Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV36049, Date: 2025-03-11 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV36049 Hearing Date: March 11, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On November 15, 2022, Plaintiff Charlotte Arneson (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Antoine Steele (“Steele”), Ultragate Corporation (“Ultragate”), Turo Inc. (“Turo”), and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence.
On January 3, 2023, Ultragate and Turo filed answers. On February 7, 2023, Steele filed an answer.
On January 26, 2024, Ultragate filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. The motion was set for hearing on February 6, 2025. On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a late opposition. (The Court exercises its discretion to consider the late opposition.) On January 30, 2025, Ultragate filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to March 11, 2025.
On January 26, 2024, Turo filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. The motion was set for hearing on February 7, 2025. On January 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a late opposition. (The Court exercises its discretion to consider the late opposition.) On January 31, 2025, Turo filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to March 11, 2025.
Trial is scheduled for October 15, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Ultragate and Turo ask the Court to grant summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motions.
DEFENDANTS’ REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary judgment and adjudication
“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar)) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.)
“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.” (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)
B. Negligence
‘The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ ” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.)
C. Negligent entrustment
“ ‘Negligent entrustment is a common law liability doctrine, which arises in numerous factual contexts. [Citation.] In cases involving negligent entrustment of a vehicle, liability “ ‘is imposed on [a] vehicle owner or permitter because of his own independent negligence and not the negligence of the driver.’ ” [Citations.] ‘ “Liability for the negligence of the incompetent driver to whom an automobile is entrusted does not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known by the owner.” ’ [Citation]; accord, Rest.2nd Torts, § 308 [“It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others”].)’ ” (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565 (McKenna), quoting Ghezavat v. Harris (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 555, 559.)
The elements of a claim for negligent entrustment are: (1) the driver was negligent in operating the vehicle, (2) the defendant owned or possessed the vehicle, (3) the defendant knew or should have known that the driver was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle, (4) the defendant permitted the driver to drive the vehicle, and (5) the driver’s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. (McKenna, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.)
D. Insurance Code section 11580.24
Insurance Code section 11580.24, subdivision (d) provides:
“Notwithstanding any other law or any provision in a
private passenger motor vehicle owner’s automobile insurance policy, in the
event of a loss or injury that occurs during any time period when the vehicle
is under the operation and control of a person, other than the vehicle owner,
pursuant to a personal vehicle sharing program, or otherwise under the control
of a personal vehicle sharing program, the personal vehicle sharing program
shall assume all liability of the owner and shall be considered the owner of
the vehicle for all purposes. Nothing in this section limits the liability of
the personal vehicle sharing program for its acts or omissions that result in
injury to any persons as a result of the use or operation of a personal vehicle
sharing program.”
(Ins. Code, § 11580.24, subd. (d).)
A “ ‘[p]ersonal vehicle sharing program’ means a legal entity qualified to do business in the State of California engaged in the business of facilitating the sharing of private passenger vehicles for noncommercial use by individuals within the state.” (Ins. Code, § 11580.24, subd. (b)(2).)
COMPLAINT
The complaint includes the following allegations:
On or about June 17, 2022, Steele operated his vehicle on the I-10 near the I-110 northbound interchange without caution and in such an unsafe manner that it violently collided into Plaintiff’s vehicle.
Defendants negligently, carelessly, recklessly, unskillfully, unlawfully, tortuously, wrongfully, wantonly, maliciously, willfully, oppressively, and despicably entrusted, managed, maintained, operated, controlled and drove the vehicle. Defendants acted in a negligent, reckless, careless and improper manner, and with negligence and disregard for the safety, rights, and well-being of others. In addition, Defendants negligently entrusted the vehicle to the driver and were otherwise careless and negligent.
Defendants’ conduct constitutes negligence per se in that Defendants' conduct violated Vehicle Code section 22350: “No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property.”
As a result of Defendants’ acts and omissions, Plaintiff was injured.
I. Ultragate’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication
A. Undisputed facts
Turo, a corporation which is qualified to do business in California, provides and operates an online platform through which private vehicle hosts may connect with prospective drivers who are seeking to reserve a vehicle for noncommercial use within the State of California. Prior to reserving a vehicle, the prospective driver must provide Turo with complete and accurate personal information, including name, date of birth, driver’s license identifier, state or country of licensing, payment method, home address, and phone number. This information enables Turo to use its proprietary internal processes or third-party vendors to verify the prospective driver’s identity, after which the prospective driver would be allowed to make a reservation on Turo’s platform.
