Judge Lisa R. Jaskol, Case Number: 23STCV06515, Date: 2025-01-07 Tentative Ruling

All parties are urged to meet and confer with all parties concerning this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreed-upon resolution of their matter.  If you are able to reach an agreement, please notify the courtroom staff in advance of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion by notifying the court by e-mailing the court at: SSCDEPT28@lacourt.org. Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the Case Number in the Subject line. In the body of the email, please provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, and whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, intervenor, or non-party, etc.

            Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may still appear at the hearing and argue the matter, and the court could change its tentative based upon the argument. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If you submit, but still intend to appear, include the words "SUBMITS, BUT WILL APPEAR" in the Subject line.    If you elect to argue your matter, you are urged to do so remotely, via Court-Connect.

                            Note that once the Court has issued a tentative, the Court has the inherent authority not to allow the withdrawal of a motion and to adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the court. This does not excuse a moving party's need to do one of the following: appear; submit; or take a matter off calendar by canceling the motion in the case reservation system before issuance of the tentative ruling if the matter moving party does not intend to proceed.

        If you submitted a courtesy copy of your papers containing media (such as a DVD or thumb drive), unless you request the return of the media in your papers, the court will destroy it following the hearing of your matter.

Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.

On March 23, 2023, Plaintiffs J.W. (“Plaintiff”), a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem Brandi Ward filed this action against Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier LLC, Raiser- CA LLC, Michael Venagas (“Venagas”), and Does 1-51 for negligence, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, and battery.

On August 4, 2023, the Court appointed Brandi Ward to serve as Plaintiff’s guardian ad litem.

On August 1, 2024, the Court sustained the demurrer filed by Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier LLC, and Raiser-CA LLC (collectively, “Uber”) to Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that Plaintiff had not pleaded facts that support imposition of a duty on Uber. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint.

On August 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against Defendants Uber, Venegas, and Does 1-52 for negligence, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, common carrier negligence, vicarious liability for the torts of Uber’s drivers, and battery.

On October 1, 2024, Uber filed a demurrer to the first amended complaint. The demurrer was set for hearing on November 21, 2024. On November 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On November 14, 2024, Uber filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to January 7, 2025.

Uber asks the Court to sustain the demurrer to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint.

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:

“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible. . . .”

In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading”].)

“For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not conclusions, deductions, or conclusions of facts or law).” (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25, emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).)

"A demurrer may be filed to one of several causes of action in the complaint, without answering the other causes of action." (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:34.1, p. 7(l)-19.)

“The elements of a negligence claim [are] . . . a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.)

“ ‘ “ ‘Courts ... invoke[ ] the concept of duty to limit generally “the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act ....” ’ ” ’ ” (Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 654, 663 (Williams).) “Our Supreme Court has explained that an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714 must be “ ‘ “ ‘clearly supported by public policy.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1083 (Vasilenko).) “Courts look to what are commonly called ‘the Rowland factors’ in determining whether policy considerations favor such an exception.” (Ibid., citing Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) “These are “ ‘ “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.)

“One well-established limit is that there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.” (Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 663, citing Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 (Delgado).) However, in cases involving harm caused by a third party, “a person may have an affirmative duty to protect the victim of another’s harm if that person is in what the law calls a ‘special relationship’ with either the victim or the person who created the harm.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 201, 215 (Brown).) “A special relationship between the defendant and the victim is one that ‘gives the victim a right to expect’ protection from the defendant, while a special relationship between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that ‘entails an ability to control [the third party’s] conduct.’ ” (Id. at p. 216, quoting Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619.) “Relationships between parents and children, colleges and students, employers and employees, common carriers and passengers, and innkeepers and guests, are all examples of special relationships that give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.” (Ibid.) “The existence of such a special relationship puts the defendant in a unique position to protect the plaintiff from injury. The law requires the defendant to use this position accordingly.” (Ibid.)

But “even when two parties may be in a special relationship, the unforeseeability of the kind of harm suffered by the plaintiff or other policy factors may counsel against establishing an affirmative duty for one party to protect the other.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 219 (discussing Rowland ^{^[1]} factors).) For example, “a court might conclude that duty should not be imposed because . . . the type of harm the plaintiff suffered was unforeseeable, or because there was no moral blameworthiness associated with the defendant’s conduct, notwithstanding the defendant’s special relationship to the plaintiff. Put differently, even when a special relationship gives rise to an affirmative duty to protect, a court must still consider whether the policy considerations set out in Rowland warrant a departure from that duty in the relevant category of cases.” (Id. at p. 222.)

On May 21, 2021, with the agreement, acceptance, knowledge, consent, authority, ratification, and permission of Uber and Does 1-51, an unnamed person arranged, organized, and paid for Plaintiff, a minor, to be transported from her home without parental or adult permission to the area of Harvard Heights. There, she was “grabbed by an elderly man who dragged her down the street and sexually assaulted her.”

