Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV29123, Date: 2025-01-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV29123 Hearing Date: January 13, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, reply, and joinder papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On September 7, 2022, Plaintiff Vita Carter (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Space Exploration Technologies Corp., Ryan Christopher Lillejohn, and Does 1-100 for negligence and negligence per se.
On October 10, 2022, Defendant Space Exploration Technologies Corp. dba SpaceX (“SpaceX”) filed an answer.
On January 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against Defendants SpaceX, Ryan Christopher Littlejohn (“Littlejohn”), and Does 1-100 for negligence and negligence per se.
On June 28, 2023, SpaceX filed an answer to the first amended complaint.
On September 19, 2023, Littlejohn filed an answer. On October 18, 2023, Littlejohn filed an answer to the first amended complaint.
On February 28, 2024, SpaceX filed an amended answer.
On March 20, 2024, SpaceX filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, along with a separate statement and supporting papers. The motion was set for hearing on September 20, 2024. On August 30, 2024, Littlejohn filed a joinder to SpaceX’s motion along with a separate statement. On October 30, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiff’s ex parte application to continue the hearing under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h). On November 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to SpaceX’s and Littlejohn’s motions. On November 21, 2024, SpaceX and Littlejohn filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to January 13, 2025.
Trial is scheduled for May 12, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
SpaceX asks the Court to grant summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Littlejohn asks to join SpaceX's motion.
Plaintiff asks the Court to deny SpaceX's motion.
SPACEX’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Granted.
PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Granted.
SPACEX’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Sustained: I.1, I.2
Overruled: II.1, II.2
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary judgment and summary adjudication
“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p. 855, emphasis omitted.)
“When a complaint affirmatively alleges facts indicating coverage by Workers’ Compensation laws but fails to state additional facts negating the application of the exclusive remedy rule, no civil action will lie and the complaint is subject to a general demurrer . . . . This pleading requirement is jurisdictionally-based; if the complaint indicates that the action is within the scope of the Workers’ Compensation law, the superior court has no jurisdiction over it unless additional allegations indicate that an exception to the exclusive remedy rule applies.” (Hughes v. Western MacArthur Co. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 951, 957.)
C. Special employment relationship
“ ‘Although the terms of a contract may specify that a special employer retains the right to control the details of an individual’s work or purports to establish an employment relationship, “the terminology used in an agreement is not conclusive ... even in the absence of fraud or mistake.” ’ ” (Kowalski v. Shell Oil Co. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 168, 176 (Kowalski).) “ ‘The contract cannot affect the true relationship of the parties to it. Nor can it place an employee in a different position from that which he actually held.’ ” (Ibid.)
“Since a contract is not conclusive evidence of the existence of the right to control, the courts have looked to a number of factors as evidentiary indicia of the existence of a special employment relationship." (Kowalski, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 176.) “ ‘The paramount consideration appears to be whether the alleged special employer exercises control over the details of [an employee’s] work. Such control strongly supports the inference that a special employment exists.’ ” (Ibid.) “However, ‘[t]he fact that instructions are given as to the result to be achieved does not require the conclusion that a special employment relationship exists.’ ” (Id. at p. 177.)
“Evidence that the alleged special employer has the power to discharge a worker “is strong evidence of the existence of a special employment relationship.” (Kowalski, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 177, fn. omitted.) “The payment of wages is not, however, determinative.” (Ibid.) Other factors to be taken into consideration are “ ‘the nature of the services, whether skilled or unskilled, whether the work is part of the employer’s regular business, the duration of the employment period, ... and who supplies the work tools.’ ” (Ibid.) “Evidence that (1) the employee provides unskilled labor, (2) the work he performs is part of the employer’s regular business, (3) the employment period is lengthy, and (4) the employer provides the tools and equipment used, tends to indicate the existence of special employment. Conversely, evidence to the contrary negates existence of a special employment relationship.” (Ibid.)
“In addition, consideration must be given to whether the worker consented to the employment relationship, either expressly or impliedly, and to whether the parties believed they were creating the employer-employee relationship.” (Kowalski, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 178, fn. omitted.)
D. Labor Code sections 3706 and 3708
Labor Code section 3602 provides in part:
“(a) Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover compensation is, except as specifically provided in this section and Sections 3706 and 4558, the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer. The fact that either the employee or the employer also occupied another or dual capacity prior to, or at the time of, the employee’s industrial injury shall not permit the employee or his or her dependents to bring an action at law for damages against the employer.
* * *
(Lab. Code, § 3602, subds. (a), (d)(1).)
Insurance Code section 11730, subdivision (c), provides:
“ ‘Experience rating’ means a rating procedure utilizing past insurance experience of the individual policyholder to forecast future losses by measuring the policyholder’s loss experience against the loss experience of policyholders in the same classification to produce a prospective premium credit, debit, or unity modification.”
(Ins. Code, § 11730, subd. (c).)
Labor Code section 3706 provides:
“If any employer fails to secure the payment of compensation, any injured employee or his dependents may bring an action at law against such employer for damages, as if this division did not apply.”
(Lab. Code, § 3706.)
