Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV35721, Date: 2025-06-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV35721 Hearing Date: June 11, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the demurring and opposition papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
A. Prior proceedings
On November 10, 2022, Plaintiff Cesaragusto Garcia Aleman (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants 414 Coronado, LLC, Cynthia Marie King, Jack George King, John George King, Stephen Mark Feldman, Robert H. Newman, King J&J Trust, All In One Construction, and Does 1-50 for premises liability and negligence.
On November 16, 2023, the Court dismissed Defendant Stephen Mark Feldman without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request. On December 11, 2023, the Court dismissed Defendant Robert H. Newman without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request.
On July 26, 2024, the clerk entered the defaults of Defendants King J&J Trust and Cynthia Marie King. On December 6, 2024, the Court set aside the defaults based on the stipulation of counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants King J&J Trust and Cynthia Marie King.
On February 7, 2025, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant 414Coronado LLC as Doe 1.
On March 12, 2025, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendants the Estate of Jack George King as Doe 2 and the Estate of John George King as Doe 3.
No trial date is currently scheduled.
B. This motion
On February 11, 2025, Defendants King J&J Trust and Cynthia Marie King (“Demurring Defendants”) filed a demurrer. The demurrer was set for hearing on March 14, 2025. On March 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On April 3, 2025, Demurring Defendants filed a request for judicial notice. The Court continued the hearing to June 11, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Demurring Defendants ask the Court to sustain their demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint.
Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the demurrer or grant leave to amend.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Demurrer
Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 provides in part:
“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
“(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
“(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.
“(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.
“(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.
“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.
“(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.
“(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading”].)
“For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not conclusions, deductions, or conclusions of facts or law).” (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2024) ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25, emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).)
“The demurrer should not be sustained where a plaintiff can cure a defective complaint by amendment or where the pleading, liberally construed, can state a cause of action.” (Jager v. County of Alameda (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 294, 297.)
“ ‘To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.’ ” (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:40, p. 7(l)-21, quoting C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
B. Labor Code section 2750.5
Labor Code section 2750.5 provides:
“There is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that a worker performing services for which a license is required pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the Business and Professions Code, or who is performing such services for a person who is required to obtain such a license is an employee rather than an independent contractor. Proof of independent contractor status includes satisfactory proof of these factors:
“(a) That the individual has the right to control and discretion as to the manner of performance of the contract for services in that the result of the work and not the means by which it is accomplished is the primary factor bargained for.
“(b) That the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established business.
“(c) That the individual’s independent contractor status is bona fide and not a subterfuge to avoid employee status. A bona fide independent contractor status is further evidenced by the presence of cumulative factors such as substantial investment other than personal services in the business, holding out to be in business for oneself, bargaining for a contract to complete a specific project for compensation by project rather than by time, control over the time and place the work is performed, supplying the tools or instrumentalities used in the work other than tools and instrumentalities normally and customarily provided by employees, hiring employees, performing work that is not ordinarily in the course of the principal’s work, performing work that requires a particular skill, holding a license pursuant to the Business and Professions Code, the intent by the parties that the work relationship is of an independent contractor status, or that the relationship is not severable or terminable at will by the principal but gives rise to an action for breach of contract.
“In addition to the factors contained in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), any person performing any function or activity for which a license is required pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the Business and Professions Code shall hold a valid contractors’ license as a condition of having independent contractor status.
“For purposes of workers’ compensation law, this presumption is a supplement to the existing statutory definitions of employee and independent contractor, and is not intended to lessen the coverage of employees under Division 4 and Division 5.”
(Lab. Code, § 2750.5; see Z. Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury (Rutter 2023) ¶ 2:2140, p. 2(ll)-339.)
C. Liability for hirers of independent contractors
“Strong public policy considerations . . . generally support a straightforward presumption about the responsibilities of hirers and contractors for worker injuries in situations like this: A person or entity hiring an independent contractor (a ‘hirer’) ordinarily delegates to that independent contractor all responsibility for the safety of the contractor's workers. [Citation.] This presumption is rooted in hirers’ reasons for employing contractors in the first place, and society's need for clear rules about who's responsible for avoiding harms to workers when contractors are hired. [The Court has] therefore generally avoided subjecting hirers to tort liability for those workers’ injuries. [Citation.] But that presumption gives way to two recognized exceptions: where the hirer either withholds critical information regarding a concealed hazard (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 664, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 495, 123 P.3d 931 (Kinsman)); or retains control over the contractor's work and actually exercises that control in a way that affirmatively contributes to the worker's injury (Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 202, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081 (Hooker)).” (Sandoval v. Qualcomm Incorporated (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256, 264 (Sandoval).)
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
The complaint includes the following allegations:
Defendants were the owners, occupiers, managers, agents, maintainers, real estate developers, contractors, and/or controllers of the real property located at 414 N. Coronado St., Los Angeles, California 90026 (“premises”).
In approximately July 2020, a man named Ariel hired Plaintiff as an unlicensed contractor to work on various construction projects. Plaintiff does not know Ariel’s last name. Ariel owned All in One Construction Company. Plaintiff believed Ariel was a licensed contractor.
