Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV08136, Date: 2023-08-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV08136    Hearing Date: December 18, 2023    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.  

BACKGROUND 

On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff Varina Goretti Carvajal (“Plaintiff”) filed this action Defendants Los Angeles Unified School District (“Defendant”) and Does 1-100 for negligence and dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835. 

On June 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, which added claims for intentional spoliation of evidence and negligent spoliation of evidence. 

On August 4, 2023, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and dangerous condition of public property based on the exclusive remedy of workers’ compensation.  The Court also sustained the demurrer to Plaintiff’s claims for intentional and negligent spoliation because Plaintiff had not identified a statutory basis for government tort liability.  The Court granted Plaintiff thirty days leave to amend. 

On September 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. 

On October 9, 2023, Defendant filed a demurrer to be heard on November 7, 2023.  On October 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition.  (The Court exercises its discretion to consider the opposition despite its late filing.) On October 31, 2023, Defendant filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to December 18, 2023. On December 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a supplemental declaration.  On December 12, 2023, Defendant filed a supplemental reply.  (The Court declines to consider the supplemental filings.) 

Trial is scheduled for October 9, 2024.  

PARTIES’ REQUESTS 

Defendant requests that the Court sustain the demurrer. 

Plaintiff requests that the Court overrule the demurrer. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.      Demurrer 

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: 

* * *

“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. . . ." 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) 

In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading”].) 

“For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not conclusions, deductions, or conclusions of facts or law).”  (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25 (Cal. Practice Guide), emphasis omitted.) 

B.       Workers' compensation exclusivity 

“Labor Code section 3600, subdivision (a), provides that, subject to certain particular exceptions and conditions, workers' compensation liability, ‘in lieu of any other liability whatsoever’ will exist ‘against an employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the course of the employment.’ ” (Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 708, fn. omitted (Fermino).) “[T]he basis for the exclusivity rule in workers’ compensation law is the ‘presumed “compensation bargain,” pursuant to which the employer assumes liability for industrial personal injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for limitations on the amount of that liability. The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16 (Shoemaker).) 

“[C]ertain types of injurious employer misconduct remain outside this bargain. There are some instances in which, although the injury arose in the course of employment, the employer engaging in that conduct “ ‘ “stepped out of [its] proper role[ ]” ’ ” or engaged in conduct of “ ‘ “questionable relationship to the employment.” ’ ” (Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 708, quoting Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 16.) “When a complaint affirmatively alleges facts indicating coverage by Workers’ Compensation laws but fails to state additional facts negating the application of the exclusive remedy rule, no civil action will lie and the complaint is subject to a general demurrer . . . . This pleading requirement is jurisdictionally-based; if the complaint indicates that the action is within the scope of the Workers’ Compensation law, the superior court has no jurisdiction over it unless additional allegations indicate that an exception to the exclusive remedy rule applies.” (Hughes v. Western MacArthur Co. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 951, 957.) 

DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

          Denied. 

DISCUSSION 

A.   Second Amended Complaint 

The Second Amended Complaint alleges the following: 

          On September 14, 2022, after Plaintiff completed her work as a librarian at Defendant’s high school, she returned to the library to retrieve a personal belonging and decided to stay to talk to a co-worker.  During the conversation, Plaintiff’s chair collapsed, causing Plaintiff to fall to the floor.  Plaintiff was “off the clock” when she fell and was not performing services incidental to her employment as a librarian. 

B.   Demurrer 

1.    Workers’ compensation exclusivity rule 

          Labor Code section 3600, subdivision (a)(9), provides in part that the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy exists “[w]here the injury does not arise out of voluntary participation in any off-duty recreational, social, or athletic activity not constituting part of the employee’s work-related duties, except where these activities are a reasonable expectancy of, or are expressly or impliedly required by, the employment.”  (See Mason v. Lake Dolores Group (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 822, 835-839 & fn. 4 [discussing statute].) 

          Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges that her injury arose out of her voluntary participation in an off-duty social activity – a conversation in the library with her co-worker -- not constituting part of her work-related duties. 

          Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff’s conversation in the library with her co-worker was a “a reasonable expectancy of, or [was] expressly or impliedly required by, the employment” (Lab. Code, § 3600, subd. (a)(9)) or that a trier of fact could infer the conversation was beneficial to Defendant (see Mason, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 839). 

          The Court therefore overrules Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and dangerous condition of public property based on the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy.  

2.    Sham pleading rule 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint omits harmful allegations contained in the first amended complaint.  The Court has considered the allegations of both complaints and finds that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint makes permissible amendments and is not subject to the sham pleading rule. 

3.    Spoliation claims 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff did comply with the Government Claims Act's claims presentation requirement for her spoliation claims.  Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.  

Plaintiff’s claim, dated February 21, 2023, does not assert that Defendant destroyed any evidence.  (See Declaration of Toni Tosello ¶ 3 & exh. A.)  Plaintiff has not submitted an amended claim to Defendant.  (Declaration of Toni Tosello ¶ 5.) 

In addition, courts have declined to permit parties to assert causes of action for intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence.  (See Forbes v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 48, 57 [“there is no tort cause of action against a litigant or third party for intentional or negligent destruction of evidence”].) 

Therefore, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff's claims for intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence without leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court OVERRULES Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s demurrer to Plaintiff Varina Goretti Carvajal’s claims for negligence and dangerous condition of public property. 

The Court SUSTAINS Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s demurrer to Plaintiff Varina Goretti Carvajal’s claims for intentional spoliation of evidence and negligent spoliation of evidence without leave to amend. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days of the date of the continued hearing.