Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV28808, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV28808 Hearing Date: November 7, 2024 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On September 6, 2022, Plaintiff Danielle Penberthy (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Jason Jean Karlo Lara Garcia (“Garcia”), Postmates LLC, and Does 1-100 for negligence, negligence entrustment, and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.
On November 4, 2022, Defendant Portier, LLC, erroneously sued as Postmates LLC (“Portier”), filed an answer. On November 23, 2022, the Court dismissed Portier without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request.
On December 2, 2022, Defendant Blue Hill Specialty Insurance Company (“Intervenor”) filed an answer-in-intervention to protect the interests of its insured, Garcia. On May 13, 2024, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation to withdraw Intervenor’s answer-in-intervention.
On April 4, 2024, Garcia filed an answer.
On September 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to quash Garcia’s deposition subpoena issued to Women’s Care of Beverly Hills and for sanctions. The motion was set for hearing on November 7, 2024. On October 25, 2024, Garcia filed an opposition and request for sanctions. On October 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply.
Trial is currently set for February 5, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Plaintiff asks the Court to quash the deposition subpoena for production of records which Garcia served on Women’s Care of Beverly Hills (“Women’s Care”) and to impose sanctions on Garcia’s counsel.
Garcia asks the Court to deny the motion and to impose sanctions on Plaintiff.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides:
"(a) If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.
"(b) The following persons may make a motion pursuant to subdivision (a): (1) A party. (2) A witness. (3) A consumer described in Section 1985.3. (4) An employee described in Section 1985.6. (5) A person whose personally identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1798.79.8 of the Civil Code, is sought in connection with an underlying action involving that person’s exercise of free speech rights."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (g), provides in part:
“(g) Any consumer whose personal records are sought by a subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action in which this subpoena duces tecum is served may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum. Notice of the bringing of that motion shall be given to the witness and deposition officer at least five days prior to production. The failure to provide notice to the deposition officer shall not invalidate the motion to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum but may be raised by the deposition officer as an affirmative defense in any action for liability for improper release of records.
* * *
“No witness or deposition officer shall be required to produce personal records after receipt of notice that the motion has been brought by a consumer . . . except upon order of the court in which the action is pending or by agreement of the parties, witnesses, and consumers affected. . . .”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3, subd. (g).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a), provides:
“Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)
For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)
When a party seeks discovery which impacts a person’s constitutional right to privacy, limited protections come into play. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.) The protections cover a person’s personal and financial matters. (Ibid.) The court must balance competing rights — the litigant’s right to discover relevant facts and the individual’s right to maintain reasonable privacy — in determining whether the information is discoverable. (Ibid.)
“ ‘[W]hile the filing of a lawsuit may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of associational privacy, the scope of such “waiver” must be narrowly rather than expansively construed, so that plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from instituting lawsuits by the fear of exposure of their private associational affiliations and activities.’ [Citation.] Therefore, . . . an implicit waiver of a party’s constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff’s claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842; see ibid. [“On occasion [a party's] privacy interests may have to give way to [the] opponent's right to a fair trial. Thus courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery”].)
“[A]lthough in seeking recovery for physical and mental injuries plaintiffs have unquestionably waived their physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges as to all information concerning the medical conditions which they have put in issue, past cases make clear that such waiver extends only to information relating to the medical conditions in question, and does not automatically open all of a plaintiff's past medical history to scrutiny.” (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 849 [trial court erred by placing “absolutely no limit on defendant's efforts to obtain wholesale disclosure of each plaintiff's lifetime medical history”].) “[P]laintiffs are ‘not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific [physical,] mental or emotional injury’; while they may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.” (Id. at p. 864, fn. omitted.)
“Even when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy. [Citation.] The scope of any disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed, drawn with narrow specificity, and must proceed by the least intrusive manner. [Citation.]” (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014.)
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
The complaint alleges that on May 12, 2022, on Beverly Boulevard near San Vicente Boulevard in Los Angeles, Garcia negligently drove his automobile into the right side of Plaintiff’s motorcycle, injuring Plaintiff.
B. The subpoena for medical records
On August 16, 2024, Garcia served a deposition subpoena asking Women’s Care for the following:
“Any and all documents and medical records, and all writings, including, but not limited to, all office, emergency room, inpatient, outpatient, and hospital charts and records; any and all radiology materials and films, X-rays, MRI’s, and CT scans (a complete list of [sic] breakdown from your film library must be provided prior to production of requested films); any and all billing charges and insurance records, billing records, explanation of benefits (EOBs), billing off-sets, write-offs, records of payment, amounts paid, and amounts adjusted, including any and all electronically stored documents and files, pertaining to the care, treatment, and examination of [Plaintiff].” (Exh. A.)
C. Plaintiff’s motion to quash
Plaintiff asks the Court to quash the deposition subpoena, arguing it seeks obstetric and gynecological records that are irrelevant to the case, violating her privacy rights. According to Plaintiff, Women’s Care has provided obstetric and gynecological care since 2022 but has not treated Plaintiff for the injuries to her neck, back, and head (traumatic brain injury and spinal injuries) resulting from the accident. However, Plaintiff admits that she discussed her post-accident physical pain with her Women’s Care obstetrician, Dr. Labrant.
D. Garcia’s opposition
Garcia asserts that he issued a subpoena to Women’s Care based on Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that, during her pregnancy, she discussed her physical complaints of pain with Dr. Labrant, who recommended acupuncture. Plaintiff also testified that she suffered pain during her pregnancy due to the accident and, as a result, Plaintiff “continued pain management throughout the entire pregnancy with more visits [to the acupuncturist].” (Opposition p. 3.)
In response to Plaintiff’s objection, Garcia has offered to limit the subpoena to exclude any pre-accident records or records after Plaintiff gave birth, but Plaintiff rejected the offer.
E. Analysis
The Court has considered the parties’ arguments and weighed Plaintiff’s privacy rights against Garcia’s right to seek discoverable information. The Court concludes that the subpoena is overbroad to the extent that it is not limited in time or in subject matter.
Garcia seeks information about the pain Plaintiff experienced (1) due to the accident and (2) before the birth of her child. The Court therefore limits the time period covered by the subpoena to the period from May 12, 2022 (the date of the accident) to the date Plaintiff gave birth to her child. In addition, the Court limits the subpoena to include only documents and records involving Plaintiff's complaints of pain in her neck, back, and head, any treatment recommended or provided for that pain, and any resulting billing information.
With these limitations, the Court finds that the subpoena does not violate Plaintiff’s privacy rights. Therefore, in all other respects, the Court denies the motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff Danielle Penberthy’s motion to quash the deposition subpoena which Defendant Jason Jean Karlo Lara Garcia issued to Women’s Care of Beverly Hills on August 16, 2024.
The Court limits the time period covered by the subpoena to the period from May 12, 2022 (the date of the accident) to the date Plaintiff Danielle Penberthy gave birth to her child. In addition, the Court limits the subpoena to include only documents and records involving Plaintiff Danielle Penberthy's complaints of pain in her neck, back, and head, any treatment recommended or provided for that pain, and any resulting billing information.
In all other respects, the Court DENIES the motion.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.