Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV08249, Date: 2023-09-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV08249 Hearing Date: September 6, 2023 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposing, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On April 13, 2023, Plaintiff Mauricio Esteban Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) and Does 1-25 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. On June 15, 2023, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendants Claire Geelan (“Geelan”) as Doe 1, Rasier, LLC as Doe 2, and Rasier-CA, LLC as Doe 3.
On May 17, 2023, Uber filed an answer. On July 20, 2023, Rasier, LLC and Rasier-CA, LLC filed an answer.
On July 20, 2023, Uber, Rasier, LLC, and Rasier-CA, LLC (“Moving Defendants”) filed a motion to compel arbitration and for a stay, to be heard on August 15, 2023. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to September 6, 2023. On August 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On August 8, 2023, Moving Defendants filed a reply.
Trial is currently scheduled for October 10, 2024.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Moving Defendants request that the Court compel arbitration and say the action pending the completion of arbitration.
Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the motion.
MOVING DEFENDANTS' EVIDENTIARY OBJECTION
LEGAL STANDARD
“A
written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a
controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save
upon such grounds as exist for the rescission of any contract. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 provides:
“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:
“(a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or
“(b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.
“(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. For purposes of this section, a pending court action or special proceeding includes an action or proceeding initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to compel arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the petition. This subdivision shall not be applicable to an agreement to arbitrate disputes as to the professional negligence of a health care provider made pursuant to Section 1295.
“(d) The petitioner is a state or federally chartered depository institution that, on or after January 1, 2018, is seeking to apply a written agreement to arbitrate, contained in a contract consented to by a respondent consumer, to a purported contractual relationship with that respondent consumer that was created by the petitioner fraudulently without the respondent consumer’s consent and by unlawfully using the respondent consumer’s personal identifying information, as defined in Section 1798.92 of the Civil Code.
“If the court determines that a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy exists, an order to arbitrate that controversy may not be refused on the ground that the petitioner’s contentions lack substantive merit.
“If the court determines that there are other issues between the petitioner and the respondent which are not subject to arbitration and which are the subject of a pending action or special proceeding between the petitioner and the respondent and that a determination of such issues may make the arbitration unnecessary, the court may delay its order to arbitrate until the determination of such other issues or until such earlier time as the court specifies.
“Arbitration is a favored procedure. An ‘ “ ‘arbitration should be upheld unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute.’ ” ’ ” (Salgado v. Carrows Restaurants, Inc. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 356, 360, quoting Cruise v. Kroger Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 390, 397.) “Doubts about the applicability of the arbitration clause to the dispute should be resolved ‘in favor of sending the parties to arbitration.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Cione v. Foresters Equity Services, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 625, 642.)
“[N]o single test delineates the nature of the conduct that will constitute a waiver of arbitration.” (St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 (St. Agnes).) “ ‘ “In the past, California courts have found a waiver of the right to demand arbitration in a variety of contexts, ranging from situations in which the party seeking to compel arbitration has previously taken steps inconsistent with an intent to invoke arbitration [citations] to instances in which the petitioning party has unreasonably delayed in undertaking the procedure. [Citations.] The decisions likewise hold that the 'bad faith' or 'wilful misconduct' of a party may constitute a waiver and thus justify a refusal to compel arbitration. [Citations.]” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1196, quoting Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 983.)
In St. Agnes, the Supreme Court agreed that the following factors are relevant and properly considered in assessing waiver claims: “(1) whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether ‘the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked’ and the parties ‘were well into preparation of a lawsuit’ before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) ‘whether important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration] had taken place’; and (6) whether the delay ‘affected, misled, or prejudiced’ the opposing party.” ’ ” (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1196, quoting Sobremonte v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 980, 992.)
DISCUSSION
On or about April 22, 2018, Plaintiff registered as a rider through the Uber App. (Gaddis Decl. ¶ 7; Ex. A.) As part of the registration process, Plaintiff agreed to be bound by Uber’s December 2017 terms, access to which was prominently displayed during the registration process. (Ex. B.) On March 5, 2021, June 19, 2021, December 22, 2021, and January 28, 2023, Plaintiff was presented with an in-app blocking pop-up screen with the header “We’ve updated our terms.” (Gaddis Decl. ¶ 8.) It stated, in large type, “We encourage you to read our Updated Terms in Full,” and contained hyperlinks to the Terms of Use and Privacy Notice in the pop-up. (Gaddis Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff clicked the checkbox all four times, consenting to the terms and conditions. (Gaddis Decl. ¶ 11.) These terms of use required Plaintiff to resolve applicable claims against Moving Defendants in arbitration and to waive his right to a jury trial. (Ex. D.) Applicable claims included “any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof or the use of the Service or Application...,” regardless of date of accrual. (Ex. D.)
On April
13, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that on October 17, 2021, he
was injured in a motor vehicle accident while riding as an Uber passenger in an
Uber vehicle driven by Geelan.
In May
and June 2023, Moving Defendants’ counsel asked Plaintiff’s counsel to stipulate
to participate in arbitration. (Brauns Dec. ¶¶ 5, 7.) Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that Plaintiff
would not stipulate to arbitrate his claims. (Brauns Dec. ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff argues that Moving Defendants waived their right to arbitrate because Uber knew about Plaintiff’s claim for over one year and attempted to obtain a recorded statement from Plaintiff without mentioning arbitration. Plaintiff cites no authority that supports the contention that a party waives arbitration on these facts. Moving Defendants were entitled to attempt to resolve the claim informally until Plaintiff filed suit. Once Plaintiff filed suit, Moving Defendants promptly asked Plaintiff to stipulate to arbitration and, when he refused, moved to compel arbitration.
Plaintiff also argues that he should not have to arbitrate his claims because Geelan is not bound by the arbitration agreement, raising “a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.” [1] (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2, subd. (c).) However, the statute provides several options when “a party to the arbitration is also a party to litigation in a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party as set forth under subdivision (c).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) One of those options permits the court to “order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action or special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) The Court concludes this is the best option here.
Moving Defendants have presented evidence of (1) a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy, and (2) a party to the agreement’s refusal to arbitrate. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) Plaintiff has presented no evidence showing the agreement is unenforceable. The Court grants the motion and orders proceedings in this case stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS the motion of Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier-CA, LLC and Rasier, LLC to compel arbitration and for a stay. Plaintiff is ordered to arbitrate his claims against Moving Defendants. The action, including Plaintiff's claims against non-parties to the arbitration agreement, is stayed pending the outcome of arbitration.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving
parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court
within five days.
[1] The Court notes but does not address Moving
Defendants’ argument that California’s arbitration statutes do not apply here
because the arbitration agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. The choice of law issue does not affect the Court's ruling.