Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV07505, Date: 2023-09-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV07505 Hearing Date: September 26, 2023 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On April 5, 2023, Plaintiff Victor Campos (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Braulio Martinez (“Defendant”) and Does 1-20 for negligence.
On August 31, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to strike to be heard on September 26, 2023. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.
Trial is currently scheduled for October 2, 2024.
PARTY’S REQUESTS
Defendant requests that the Court strike the complaint's request for punitive damages and references to driving under the influence and despicable conduct.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to strike
“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The Court may “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading of from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) “Where the motion to strike is based on matter of which the court may take judicial notice pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, such matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (b).)
“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 (Clauson).) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Ibid.) “In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Ibid.)
B. Punitive damages
“(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
* * *
“(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
“(2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.
“(3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (c).)
“In addition to the requirement that the operative complaint set forth the elements as stated in section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages.” (Today's IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193, citing Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872 (Brousseau).) “Punitive damages may not be pleaded generally.” (Ibid., citing Brousseau, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 872.)
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
Plaintiff alleges that on August 31, 2021, Defendant was driving his vehicle negligently and “under the influence (despicable conduct)” and, as a result, collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle, injuring Plaintiff.
Defendant knew or should have known that his acts or omissions created an unreasonable risk of harm but negligently failed to take steps to make the conditions safe or warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition.
Plaintiff prays for compensatory and punitive damages.
B. Defendant’s motion to strike
1. Driving under the influence
The complaint alleges that Defendant was driving under the influence at the time of the accident. The allegation is sufficiently specific to withstand a motion to strike. Therefore, the Court denies the motion to strike the driving under the influence allegation. (See Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 6:123, p. 6-39 [“ ‘The complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged’ ” (quoting C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872)].)
2. Punitive damage claim and reference to despicable conduct
Defendant moves to strike the punitive damage claim and reference to despicable conduct, arguing the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support a punitive damage award and the allegations are “conclusory in nature and fail to satisfy pleading requirements entitling a party to such recovery” under Civil Code section 3294.
“[C]onclusory allegations will not be stricken where they are supported by other, factual allegations in the complaint.” (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 7:181, p. 7(l)-80, emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).)
The Court has concluded the complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant drove while under the influence at the time of the accident. The question, then, is whether the allegation, along with other factual allegations in the complaint, supports a claim for punitive damages for purposes of a motion to strike.
“Simple negligence will not justify an award of punitive damages.” (Spencer v. San Francisco Brick Co. (1907) 5 Cal.App.126, 128.) But a complaint states facts that support a punitive damage claim when its gravamen is that “‘[d]efendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby’” (Peterson v. Superior Court (1983) 31 Cal.3d 147, 163, quoting Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896 (Taylor).) “[T]he act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probably dangerous consequences.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 892.)
“There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 896-897.)
Applying this standard, as well as the rule that punitive damages may not be pleaded generally, the Court concludes that the complaint does not allege facts showing that Defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud for purposes of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c). The complaint alleges that Defendant knew or should have known that his acts or omissions created an unreasonable risk of harm but negligently failed to take steps to make the conditions safe or warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition. This allegation is too general to support a claim that, in driving under the influence, Defendant acted with a conscious disregard for the safety of others.
Therefore, the Court grants the motion to strike the punitive damages claim and reference to despicable conduct.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendant Braulio Martinez’s motion to strike the punitive damage claim and reference to despicable conduct with 30 days leave to amend.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.