Uber and Does 1-51 knew or should have known Plaintiff was a minor, that she did not have an Uber account, that the trip was requested by someone other than Plaintiff who did have an Uber account and that she was unaccompanied, all in direct violation of Uber’s policies and guidelines.

On or about April 2021, at the time of the incident, Defendant Doe 51 was a driver and transportation provider who was operating a motor vehicle (“the vehicle”) while using, utilizing and logged on to the Uber app. Doe 51 was an agent, employee, servant, and/or partner of Uber and Does 1-50 and was acting under their assignment, scheduling, routing and direction, within within the course and scope of that agency, employment and partnership, and with their full knowledge, consent, authority, ratification, and permission.

As a result of the negligence, carelessness, recklessness and conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s safety and security by Uber and Does 1-51, Plaintiff was subjected to criminal assault and battery, sustaining serious injury.

Uber, a common carrier, is aware that the sex trafficking of minors is a pervasive issue in the ride sharing industry.

Uber and Does 1-50 knew or should have known that Doe 51 was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle. Doe 51’s incompetence and/or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to Plaintiff.

Uber demurs to Plaintiffs’ claims for (1) negligence, (2) negligent entrustment, (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, (4) common carrier negligence, and (5) vicarious liability for the torts of Uber’s drivers.

For each of these claims, Uber argues Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to allege facts showing that Uber owed Plaintiff a duty. According to Uber, any duty which Uber owed Plaintiff arising from a special relationship based on Uber’s alleged status as a common carrier ended when the Uber driver delivered Plaintiff to her destination. Therefore, Uber asserts, Uber owed Plaintiff no duty when Venegas assaulted her.

In Jane Doe No. 1 v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 410, 421 (Jane Doe), the Court of Appeal observed:

“[The common carrier’s heightened standard of care] ‘properly ceases with the reason for it.’ ” [Citation.] Thus, although this heightened “duty of care does not end absolutely when the passenger alights from carriage” in all instances, once “ ‘the passenger reaches a place outside the sphere of any activity of the carrier which might reasonably constitute a mobile or animated hazard to the passenger’ ” [citation] and the passenger is ‘discharged into a relatively safe space, the hazards incident to the journey, as well as the carrier's control over the passenger, cease to exist,’ and no heightened duty of care is owed.”

(See also Parker v. City and County of San Francisco (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 597, 603 (Parker) [“we can see no reason why the exception to the general rule [limiting common carriers’ liability] should not apply where, as here, the passengers are discharged into an area of immediate danger”]; cf. Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780 , 791, 795 [common carrier has duty to protect plaintiffs from assaults by fellow passengers “where, in the exercise of the required degree of care, the carrier has or should have knowledge from which it may reasonably be apprehended that an assault on a passenger may occur, and has the ability in the exercise of that degree of care to prevent the injury”].)

Here, Plaintiff has alleged facts showing that she was discharged into an area of immediate danger (see Parker, supra, 158 Cal.App.2d at p. 603), not into a relatively safe space (see Jane Doe, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 421). The first amended complaint alleges that Uber is aware that sex trafficking of minors is a pervasive issue in the ride-sharing industry and “claims to implement driver training programs to identify and address human trafficking and abusive situations . . . .” (FAC ¶ 40.) The first amended complaint also alleges that Uber and Does 1-51 knew or should have known that Plaintiff was a minor, that she did not have an Uber account, that the trip was requested by someone other than Plaintiff who did have an Uber account, and that she was unaccompanied, all in violation of Uber’s policies and guidelines. The Court accepts these allegations as true for the purpose of the demurrer and concludes that Plaintiff has adequately pleaded facts giving rise to a duty which Uber owed Plaintiff.

Uber contends the Court should not impose a duty based on a weighing of the Rowland factors. Accepting Plaintiff’s properly pleaded allegations as true and having balanced the Rowland factors, the Court concludes that the Rowland factors do not prevent Plaintiff from alleging that Uber owed Plaintiff a duty.

Uber contends that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts showing that Uber’s alleged negligence caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Accepting Plaintiff’s properly pleaded allegations as true for the purpose of the demurrer, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts showing causation.

Last, Uber argues that the assailant’s criminal assault was a superseding cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Accepting Plaintiff’s properly pleaded allegations as true for the purpose of the demurrer, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has pleaded facts showing that the assault “involve[d] a particular and foreseeable hazard inflicted upon a member of a foreseeable class.” (See Kane v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 350, 360.)

The Court OVERRULES the demurrer of Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier LLC, and Raiser-CA, LLC.

Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

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[1] “To depart from the general principle that all persons owe a duty of care to avoid injuring others . . . ‘involves the balancing of a number of considerations’: ‘the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’ ” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 217, quoting Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113.)