Turo has the right, but not the obligation, to conduct further screening into prospective drivers under its Terms of Service. Before a guest, like Steele, may reserve a vehicle on Turo’s platform, he or she must affirmatively accept Turo’s Terms of Service.
After a reservation is made, Turo’s in-person check in process requires the host of the vehicle to coordinate pick up time and location with the prospective driver to finalize the check in process by verifying the prospective driver through his or her driver’s license to ensure they match the reservation before granting the prospective driver access to the selected vehicle.
Ultragate is a host on the Turo platform. Prior to the subject reservation, Ultragate listed the 2016 Jeep Compass (“Jeep”), California license plate number of 7MJP431 owned by Ultragate, on the Turo platform.
On or about February 19, 2021, Steele gave Turo the required personal information, including his name, date of birth, and his Ohio driver’s license number, which enabled Turo to verify Steele’s identity and allowed Steele to use the Turo platform.
On June 16, 2022, Steele successfully reserved Ultragate’s Jeep through the Turo platform for the period from June 17, 2022, at 10:00 a.m. through June 20, 2022, at 10:00 a.m.
On June 17, 2022, David Gutierrez (“Gutierrez”), on behalf of Ultragate, met Steele in person to complete the check-in process and vehicle handoff process. During this meeting, Gutierrez verified that Steele’s personal information on his facially valid driver’s license matched the information on the reservation. Gutierrez on behalf of Ultragate also verified that the photograph on the driver’s license matched the person presenting the driver’s license as Steele.
During this in-person meeting, Mr. Gutierrez did not observe anything to indicate or even suggest that Steele was unfit or unqualified to drive the Jeep. Accordingly, Gutierrez, on behalf of Ultragate, handed the keys to Steele to proceed with the Turo reservation of the Jeep.
The subject accident occurred on June 17, 2022. Plaintiff contends that she was driving her vehicle on the Interstate 10 near the Interstate 110 northbound interchange in Los Angeles when Steele operated the Jeep without caution and rear-ended Plaintiff’s vehicle. In response to Ultragate’s written discovery requests, when asked to state all facts to support her contention that Ultragate is liable to her on theories of negligence and motor vehicle tort, Plaintiff responded in part that Ultragate negligently and carelessly entrusted the subject vehicle to Steele, who operated the vehicle without caution and in an unsafe manner, and, as a result, the vehicle rear-ended and collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle.
Plaintiff provided the identical response when asked to state all facts to support her contention that Ultragate is liable for negligent entrustment and her contention that Ultragate negligently, carelessly, recklessly and wantonly drove, managed, maintained, controlled, operated and entrusted the vehicle. In response to Ultragate’s written discovery, when asked whether Plaintiff contends that any person involved in the incident violated any statute, ordinance, or regulation and that the violation was a proximate cause of the incident, Plaintiff responded in part: “Yes. Responding Party contends Defendant Antoine Steele violated Vehicle Code sections 21703 and 22350.”
B. Ultragate has carried its initial burden on summary judgment or summary adjudication
Ultragate asks the Court to grant summary judgment or summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims because Steele obtained the use of Ultragate’s Jeep through a personal vehicle sharing program, Turo. It is undisputed that Turo provides and operates an online platform through which private vehicle hosts may connect with prospective drivers who are seeking to reserve a vehicle for noncommercial use within the State of California. (UMF 2; see Armstrong dec.¶ 3.)
Ultragate has presented a prima facie case that, under
Insurance Code section 11580.24, Turo therefore “assume[d] all liability of [Ultragate] and shall be considered the owner of [the Jeep] for all purposes.” (See Ins.
Code, § 11580.24, subd. (d).) As a result, Ultragate has carried its initial burden on summary judgment of showing that it
is relieved of potential liability under Insurance Code section 11580.24, subdivision (d). The
burden shifts to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff relies on Insurance Code section 11580.24, subdivision (h), which provides:
“Notwithstanding any other law or any provision in a vehicle owner’s automobile liability insurance policy, while a private passenger motor vehicle is used by a person other than its owner pursuant to personal vehicle sharing facilitated through a personal vehicle sharing program, all of the following shall apply:
“(1) The insurer of that vehicle on file with the Department of Motor Vehicles may exclude any and all coverage afforded pursuant to its policy.
