Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV37886, Date: 2024-04-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV37886 Hearing Date: April 29, 2024 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On December 5, 2022, Plaintiffs Gayane Vardanyan (“Vardanyan”) and Ani Gasparyan (“Gasparyan”) filed this action against Defendants Shango Meru Kani (“Kani”), Cecil O. Coleman (“Coleman”), and Does 1-10 for general negligence, motor vehicle tort, and negligent entrustment.
On September 19, 2023, Kani and Coleman filed an answer.
On February 7, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to quash a deposition subpoena for production of business records issued by Kani, to be heard on April 29, 2024. On April 15, 2024, Kani filed an opposition. On April 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a reply.
On March 20, 2024, the Court dismissed Coleman without prejudice at Plaintiffs’ request.
Trial is currently set for June 3, 2024.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Plaintiffs ask the Court to quash Kani’s subpoena for records served on Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (“Exchange”).
Kani asks the Court to deny the motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides:
"(a) If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.
"(b) The following persons may make a motion pursuant to subdivision (a): (1) A party. (2) A witness. (3) A consumer described in Section 1985.3. (4) An employee described in Section 1985.6. (5) A person whose personally identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1798.79.8 of the Civil Code, is sought in connection with an underlying action involving that person’s exercise of free speech rights."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (g), provides in part:
“(g) Any consumer whose personal records are sought by a subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action in which this subpoena duces tecum is served may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum. Notice of the bringing of that motion shall be given to the witness and deposition officer at least five days prior to production. The failure to provide notice to the deposition officer shall not invalidate the motion to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum but may be raised by the deposition officer as an affirmative defense in any action for liability for improper release of records.
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(Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3, subd. (g).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a), provides:
“(a) Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)
When a party seeks discovery which impacts a person’s constitutional right to privacy, limited protections come into play. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.) The protections cover a person’s personal and financial matters. (Ibid.) The court must balance competing rights — the litigant’s right to discover relevant facts and the individual’s right to maintain reasonable privacy — in determining whether the information is discoverable. (Ibid.)
For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
The complaint alleges that on February 11, 2022, at the intersection of Fountain Avenue and Hyperion Avenue in Los Angeles, Kani negligently drove Coleman’s vehicle, causing an collision with the vehicle Vardanyan was driving, in which Gasparyan was a passenger.
B. The subpoena for business records
On January 10, 2024, Kani issued a deposition subpoena to Exchange requesting:
“Any and all insurance records, and all traffic collision reports, vehicle estimates, repair invoices, photographs, recorded statements, medical records, related to a motor vehicle accident of 10/22/2021, Claim No.: 014929916, involving Ani Gasparyan. DOB: 01/02/1990, SSN: UNKNOWN.”
C. Legal issues
Plaintiffs argue the subpoena (1) is overbroad, intrusive, and irrelevant, (2) violates the privacy rights of Plaintiff and others, (3) violates the attorney client privilege and attorney work product protection, and (4) violates the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act (Ins. Code, § 791.13).
1. Attorney-client privilege
Plaintiffs assert the subpoena violates the attorney-client privilege because information in an insurance company’s claims file is subject to the privilege. Plaintiffs rely on the rule that “communications made by an insured to his ‘“liability insurance company, concerning an event which may be made the basis of a claim against him covered by the policy, is a privileged communication, as being between attorney and client, if the policy requires the company to defend him through its attorney, and the communication is intended for the information or assistance of the attorney in so defending him.” ’ ” (Scripps Health v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 529, 535 (Scripps), quoting Travelers Ins. Companies v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 436, 448-449.)
“[T]he party claiming the attorney-client privilege as a bar to disclosure has the burden of showing that the communication sought to be suppressed falls within the parameters of the privilege.” (Scripps, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 533; accord, Soltani-Rastegar v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 424, 426 (Soltani-Rastegar).)
Plaintiffs have not carried this burden. As Defendant observes, Exchange was not Gasparyan’s insurance company. Instead, Exchange insured the other driver in the October 22, 2021 accident. Therefore, the rule stated in Scripps does not apply here.
Even if the Scripps rule applied, Plaintiffs have not shown that the subpoenaed materials include any communications by Gasparyan to Exchange or that any such communications were intended for the information or assistance of an attorney whom Exchange would provide to defend Gasparyan from a potential claim against her. (Cf. Scripps, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 535 [“Here, undisputed evidence revealed that Scripps’s corporate in-house counsel declared that the occurrence reports are confidential records prepared by Scripps employees under its risk management plan . . . and pursuant to the directive of its legal department”]; Soltani-Rastegar, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 426 [“In opposing the discovery request, petitioners submitted declarations explaining that their statements were made in confidence to CSAA agents ‘for the sole purpose of defending’ them against claims brought by those involved in the accident”].)
2. Work product protection
Plaintiffs also argue the subpoena violates the attorney work product doctrine, but they provide no substantive discussion or authority on this point and the Court considers the argument waived.
3. Privacy and overbreadth
“ ‘[W]hile the filing of a lawsuit may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of associational privacy, the scope of such “waiver” must be narrowly rather than expansively construed, so that plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from instituting lawsuits by the fear of exposure of their private associational affiliations and activities.’ [Citation.] Therefore, . . . an implicit waiver of a party’s constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff’s claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842; see ibid. [“On occasion [a party's] privacy interests may have to give way to [the] opponent's right to a fair trial. Thus courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery”].)
“Even when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy. [Citation.] The scope of any disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed, drawn with narrow specificity, and must proceed by the least intrusive manner. [Citation.]” (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014.)
Plaintiffs argue the subpoena seeks private information and documents which are not related to this case. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the request for "all . . . medical records” may lead to the production of medical records of injuries and/or treatment of body parts not related to this case, violating Gasparyan’s and third parties' privacy rights.
At her February 19, 2024 deposition, Gasparyan testified that she had experienced neck and back pain as a result of the previous (October 2021) accident and the same car was involved in both accidents. Defendant is entitled to information about Gasparyan’s injuries and vehicle damage incurred in the October 2021 accident because it is relevant to a possible apportionment of Gasparyan’s damages between that accident and the accident at issue in this case.
The Court has weighed the need for this discovery against Gasparyan’s privacy rights and concludes that the subpoena is not overbroad and does not violate Gasparyan’s privacy rights. However, the Court modifies the subpoena to exclude records of the Exchange policyholder’s injuries, treatment, and property damage.
4. Insurance Code
Plaintiffs assert: “Insurance company files regarding an insured or a claimant are protected by the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act. [Citation.] Moreover, under California Insurance Code section 791.13, disclosure of any personal or privileged information gathered or received in connection with an insurance transaction is restricted.” Plaintiffs do not elaborate on this argument.
Insurance Code section 791.13 provides:
“An insurance institution, agent, or insurance-support organization shall not disclose any personal or privileged information about an individual collected or received in connection with an insurance transaction unless the disclosure is:
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“(h) In response to a facially valid administrative or judicial order, including a search warrant or subpoena.”
(Ins. Code, § 791.13, subds.
(g), (h).) Insurance Code section 791.13
does not support Plaintiffs’ request to quash the subpoena.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES the motion of Plaintiffs Gayane Vardanyan and Ani Gasparyan to quash the subpoena served by Defendant Shango Meru Kani on Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club.
The Court MODIFIES the subpoena served by Defendant Shango Meru Kani to exclude records of the Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club policyholder’s injuries, treatment, and property damage.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.