Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV31780, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV31780 Hearing Date: January 30, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the documents submitted in support of a default judgment, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On September 28, 2022, Plaintiff Donte Harp (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Jacob McDermont (“McDermont”), Conrad Cyrus Brown, Jr. (“Brown”), and Does 1-20 for motor vehicle tort.
On March 7, 2023, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant Universal Custom Auto Body, LLC as Doe 1 (“Universal”).
On January 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of personal service of the summons, complaint, statement of damages, and other documents on Brown on April 7, 2023. Plaintiff also filed a statement of damages sought against Brown listing $30,000.00 for pain, suffering, and inconvenience, $30,000.00 for emotional distress, $16,926.77 for past medical expenses, and $10,000.00 in property damages. The same day, the clerk entered Brown’s default.
On January 29 and May 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of personal service of the summons, complaint, statement of damages, and other documents on Universal on April 7, 2023. On January 29, 2024, Plaintiff also filed a statement of damages sought against Universal listing $30,000.00 for pain, suffering, and inconvenience, $30,000.00 for emotional distress, $16,926.77 for past medical expenses, and $10,000.00 in property damages. On May 3, 2024, the clerk entered Universal’s default.
On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of personal service of the summons, complaint, statement of damages, and other documents on McDermont on April 7, 2023. Plaintiff also filed a statement of damages sought against McDermont listing $30,000.00 for pain, suffering, and inconvenience, $30,000.00 for emotional distress, $16,926.77 for past medical expenses, and $10,000.00 in property damages. The same day, the clerk entered McDermont’s default.
On July 18, 2024, the Court dismissed Does 2-20 without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request.
On November 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed an application for default judgment against McDermont, Brown, and Universal. The application was set for hearing on January 30, 2025.
PARTY’S REQUESTS
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter default judgment against McDermont, Brown, and Universal for $58,117.46, consisting of $16,883.76 in special damages, $40,000.00 in general damages, and $1,233.70 in costs.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Default judgment
“[With exceptions that do not apply here,] [a] party seeking a default judgment on declarations must use mandatory Request for Entry of Default (Application to Enter Default) (form CIV-100) . . . The following must be included in the documents filed with the clerk:
“(1) Except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim;
“(2) Declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested;
“(3) Interest computations as necessary;
“(4) A memorandum of costs and disbursements;
“(5) A declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought;
“(6) A proposed form of judgment;
“(7) A dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment against specified parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment;
“(8) Exhibits as necessary; and
“(9) A request for attorney fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a).)
B. Damages
On a request for default judgment, “[w]here a cause of action is stated in the complaint, plaintiff merely needs to introduce evidence establishing a prima facie case for damages.” (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 5:213.1, p. 5-56, citing Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361 [trial court erred in applying preponderance of the evidence standard].)
The relief granted to a plaintiff upon entry of a defendant's default cannot exceed the amount demanded in the complaint or, for personal injury cases where damages may not be stated in the complaint, the amount listed in the statement of damages. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580, subd. (a), 585, subd. (b).) “The notice requirement of section 580 was designed to insure fundamental fairness.” (Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 494.) The statute insures that “defendants in cases which involve a default judgment have adequate notice of the judgments that may be taken against them. [Citation.] ‘If a judgment other than that which is demanded is taken against him, [the defendant] has been deprived of his day in court—a right to a hearing on the matter adjudicated.’ ’’ (Id. at p. 493.) A trial court exceeds its jurisdiction if it awards damages in excess of the amount specified in the complaint or statement of damages. (Id. at p. 494.)
The Court previously found that Plaintiff had provided evidence supporting his request for $16,883.76 in special damages. (August 9, 2024 minute order.) In addition, the Court stated: “Based on Plaintiff’s declaration describing his injuries, the attached medical records, and the special damages shown, the Court finds support for $40,000 in general damages.” (August 9, 2024 minute order.)
In paragraph 12 of the declaration supporting Plaintiff’s November 25, 2024 application for default judgment, Plaintiff requests $16,926.76 in special damages, even though declaration also lists $16,883.76 as the amount of special damages (and the CIV-100 form lists this amount). Plaintiff should clarify the amount of special damages he is requesting.
On October 17, 2024, the Court found that Plaintiff had provided evidence supporting his request for $750 in process server fees. (October 17, 2024 minute order.) The Court also stated:
“As a general rule, debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, are solely the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of the limited liability company to which the debts, obligations, or other liabilities relate. (Corp. Code § 17703.04(a)(1).) They do not become the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a member or manager solely by reason of the member acting as a member or the manager acting as a manager for the company. (Corp. Code § 17703.04(a)(2).)
“Based on Plaintiff’s declaration it appears Conrad Cyrus Brown, Jr. was McDermont’s boss, and that the employer was Universal Custom Auto Body, LLC. Given the general law surrounding limited liability companies, Plaintiff must provide further evidence showing that Conrad Cyrus Brown, Jr. is personally liable, or dismiss him accordingly.
“Plaintiff provides sufficient proof that McDermont was acting in the scope of employment with Universal Custom Auto Body, LLC.
“Counsel for plaintiff to resubmit the default judgment packet correcting the above issues.” (October 17, 2024 minute order.)
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s November 25, 2024 application for default judgment, including Plaintiff’s declaration. Plaintiff has not provided any new information showing that Brown is personally liable to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s November 25, 2024 application for default judgment uses outdated versions of the CIV-100 and JUD-100 forms. Plaintiff should resubmit his application using the current versions of these forms.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff Donte Harp’s application for default judgment filed on November 25, 2024.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.