“(2) The primary and excess insurer or insurers of the owners, operators, and maintainers of the private passenger motor vehicle used in a personal vehicle sharing program shall have the right to notify an insured that it has no duty to defend or indemnify any person or organization for liability for any loss that occurs during use of the vehicle in a personal vehicle sharing program.”
(Ins. Code, § 11580.24, subd. (h).)
Plaintiff argues that Ultragate has not presented evidence under Insurance Code section 11580.24, subdivision (h), establishing the terms of its insurance policy or identifying policy language its insurer may have used to exclude “permissive user” coverage for the Jeep while another person drove it under the personal vehicle sharing program.
But Plaintiff has not shown that an insurer’s failure to exercise its rights under Insurance Code section 11580.24, subdivision (h), affects the exclusion from liability to which a vehicle owner is entitled under Insurance Code section 11580.24, subdivision (d). On their face, the two provisions operate independently and Plaintiff has not explained why one should depend on the other.
Plaintiff also argues that Ultragate:
· has not shown that Turo “[p]rovide[d] the registered
owner of the vehicle with a Department of Motor Vehicles Form REG 5085 or other
suitable proof of compliance with the insurance requirements of this section
and the requirements of the California Financial Responsibility Law in Section
1656.2 of the Vehicle Code” (see Ins. Code, § 11580.24, subd. (c)(1)), and
· has not shown that “[t]he annual revenue received by [Ultragate] that was generated by the personal vehicle sharing of the vehicle does not exceed the annual expenses of owning and operating the vehicle, including depreciation, interest, lease payments, auto loan payments, insurance, maintenance, parking, fuel, cleaning, automobile repair, and costs associated with personal vehicle sharing, including, but not limited to, the installation, operation, and maintenance of computer hardware and software, signage identifying the vehicle as a personal sharing vehicle, and any fees charged by a personal vehicle sharing program.” (See Ins. Code, § 11580.24, subd. (a)(2).)
The Court finds that Ultragate was not required, as part of its initial summary judgment burden, to present evidence showing that Turo and Ultragate complied with these statutory provisions. Instead, to carry its initial burden, Ultragate was required to show only that the loss or injury occurred “when the vehicle [was] under the operation and control of a person, other than the vehicle owner, pursuant to a personal vehicle sharing program, or otherwise under the control of a personal vehicle sharing program . . . .” (Ins. Code, § 11580.24, subd. (d).) As noted, Ultragate made that showing and shifted the burden on summary judgment to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has not presented evidence which raises a triable issue of fact concerning whether Turo is a personal vehicle sharing program for purposes of the immunity provided by Insurance Code section 11580.24, subdivision (d). The Court therefore grants Ultragate’s motion for summary judgment.
II.
Turo’s
motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication
Turo, a corporation which is qualified to do business in California, provides and operates an online platform through which private vehicle hosts may connect with prospective drivers who are seeking to reserve a vehicle for noncommercial use within the State of California. Prior to reserving a vehicle, a prospective driver must provide Turo with complete and accurate personal information, including name, date of birth, driver’s license identifier, state or country of licensing, payment method, home address, and phone number. This information enables Turo to use its proprietary internal processes or third-party vendors to verify the prospective driver’s identity, after which the prospective driver would be allowed to make a reservation on Turo’s platform.
Turo has the right, but not the obligation, to conduct further screening into prospective drivers under its Terms of Service. Before a guest like Steele may reserve a vehicle on Turo’s platform, he or she must affirmatively accept Turo’s Terms of Service.
After a reservation is made, Turo’s in-person check in process requires the host of the vehicle to coordinate pick up time and location with the prospective driver to finalize the check in process by verifying the prospective driver through his or her driver’s license to ensure they match the reservation before granting the prospective driver access to the selected vehicle.
Ultragate is a host on the Turo platform. Prior to the subject reservation, Ultragate listed its Jeep on the Turo platform.
On or about February 19, 2021, Steele gave Turo the required personal information, including his name, date of birth, and his Ohio driver’s license number, which enabled Turo to verify Steele’s identity and allowed Steele to use the Turo platform. On June 16, 2022, Steele successfully reserved Ultragate’s Jeep through the Turo platform for the period from June 17, 2022, at 10:00 a.m. through June 20, 2022, at 10:00 a.m.
