Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV31914, Date: 2025-01-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV31914 Hearing Date: January 6, 2025 Dept: 28
Having reviewed the moving and late opposition papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On September 29, 2022, Plaintiff Jesus Cuevas Hernandez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants J.B. Hunt, LLC, J.B. Hunt Logistics, Inc., J.B. Hunt Transport, J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., J.B. Hunt Corp., Stephen Andrew Scheel, and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle negligence, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent undertaking, negligent retention, negligent supervision, negligent training, and negligence per se.
On October 10, 2023, Defendants J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (“Hunt”) and Stephen Andrew Scheel (“Scheel”) filed an answer.
On September 20, 2024, Hunt and Scheel (“Defendants”) filed a motion for a protective order preventing Plaintiff from deposing Scheel or limiting the scope of the deposition. Plaintiff opposed the motion. On October 28, 2024, the Court denied the motion.
On November 15, 2024, Defendants filed another motion for a protective order preventing Plaintiff from deposing Scheel or limiting the scope of the deposition. The motion was set for hearing on January 6, 2025. On December 27, 2024, Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition. On January 3, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s ex parte application for relief from the failure to file a timely opposition. On January 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed a late opposition and another ex parte application for relief from the failure to file a timely opposition.
Trial is currently scheduled for June 16, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Defendants ask the Court for a protective order preventing Plaintiff from taking Scheel’s deposition or limiting the subjects about which Scheel can be deposed.
Plaintiff asks the Court to consider his late opposition and deny Defendants’ motion for a protective order.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420 provides in part:
“(a) Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.
“(b) The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions:
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"(10) That the scope of the examination be limited to certain matters.
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"(h)
The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with
Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully
makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one
subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other
circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. . . .”
DISCUSSION
A. The Court’s October 28, 2024 order denying Defendants’ first motion for a protective order
The Court’s October 28, 2024 order denying Defendant’s previous motion for a protective order stated the following:
“Defendants argue Scheel’s deposition is unnecessary because they have served a Stipulation admitting liability for the accident; [Hunt] has also admitted that Scheel was acting within the course and scope of employment at the time. (McIntyre Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A.) As a result, Defendants argue the only remaining issue is Plaintiff’s damages, and therefore, a deposition by Scheel on the issue of liability is irrelevant. They also argue that a deposition based on the negligent hiring, training, and supervision cause of action, is also irrelevant under Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 1148 since [Hunt] has admitted vicarious liability.
“As a result, Defendants move for a protective order prohibiting the deposition, or alternatively, limiting the deposition to the issue of Plaintiff’s claimed damages.
“ ‘If . . . an employer offers to admit vicarious liability for its employee's negligent driving, then claims against the employer based on theories of negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention become superfluous. To allow such claims in that situation would subject the employer to a share of fault in addition to the share of fault assigned to the employee, for which the employer has already accepted liability. To assign to the employer a share of fault greater than that assigned to the employee whose negligent driving was a cause of the accident would be an inequitable apportionment of loss.’ (Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1160.)
“The Stipulation states in relevant part, ‘[a]t the time of the upcoming trial of this matter on January 28, 2025, and for the sole purpose of such proceedings, Defendants, Stephen Andrew Scheel and J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. shall not dispute liability for causing the auto accident that occurred on July 7, 2021 on SR-138 in an unincorporated area of the County of Los Angeles, California, involving Plaintiff, Jesus Cuevas Hernandez, which is the subject of this litigation.’ The stipulation, signed by Counsel, also states that ‘J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. agrees that it is vicariously liable for the actions of Defendant, Stephen Andrew Scheel at the time of the subject accident.’ (McIntyre Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A.)
“In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that Scheel’s deposition is currently set for October 30, 2024. Regarding the stipulation, Plaintiff argues he has not signed it, and points to Defendants’ responses to Request for Admission where they have denied all aspects of this case. (Agarwal Decl., Exh. B.)
“In reply, Defendants do not address whether the stipulation is adequately worded or explain its binding effect given that Plaintiff did not sign it and given its previous responses to the Request for Admissions.
“ ‘It is the general rule that where a stipulation is distinctly and formally made for the express purpose of relieving the opposing party from proving some fact, and no provision is made by its terms indicating a limitation of scope or the duration of its effect, that admission can be introduced in evidence and is available upon a subsequent trial of the same action, unless the court permits its withdrawal upon proper application therefor.’ (Gonzales v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1950) 34 Cal.2d 749, 755.) A party to a stipulation is conclusively estopped from taking a position contrary to the stipulation, in the same or related litigation. (Palmer v. City of Oakland (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 39, 44.) ‘It is up to the parties to state a stipulation clearly and properly if they intend to be bound by it.’ (Bemer v. Bemer (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 766, 771-772.)
“Therefore, based on the above, the Court agrees that, assuming the ‘stipulation’ is a binding admission that clearly admits breach of a duty, and causation, while reserving the issue of damages for trial, and admits vicarious liability, that under Armenta v. Churchill (1954) 42 Cal.2d 448, 457-58 and Diaz v. Carcamo, the motion for protective order should be granted. Though Plaintiff argues in opposition that these cases only apply to the admissibility of evidence at trial, he fails to show how testimony from Scheel regarding the accident, and further evidence on the negligent hiring, supervision claim is ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)
“However, here, there appears to be a dispute whether the stipulation is adequately binding. The Court notes that Defendants’ stipulation states they ‘shall not dispute liability for causing the auto accident’. This does not clearly state that liability is admitted, or that Plaintiff will not still have the burden to prove the breach of duty at trial. Moreover, unlike admissions which are verified, here, the stipulation is not signed by the defendants.
“Even though Defendants were unsuccessful, the Court finds that they acted with substantial justification and declines to award sanctions.”
B. Defendants’ second motion for a protective order
On November 12, 2024, in response to the Court’s October 28, 2024 order, Defendants served a revised stipulation on Plaintiff. The revised stipulation states in part:
“1. Defendants, STEPHEN ANDREW SCHEEL and J.B. HUNT
TRANSPORT, INC. hereby admit liability for causing the auto accident that
occurred on July 7, 2021 on SR-138 in an unincorporated area of the County of
Los Angeles, California, involving Plaintiff, JESUS CUEVAS HERNANDEZ, which is
the subject of this litigation (the subject accident').
“2. This admission of liability for the subject
accident does not admit causation of any damages or injuries alleged by
Plaintiff, nor does it admit the reasonableness or necessity of any medical
treatment or any other alleged damages.
“3. This admission of liability for the subject
accident is a judicial admission.
'A judicial admission is a party’s
unequivocal concession of the truth of a matter, and removes the matter as an
issue in the case. [Citations.]' (Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140
Cal.App.4th 34, 48 [43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874].)”
The Court finds that the revised stipulation cures the defects identified in the Court’s October 28, 2024 order. Consistent with the October 28, 2024 order, the Court therefore grants Defendants’ motion and limits the scope of Scheel’s deposition to Plaintiff’s damages, including the causation and extent of Plaintiff’s claimed damages and injuries, the reasonableness and necessity of his medical treatment, and the usual and customary charges for his medical treatment.
CONCLUSION
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.