the store. 

Plaintiff left her shopping cart on the sales floor because there was no way to get a cart into the restroom.  Plaintiff was in the restroom for a little while.  She then opened the door to come out, slipped, and fell on water in the hallway while exiting.  Plaintiff did not see water on the floor of the bathroom hallway before the incident.   No one aside from Plaintiff witnessed the incident. 

Phillip Gotto (“Gotto”) was the Captain of the Trader Joe’s grocery store.  Gotto was responsible running the store, training and supervising the employees, supervising the “leaders,” and customer service.  The store had twelve leaders, including a customer service team leader, a product team leader, a helms person, and/or a team leader for opening or closing the store.  The helms person was responsible for inspecting the store for hazards and for “look[ing] out and see[ing] what was necessary for customer service and safety.”  (UMF 20.) 

All store employees were responsible for being constantly aware of the condition of the floor at the store, such as any spills or debris on the floor. With respect to training employees regarding how to inspect the floor at the store, the leaders would walk with employees from the front door and walk through the store and identify any areas of particular concern and objects of particular concern, including ladders and boxes, and areas where there might be standing water and areas (like the produce tables) where debris had accumulated. These walks with newly hired employees included the area near the bathrooms where the incident occurred. 

Before the incident, Gotto was unaware of any malfunction or defect involving the water fountain. 

The store had approximately ten “Wet Floor” signs which were strategically stored throughout the store. The store’s employees were trained on how to take care of a wet spot on the floor, which included standing by the wet area until another employee came by, getting equipment (a vacuum machine) or paper towels to mop up the wet area, leaving a person to guard the wet spot until it was taken care of, and leaving a “Wet Floor” sign on the floor if there was any lingering moisture while cleaning it up with a mop.  The store did not wax its floors. 

The automatic or mechanical scrubber (vacuum machine) did not fit down the hallway of the bathrooms so the floors there were only dry dust mopped and not wet mopped. 

C.   Defendant has not carried its initial summary judgment burden 

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant created the dangerous condition (the water on the floor) and cannot show that Defendant knew or should have known about the dangerous condition before Plaintiff fell.  Defendant contends that “Plaintiff has absolutely no facts or admissible evidence as to who created the dangerous condition or how long this condition existed before the Subject Incident.”  (Points and Authorities p. 19.) 

In Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200 (Ortega), the Supreme Court held that when the plaintiff has no evidence of the source of the dangerous condition or the length of time it existed, the plaintiff may rely solely on the owner’s failure to inspect the premises within a reasonable period of time in order to establish an inference that the defective condition existed long enough for a reasonable person exercising ordinary care to have discovered and remedied it.  “ ‘The requirement of actual or constructive knowledge is merely a means of applying the general rule . . . that the proprietor may be liable if he knew or by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the dangerous condition . . . .’ ” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1203, quoting Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 447.)  But “if a store owner has taken care in the discharge of its duty, by inspecting its premises in a reasonable manner, then no breach will be found even if a plaintiff does suffer injury.”  (Id. at p. 1211.) 

Here, Defendant has presented evidence that it requires store employees to inspect the store’s floor and address any hazards.  In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant does not schedule regular inspections or maintain records documenting when its employees conduct their inspections.  As a result, Plaintiff asserts, Defendant cannot show when it last inspected the premises before Plaintiff’s fall, raising an inference that the defective condition existed long enough for a reasonable person exercising ordinary care to have discovered and remedied it.  (See Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1203.) 

Defendant, on the other hand, argues that Plaintiff’s testimony that she did not observe water on the floor before she fell supports “a reasonable inference that the water on the floor only existed for a short period of time [i.e., the time it took Plaintiff to enter the restroom and the time it took for her to exit the restroom] . . . .”  (Reply p. 3.)  Based on this inference, Defendant concludes that “there was legally insufficient time in which [Defendant] could have discovered and cleaned up the water on the floor before Plaintiff exited the restroom, which again was only for a short amount of time.”  (Reply p. 3.) 

On a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the Court does not draw inferences from the evidence in favor of the moving party.  Instead, the Court views the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.  (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)  Therefore, the Court will not infer that the water was on the floor for only a short period of time, particularly when Defendant admits that “it is unknown as to how long the water existed on the floor prior to the Subject Incident . . . .”  (Reply p. 3; see Reply p. 5 [“there is no admissible evidence as to how long the subject dangerous condition existed on the floor in the restroom area”].) 

For the same reason, Defendant is incorrect in asserting that “[r]easonable inferences and common sense establish that [Defendant] had a reasonable inspection program at the time of the Subject Incident notwithstanding the lack of documentary evidence.”  (Reply p. 5.)  The moving party must carry its initial burden on summary judgment or summary adjudication with evidence, not inferences. 

Because Defendant has not carried its initial burden on summary judgment or summary adjudication, the Court denies the motion. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court DENIES Defendant Trader Joe’s Company’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.