The subject accident occurred on June 17, 2022. Plaintiff contends that she was driving her vehicle on the Interstate 10 near the Interstate 110 northbound interchange in Los Angeles when Steele operated the Jeep without caution and rear-ended Plaintiff’s vehicle.
In response to Turo’s written discovery requests, when asked to state all facts to support her contention that Turo is liable to her on negligence and motor vehicle tort theories, Plaintiff responded in part that Turo negligently and carelessly entrusted the subject vehicle to Steele, who operated the vehicle without caution and in an unsafe manner, and, as a result, the vehicle rear-ended and collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle.
Plaintiff provided the identical response when asked to state all facts to support her contention that Turo is liable under a theory of negligent entrustment and her contention that Turo negligently, carelessly, recklessly and wantonly drove, managed, maintained, controlled, operated, and entrusted the vehicle.
In response to Turo’s written discovery, when asked whether Plaintiff contends that any person involved in the incident violated any statute, ordinance, or regulation and that the violation was a proximate cause of the incident, Plaintiff responded in part: “Yes. Responding Party contends Defendant Antoine Steele violated Vehicle Code sections 21703 and 22350.”
B. Turo has carried its initial burden on summary judgment or summary adjudication
Turo contends that Plaintiff cannot prove two elements of a negligent entrustment claim: (1) that Turo knew or should have known that Steele was incompetent or unfit to drive the Jeep and (2) that Steele’s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. (See McKenna, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.) Turo points to the undisputed fact that Gutierrez, during his in-person meeting with Steele, did not observe anything to indicate or even suggest that Steele was unfit or unqualified to drive the Jeep. Gutierrez verified that Steele’s personal information on his facially valid driver’s license matched the information on the reservation and verified that the photograph on Steele’s driver’s license matched the person presenting the driver’s license (Steele).
Turo also argues that Vehicle Code section 17151, subdivision (a), limits its liability to Plaintiff to $15,000.00. The statute provides:
“The liability of an owner, bailee of an owner, or personal representative of a decedent imposed by this chapter and not arising through the relationship of principal and agent or master and servant is limited to the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for the death of or injury to one person in any one accident and, subject to the limit as to one person, is limited to the amount of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) for the death of or injury to more than one person in any one accident and is limited to the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000) for damage to property of others in any one accident.”
(Veh. Code, § 17151, subd. (a).)
In addition, Turo presented evidence that Ultragate regularly serviced the Jeep for routine maintenance. The last maintenance service the Jeep received before Steele’s reservation on June 17, 2022 was on April 27, 2022 by Grant Auto LLC (“Grant Auto”). For this service, Grant Auto replaced the alternator, changed the oil and filter, and cleaned and adjusted the rear brakes on the Jeep. Grant also completed a total vehicle inspection on April 27, 2022. The Jeep passed the inspection and no mechanical or maintenance issues were noted. (Shafigh Shirinfar dec., ¶¶ 3-3a.)
Turo has carried its initial burden on summary judgment or summary adjudication, shifting the burden to Plaintiff.
C. Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact
Plaintiff argues that Turo negligently maintained the Jeep, resulting in faulty brakes that caused Steele’s collision with Plaintiff.
To support this contention, Plaintiff cites Steele’s discovery responses asserting that, before the accident, Steele felt his brakes were not working properly and “is informed and believes the brakes on his vehicle were not working properly.” (Plaintiff’s evidence, exh. 1, p. 26.)
Turo argues that Steele’s discovery responses do not raise a triable issue of fact because they are conclusory allegations and unsupported speculation. In addition, Turo argues that “this is the first time in Opposition that Plaintiff contends that Turo negligently maintained the subject vehicle” (Reply p. 2) and Plaintiff’s negligent maintenance argument contradicts Plaintiff’s opposition to Ultragate’s motion for summary judgment.
Viewing the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to Plaintiff (see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843), the Court finds that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact concerning whether Turo negligently maintained the jeep, resulting in faulty brakes that caused or contributed to the accident. The Court therefore denies the motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendant Ultragate Corporation’s motion for summary judgment.
The Court DENIES Defendant Turo Inc.’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.