Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV02290, Date: 2024-11-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV02290    Hearing Date: November 19, 2024    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

On February 2, 2023, Plaintiffs Bayron Gonzalez and Andrew Zaldivar (“Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendant Kurtis Dale Kitchens, Just Pushing Dirt, Inc., and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle negligence, negligence per se, and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. 

On June 23, 2023, Defendants Kurtis Kitchens (“Kitchens”) and Just Pushing Dirt, Inc. (“JPD”) filed an answer. 

On October 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.  The motion was set for hearing on November 19, 2024.  On November 4, 2024, Defendants Kitchens and JPD ("Defendants") filed an opposition.  On November 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a reply. 

Trial is currently scheduled for February 3, 2025. 

PARTIES’ REQUESTS 

Plaintiffs ask the Court for leave to file a first amended complaint adding a claim for punitive damages and related allegations. 

Defendants ask the Court to deny the motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.   Leave to amend complaint 

“The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) 

“Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 576; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324.) 

“ ‘While a motion to permit an amendment to a pleading to be filed is one addressed to the discretion of the court, the exercise of this discretion must be sound and reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. [Citations.] And it is a rare case in which “a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleadings so that he may properly present his case.” [Citations.] If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]’ ”  (Redevelopment Agency v. Herrold (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1031, quoting Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.) 

“[I]t is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment.” (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 (Kittredge).)  “Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in a delay of trial, along with loss of critical evidence, added costs of preparation, increased burden of discovery, etc.”  (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 6:656, p. 6-193 (Cal. Practice Guide).) 

“Ordinarily, the judge will not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in deciding whether to grant leave to amend. . . . After leave to amend is granted, the opposing party will have the opportunity to attack the validity of the amended pleading.” (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 6:644, pp. 6-189 to 6-190.) 

B.   Punitive damages 

Civil Code section 3294 provides in part: 

“(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. 

“(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. 

“(c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply: 

“(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. 

“(2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. 

“(3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. . . .” 

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (b), (c).) 

“In addition to the requirement that the complaint set forth the elements as stated in [Civil Code] section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages.” (Today's IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193, citing Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872 (Brousseau).) “Punitive damages may not be pleaded generally.”  (Ibid., citing Brousseau, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 872.) 

“Simple negligence will not justify an award of punitive damages.” (Spencer v. San Francisco Brick Co. (1907) 5 Cal.App.126, 128.)

DISCUSSION 

A.   Plaintiffs’ complaint 

The complaint alleges the following: 

On December 14, 2021, Kitchens suddenly made an improper left-hand turn while driving JPD’s Ford F-350 truck.  After illegally maneuvering the truck over train tracks, through a red light, and around a cone barricade, Kitchens collided with the vehicle in which Plaintiffs were traveling as passengers, injuring Plaintiffs.  The collision took place at or near the intersection of Exposition Boulevard and Bill Robertson Lane in the City of Los Angeles. 

Kitchens was driving JPD’s truck as an authorized (or at least as an apparent) agent of and/or within the course and scope of his employment with JPD. 

Kitchens and JPD “negligently, carelessly, recklessly, unskillfully, unlawfully, tortuously, wrongfully, wantonly, maliciously, willfully, oppressively, and despicably entrusted, managed, maintained, operated, controlled and/or drove the TRUCK at issue in this case.”  (Complaint ¶ 21.) 

The complaint prayed for special and general damages. 

B.   Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint 

Plaintiffs move for leave to amend their complaint to add new factual allegations and a prayer for punitive damages against Kitchens and JPD.  To support a punitive damage claim against Kitchens, Plaintiffs propose amending their complaint to allege that Kitchens saw but deliberately ignored traffic control devices when he drove into the intersection and collided with Plaintiffs, showing a conscious disregard for the safety of others.  To support a punitive damage claim against JPD, Plaintiffs propose amending their complaint to allege (1) JPD acted with malice, oppression, and conscious disregard for the safety of others because it allowed individuals to drive heavy machinery without proper training, knew or should have known that Kitchens did not have proper safety training, and failed to implement proper safety training, policies and procedures and (2) Kitchens was JPD’s president, knew about his lack of training, and was in a position to implement safety policies, procedures, and trainings. 

Defendants ask the Court to deny the motion, arguing the proposed amendments do not allege facts that support a claim for punitive damages. The Court does not consider the validity of the amended pleading on a motion for leave to amend the complaint.  (See Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 6:644, pp. 6-189 to 6-190.) 

The Court finds that the amendments do not prejudice Defendants.  The Court grants the motion. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court GRANTS the motion for leave to file a first amended complaint filed by Plaintiffs Bayron Gonzalez and Andrew Zaldivar.  Plaintiffs are ordered to file and serve their first amended complaint within 30 days of the hearing on this motion.  (The Court does not deem served the first amended complaint attached to Plaintiffs' motion.) 

Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.