Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV31770, Date: 2025-01-31 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV31770 Hearing Date: January 31, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On September 28, 2022, Plaintiffs Carmen Vasquez (“Vasquez”), Willie Atkins, Sr. (“Atkins”), and Carmen Vasquez and Willie Atkins, Sr. as successors in interest to Decedent William Atkins, Jr. (“Decedent”) filed this action against Defendants Jose Hernandez (“Hernandez”), H-H & S Enterprises (“H-H & S”), Sunset-Cherokee Plaza, 7-Eleven, Inc. (“7-Eleven”), and Dos 1-100 for intentional tort—assault and battery, negligence, and violation of the Ralph Act.
On November 3, 2022, 7-Eleven filed an answer. On December 5, 2022, H-H & S filed an answer. On December 6, 2022, Defendant Sunset-Cherokee Plaza, L.P. (erroneously sued as Sunset-Cherokee Plaza, a California Limited Partnership) (“Sunset”) filed an answer.
On September 14 and 26, 2023, the Court dismissed 7-Eleven, H-H & S, and Hernandez with prejudice at Plaintiffs’ request.
On September 29, 2023, the Court found that the settlement between Plaintiffs, 7-Eleven, and H-H & S was made in good faith.
On January 9, 2024, Sunset filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Hernandez and Roes 1-100 for comparative indemnity, equitable indemnity, contribution, and implied indemnity. On March 13, 2024, Hernandez filed an answer to the cross-complaint.
On December 5, 2023, Sunset filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was set for hearing on January 24, 2025. On January 3, 2025, Atkins filed opposition papers. On January 3 and 7, 2025, Vasquez filed opposition papers. On January 13, 2025, Sunset filed reply papers. The Court continued the hearing to January 31, 2025.
Trial is scheduled for March 26, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Sunset asks the Court to grant summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ complaint.
Atkins and Vasquez ask the Court to deny the motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary judgment
“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar)) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.)
“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.” (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)
In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)
B. Negligence
“The elements of a negligence claim [are] . . .: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.)
“ ‘ “Generally, one owes a duty of ordinary care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others....” ' [Citation.]” (Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 411 (Salinas), quoting Padilla v. Rodas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 742, 747 (Padilla).) “ ‘Civil Code section 1714 sets forth the general duty of a property owner toward others: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” The application of this provision entails an inquiry as to “whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable [person] in view of the probability of injury to others....” [Citations.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 411-412, quoting Laico v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 649, 659 (Laico).) “A landowner ‘ “ ‘has an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and therefore must inspect them or take other proper means to ascertain their condition. And if, by the exercise of reasonable care, he would have discovered the dangerous condition, he is liable.’ ” ’ [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 412, quoting Portillo v. Aiassa (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1134.)
“ ‘An exception to the statutory rule of liability for failure to use ordinary care in the management of one's property requires clear support in public policy.’ ” (Salinas, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 412, quoting Laico, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659–660.) “ ‘ “In the case of a landowner's liability for injuries to persons on the property, the determination of whether a duty exists, ‘involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid., quoting Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club of Chula Vista (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 419, 430.) “ ‘Foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily the crucial considerations, but in a given case one or more of the other Rowland factors may be determinative of the duty analysis.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.) “The existence and scope of a defendant's duty is a question of law for the court's resolution.” (Ibid., citing Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 488; see Padilla, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)
C. Landlord’s duty of care
“[W]here a landlord has relinquished control of property to a tenant, a ‘bright line’ rule has developed to moderate the landlord's duty of care owed to a third party injured on the property as compared with the tenant who enjoys possession and control.” (Salinas, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) “ ‘ “Because a landlord has relinquished possessory interest in the land, his or her duty of care to third parties injured on the land is attenuated as compared with the tenant who enjoys possession and control. Thus, before liability may be thrust on a landlord for a third party's injury due to a dangerous condition on the land, the plaintiff must show that the landlord had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition in question, plus the right and ability to cure the condition.” [¶] Limiting a landlord's obligations releases it from needing to engage in potentially intrusive oversight of the property, thus permitting the tenant to enjoy its tenancy unmolested.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Stone v. Center Trust Retail Properties, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 608, 612.)