On or about October 13, 2020, Ariel “notified Plaintiff to begin work at Defendant Property Owners, Operators, Agents: 414 Coronado LLC, Cynthia Marie King, Jack George King, John George King, Stephen Mark Feldman, Robert H. Newman, King J&J Trust, and DOES 1-50, inclusive, at an apartment complex located at [the premises].)” (Complaint ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff’s job duties at the premises involved demolition, renovation, plumbing, framing, electrical wiring, and installation of new walls, kitchen and bathroom. Plaintiff worked at the premises six days a week from Monday through Saturday from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm. Plaintiff worked with two other workers on site.
Plaintiff’s employer, All in One Construction, made daily visits to the site. Plaintiff and his coworkers were responsible for purchasing any needed materials from the hardware store and would call Ariel, All in One Construction’s owner, to pay for the materials over the phone.
On or about November 1, 2020, while Plaintiff was working at the premises, Plaintiff was informed that the property owner was coming to visit and inspect the premises. Plaintiff showed the owner the state of the unit, the dangerous condition of the warped floors and walls. The property owner did not go beyond the living room into the unit because of the dangerous conditions of the site. The property owner was shown photos of the areas of the unit that he could not enter.
On November 13, 2020, Plaintiff was working at the premises. In order to demolish the kitchen ceiling, Plaintiff required the use of a ladder. The floors in the unit, including the kitchen area, were not level or stable because the ground was warped and rotted. To provide additional stability, Plaintiff placed a piece of plywood on the floor and placed his eight foot ladder on top of the plywood. Plaintiff was approximately halfway up the ladder at four feet, tearing down the ceiling. Suddenly, the ladder slipped out from underneath Plaintiff. Plaintiff had no choice but to jump off the ladder onto the ground. Plaintiff’s right toe landed directly onto a nail that was sticking out of a piece of wood that had been knocked down from the ceiling (“incident”).
Upon information and belief, the warped, uneven floors of the ground of the premises posed a dangerous condition prior to and at the time of the incident. Defendants knew and/or should have known about the state of the ground floor including the unstable and uneven ground.
All in One Construction paid Plaintiff $200.00 per day, approximately $6,000.00, for the work at the premises based on an agreement for services. In total, the project had been ongoing for 4-5 weeks prior to the incident.
Defendants negligently, recklessly, carelessly and wrongfully owned, possessed, occupied, managed, inspected, repaired, serviced, operated, supervised, controlled, permitted, contracted, and/or maintained the premises, including the ground floor, causing Plaintiff’s injuries.
B. The demurrer
1. Employee status under Labor Code section 2750.5
Demurring Defendants contend that the complaint does not plead facts showing that Plaintiff was their employee under Labor Code section 2750.5 because the complaint alleges that All in One Construction, a licensed contractor, not Demurring Defendants, hired Plaintiff.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Demurring Defendants hired Plaintiff because (1) Demurring Defendants hired All in One Construction, (2) All in One Construction was unlicensed when the accident took place, and (3) All in One Construction hired Plaintiff. (Plaintiff’s declaration asserting that All in One Construction’s contractor license expired on November 30, 2019 violates the rules governing demurrers and the Court does not consider it.)
Plaintiff has not clearly alleged whether All in One Construction was licensed. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff “believed that Defendant, All in One Construction Company’s owner, Ariel, was a licensed contractor.” (Complaint ¶ 11.) The complaint subsequently alleges that the California Contractors State Licensing Board required Ariel, of All in One Construction, to obtain and/or maintain a contractor’s license for the activities that he hired Plaintiff to perform at the premises on the date of the incident. (Complaint ¶ 30.)
2. Delegation of responsibility to independent contractor
Demurring Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts establishing an exception to the presumption that Demurring Defendants delegated to All in One Construction “all responsibility for the safety of [All in One Construction’s] workers.” (See Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 264.)
Plaintiff does not appear to address this argument in his opposition.
The Court sustains Demurring Defendants’ demurrer with leave to amend based on Plaintiff’s failure to plead facts establishing an exception to the presumption that Demurring Defendants delegated responsibility to All in One Construction for the safety of All in One Construction’s workers.
3. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies
Demurring Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts showing that he exhausted his administrative remedies before filing this action.
In response, Plaintiff appears to argue that he could not exhaust his administrative remedies because Demurring Defendants did not give him the required claim form.
The Court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend based on Plaintiff’s failure to plead facts concerning his exhaustion of administrative remedies.
4. Sale of the premises
Demurring Defendants contend they cannot be liable to Plaintiff because they sold the premises at issue. Demurring Defendants contend that the Court may take judicial notice of “the existence and recordation of real property records.” (Opposition p. 9.)
However,
Demurring Defendants did not file a request for judicial notice until April 3,
2025, one month after Plaintiff filed his opposition to the demurrer. The Court declines to grant the untimely
judicial notice request. As a result,
the Court overrules Demurring Defendants’ demurrer based on their purported
sale of the premises.
CONCLUSION
The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer filed by Defendants King J&J Trust and Cynthia Marie King with 30 days leave to amend.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling.
Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling within five days.