Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV07615, Date: 2024-08-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV07615    Hearing Date: August 20, 2024    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

On April 6, 2023, Plaintiff Ivan Garcia (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Defendant”) and Does 1-26 for negligence. 

On July 24, 2024, Defendant filed a demurrer and a motion to strike.  The demurrer and motion to strike were set to be heard on August 20, 2024.  Plaintiff has not filed oppositions. 

Trial is currently scheduled for October 3, 2024. 

PARTY’S REQUESTS 

Defendant asks the Court to sustain the demurrer and strike portions of the complaint. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.   Demurrer 

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: 

* * *

 “(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 

“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, 'uncertain' includes ambiguous and unintelligible.” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).) 

In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading”].) 

“For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law).”  (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2024) ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25, emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).) 

B.   Motion to strike 

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof . . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)  The Court may “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)  “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading of from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) 

“In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  “In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.”  (Ibid.) 

DISCUSSION 

A.   The complaint 

The complaint alleges that on August 29, 2022, Defendants negligently entrusted, maintained, controlled, managed, drove, manufactured, operated, repaired, distributed, inspected, and repaired their automobile so as to cause their vehicle, or the vehicle carrying them, to collide and come into direct contact with Plaintiff’s vehicle, injuring Plaintiff. 

In paragraph 14, the complaint alleges: 

“[Defendant] is liable for the wrongful acts of its employees/agents hired by [Defendant], SUCH AS OPERATOR 25476, who, upon information and belief, was working for the said Defendant within the course and scope of employment/agency with [Defendant] at the time of the traffic collision described herein and who, by wrongful acts as alleged herein (including negligence), actually and proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries and damages.” 

B.   Defendant’s demurrer 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff may not assert negligence, a common law claim, against a government entity like Plaintiff.  (See Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a) [“Except as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person”].) 

Although the complaint’s is titled “Negligence,” the complaint alleges: “Defendants’ liability to the Plaintiff is based upon the laws of this State, including but not limited to, Government Code §§ 815.2(a), 815.4, 820(a), Vehicle Code § 17001 and Civil Code § 1714 . . . .”  (Complaint ¶ 15.) 

Vehicle Code section 17001 provides: 

“A public entity is liable for death or injury to person or property proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public entity acting within the scope of his employment.” 

(Veh. Code, § 17001.) 

          Plaintiff has pleaded facts that support a claim under Vehicle Code section 17001. 

Defendant also argues the complaint is uncertain.  The Court finds the complaint pleads sufficient facts to put Defendant on notice of the claims against it.  (See Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:85, p. 7(l)-44 [“A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her”].)  “[I]f the complaint contains enough facts to apprise defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, failure to label each cause of action is not ground for demurrer.”  (Id., ¶ 7:86.1, pp. 7(l)-44 to 7(l)-45.) 

The Court overrules the demurrer. 

C.   Defendant’s motion to strike 

1.    Punitive damage claim 

Defendant appears to ask the Court to strike a claim for punitive damages.  (Motion p. 3.)  The complaint does not include a punitive damage claim.  The Court denies the request. 

2.    Portions of paragraphs 12, 19, and 20 

Defendant asks the Court to strike portions of paragraphs 12, 19, and 20 because, according to Defendant, they do not support a claim under Government Code sections 835, 840, or 840.2.  Plaintiff has not alleged claims under these statutes.  

The Court grants the motion in part and strikes the last sentence of paragraph 20, which states: “Defendants, and each of them, negligently failed to take steps to either make the condition safe or warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition, thereby causing the hereinafter described injuries and damages to Plaintiff.”  

3.    Prejudgment interest 

Defendant asks the Court to strike Plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest.  The Court denies the request because Defendant has not shown that none of Plaintiff’s damages are “certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation” for purposes of Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a). 

4.    Attorney’s fees 

Defendant asks the Court to strike Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees.  The Court grants the request and strikes the portion of the prayer that requests attorney’s fees. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court OVERRULES Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s demurrer. 

The Court GRANTS in part Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s motion to strike as follows:  

·       The Court strikes the last sentence of paragraph 20 of the complaint, which states: “Defendants, and each of them, negligently failed to take steps to either make the condition safe or warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition, thereby causing the hereinafter described injuries and damages to Plaintiff.”

·       The Court strikes the request for attorney’s fees in the complaint’s prayer for relief.

  The Court grants 30 days leave to amend the complaint.

In all other respects, the Court DENIES the motion to strike.
 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.