Labor Code section 3708 provides:
“In such action it is presumed that the injury to the employee was a direct result and grew out of the negligence of the employer, and the burden of proof is upon the employer, to rebut the presumption of negligence. It is not a defense to the employer that the employee was guilty of contributory negligence, or assumed the risk of the hazard complained of, or that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant. No contract or regulation shall restore to the employer any of the foregoing defenses.
“This section shall not apply to any employer of an employee, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 3351, with respect to such employee, but shall apply to employers of employees described in subdivision (b) of Section 3715, with respect to such employees.”
(Lab. Code, § 3708.)
DISCUSSION
A. The first amended complaint
The first amended complaint alleges that on September 29, 2020, Littlejohn – while in the course of his employment with SpaceX – attempted to make an unsafe U-turn and collided into the front of Plaintiff’s vehicle, injuring Plaintiff and damaging her vehicle.
B. Undisputed facts
Plaintiff’s verified responses to written discovery state that, at the time of the accident, Plaintiff was acting as an agent/employee for Parking Company of America aka PCAM, LLC (“PCA”), as a driver.
Under a written agreement between SpaceX and PCA in effect on September 20, 2020 (the day of the accident), PCA provided shuttling services for SpaceX and its employees. The agreement specified that PCA was to maintain workers’ compensation insurance for the borrowed shuttle drivers.
Plaintiff had picked up a passenger (a SpaceX employee on the SpaceX campus) in front of 1 Rocket Road. Plaintiff was to drop off the passenger at the passenger’s work station located on Lot 27 on the SpaceX campus.
Plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim against PCA and received workers’ compensation benefits from PCA’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, Gallagher Bassett, from approximately December 2020 through August 2022.
C. Joinder
The Court grants Littlejohn’s unopposed request to join SpaceX’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
D. SpaceX has carried its initial burden on summary judgment
SpaceX contends that Plaintiff was its employee for workers’ compensation purposes under the Transportation Agreement between PCA and SpaceX. As a result, SpaceX argues, Plaintiff’s sole remedy is workers’ compensation benefits and SpaceX is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims.
To support this contention, SpaceX points to evidence that Plaintiff was its “special employee”: (1) The Transportation Agreement requires that PCA drivers drive SpaceX-provided vehicles, on SpaceX’s campus, carrying SpaceX employees as passengers, on the routes laid out by SpaceX, (2) Plaintiff was performing her work using SpaceX’s vehicle at SpaceX’s worksite, (3) the Transportation Agreement shows that there was an agreement, understanding, or meeting of the minds between the original and special employer, (4) SpaceX provided Plaintiff’s tools (the vehicle, fuel, vehicle maintenance), the worksite, cargo, and routes, and (5) SpaceX was obligated to pay Plaintiff her normal hourly rate, along with 150% of her normal hourly rate for overtime work or for special events on short notice.
In addition, SpaceX has presented evidence that it satisfied its statutory obligation to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for Plaintiff. The Transportation Agreement provided that PCA would maintain workers’ compensation insurance for the borrowed PCA employees and Plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits from PCA’s workers’ compensation insurer.
SpaceX has carried its initial burden on summary judgment of showing that Plaintiff’s sole remedy was workers’ compensation benefits. The burden shifts to Plaintiff.
E. Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact
Plaintiff argues that SpaceX may not invoke the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule because it “deliberately circumvented workers’ compensation coverage for Plaintiff by exclusively employing PCA’s employees to undertake tasks at its facility.” (Opposition p. 1.) According to Plaintiff, SpaceX thereby avoided the need to pay increased workers’ compensation benefits, creating a presumption that it was negligent under Labor Code section 3708.
The argument lacks merit. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that SpaceX entered into the Transportation Agreement with PCA “for the purpose of avoiding [SpaceX’s] appropriate experience rating as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 11730 of the Insurance Code.” (See Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (d)(1).) Therefore, Labor Code section 3708 does not apply.
Plaintiff also argues that SpaceX cannot prevail on summary judgment because it failed to produce the workers’ compensation policy covering PCA employees. (Opposition p. 2.) It is undisputed, however, that Plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits from PCA’s workers’ compensation carrier. Therefore, SpaceX was not required to produce PCA’s policy.
Last, Plaintiff argues that she was not SpaceX's special employee. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she did not interview with SpaceX before she was transferred to its campus, her paychecks and W-2 form came from PCA, and she thought PCA employed her. In addition, in a November 2024 declaration, Plaintiff stated:
· Plaintiff wore a shirt with a PCA logo until she realized that uniforms were not mandatory
· Plaintiff was required to contact PCA if she needed to call in sick or request time off
· Plaintiff never received any training from SpaceX during her employment
· Plaintiff’s PCA supervisors were solely responsible for evaluating and reprimanding her work performance
· Plaintiff was not required to punch in my time or clock out when arriving to perform shuttle services at SpaceX’s premises.
The Court grants SpaceX’s motion for summary judgment, in which Littlejohn joins.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendant Ryan Christopher Lillejohn’s request for joinder in Defendant Space Exploration Technologies Corp.’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
The Court GRANTS Defendant Space Exploration Technologies Corp.’s motion for summary judgment, in which Defendant Ryan Christopher Lillejohn has joined.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.