“To this general rule of nonliability, the law has developed a number of exceptions, such as where the landlord covenants or volunteers to repair a defective condition on the premises [citations], where the landlord has actual knowledge of defects which are unknown and not apparent to the tenant and he fails to disclose them to the tenant [citation], where there is a nuisance existing on the property at the time the lease is made or renewed [citation], when a safety law has been violated [citation], or where the injury occurs on a part of the premises over which the landlord retains control, such as common hallways, stairs, elevators or roof [citation].” (Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 511.) “A common element in these exceptions is that either at or after the time possession is given to the tenant the landlord retains or acquires a recognizable degree of control over the dangerous condition with a concomitant right and power to obviate the condition and prevent the injury. In these situations, the law imposes on the landlord a duty to use ordinary care to eliminate the condition with resulting liability for injuries caused by his failure so to act. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
SUNSET’S REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Initial request: Granted.
Subsequent request: Denied. The Court considers applicable legal authority without the need to take judicial notice.
OBJECTIONS
“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need only rule on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)
A. Atkins’s objections to Sunset’s separate statement
Overruled. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c authorizes objections to evidence, not to material facts. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c) [“the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deductible from the evidence”].)
B. Vasquez’s evidentiary objections
Overruled.
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
The complaint includes the following allegations:
Sunset owned the property located at 6660 West Sunset Blvd., Los Angeles, California (“premises”).
On March 1, 2022, Hernandez was a manager and employee of a 7-Eleven store on the premises. While acting in the course and scope of his employment, Hernandez initiated a physical confrontation with Decedent, attempted to prevent Decedent from leaving the store, pursued Decedent as he attempted to flee, and stabbed Decedent with a boxcutter in the parking lot. Decedent was taken to the hospital, where he died.
Defendants owned, operated, controlled, managed, designed, planned, engineered, maintained, inspected or were otherwise involved with the day-to-day operations at the premises. On March 1, 2022, Defendants and/or their employees, staff, agents or contractors, acting within the course and scope of their duties and/or employment, failed to act in a reasonable manner in the area of the incident, were negligent in their conduct in the area of the incident, and/or owed a duty to Decedent.
The complaint asserts a negligence claim against Sunset.
B. Sunset has carried its initial burden on summary judgment
It is undisputed that Sunset owned the premises and 7-Eleven leased the premises from Sunset.
Sunset argues it did not know about any dangerous conditions on the premises, citing the declaration of Serge Sinanian. Sinanian, general counsel of Sunset’s management company, states that Sunset “had no knowledge of a dangerous condition on the Premises,” “was not made aware of any alleged problems with theft/robbery on the Premises,” and “had no reason to know of such alleged dangerous conditions.” (Sinanian dec. ¶ 5.) Sinanian also asserts that Sunset “did not actually know or have reason to know of any risk of the type of harm that is alleged to have occurred here . . . .” (Sinanian dec. ¶ 5.)
In addition, Sunset argues that it had no contractual obligation to protect patrons on the premises. Sunset again cites Sinanian’s declaration, which asserts that the lease between Sunset and 7-Eleven did not obligate Sunset to maintain safety or security at the premises. (Sinanian dec. ¶ 4.)
Sunset has carried its initial burden on summary judgment of presenting evidence that Sunset relinquished possessory control over the premises to a tenant and no exception to the general rule of landlord “nonliability” applies.
C. Plaintiffs have raised a triable issue of fact
Plaintiffs have presented evidence that, before March 1, 2022, Sunset provided security guards during regular business hours for the shopping plaza in which the premises were located. (Atkins’ exh. 2, p. 132.) Hernandez testified that the security guard stated he would help inside the store if needed. (Atkins’ exh. 2, p. 132.) This evidence raises a triable issue of fact concerning Sunset’s retention of control over the premises, potentially allowing a trier of fact to conclude that Sunset is not entitled to rely on the general rule of landlord nonliability.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Defendant Sunset-Cherokee Plaza, L.P.’s motion for summary judgment.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.