Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV08991, Date: 2025-03-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV08991    Hearing Date: March 24, 2025    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

On April 21, 2023, Plaintiff Phylisha Bullock (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Defendant”), John Doe, and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. 

On February 15, 2024, the Court overruled Defendant’s demurrer.  On February 22, 2024, Defendant filed an answer. 

On July 26, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.  The motion was set for hearing on March 12, 2025.  On February 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition.  On February 27, 2025, Defendant filed a reply.  The Court continued the hearing to March 24, 2025. 

Trial is scheduled for April 16, 2025. 

PARTIES’ REQUESTS 

Defendant asks the Court to grant summary judgment. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion. 

PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

          Sustained:    1, 2, 3 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.   Summary judgment 

“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)  

          When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.”  (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.) 

          “Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.”  (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)  

          In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) 

B.   Government Claims Act 

Government Code section 945.6, subdivision (a), provides: 

“(a) Except as provided in Sections 946.4 and 946.6 and subject to subdivision (b), any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of this division must be commenced: 

“(1) If written notice is given in accordance with Section 913, not later than six months after the date such notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail. 

“(2) If written notice is not given in accordance with Section 913, within two years from the accrual of the cause of action. If the period within which the public entity is required to act is extended pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 912.4, the period of such extension is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action under this paragraph.” 

(Gov. Code, § 945.6, subd. (a).) 

“The Government Claims Act ‘established a standardized procedure’ for bringing personal injury claims against local governmental entities.”  (Hernandez v. City of Stockton (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1230.) “As a general rule, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity until a written claim, known as a government claim, is presented to and rejected by that entity.”  (Ibid.) 

“If the governmental entity provides the claimant with written notice of rejection, ‘the claimant must bring an action against the entity within six months after “the date such notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail.” ’ ” (Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246, quoting Gov. Code, § 945.6, subd. (a)(1).)  “This six-month deadline ‘is mandatory and must be strictly complied with.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Julian v. City of San Diego (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 169, 176.) 

“Proper mail delivery [of a notice of rejection] requires deposit in the U.S. post office, a mailbox or other U.S. government mail facility, in a sealed envelope, properly addressed with postage paid . . . in which event the notice is deemed to have been presented and received at the time of deposit.”  (Z. Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury (Rutter 2023) ¶ 5:34.6, p. 5-39, original emphasis, citing Gov. Code, § 915.2, subd. (a) [any notice under this chapter “shall be deposited in the United States post office, a mailbox, sub-post office, substation, mail chute, or other similar facility regularly maintained by the government of the United States, in a sealed envelope, properly addressed, with postage paid” and “shall be deemed to have been presented and received at the time of the deposit”]; id., ¶ 5:38, p. 5-42 [“The six-month period commences to run as soon as the notice is properly delivered or mailed [citation] even though not actually received by the claimant” (original emphasis)]; see Katelaris v. County of Orange (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1216.) 

DISCUSSION 

A.   The complaint 

The complaint includes the following allegations: 

On or about April 26, 2022, at or near Western Avenue and Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles, while Plaintiff was boarding or exiting Defendants’ bus, Defendant John Doe suddenly, abruptly and without warning closed the bus doors on Plaintiff, injuring her. 

“Defendants, LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; and DOES 1 through 50, were served with a claim for damages pursuant to Government Code Section 911.2 on or about May 18, 2022 and has not been rejected by an agent for Defendants LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.” 

B.   Undisputed facts 

Carl Warren & Company acts as Metro’s third-party administrator. 

C.   Defendant has not carried its initial burden on summary judgment 

Defendant asks the Court to grant summary judgment because Plaintiff did not file a complaint within Government Code section 945.6, subdivision (a)(1)’s six-month limitations period. 

To support this argument, Defendant has presented the declaration of Charles Skiffer (“Skiffer”), an employee of Carl Warren & Company.  Skiffer states that a former employee of Carl Warren & Company caused a notice of rejection to be sent on July 7, 2022 in the usual course of business to the address Plaintiff provided in her claim for damages.  (Declaration of Charles Skiffer ¶ 5 and exh. B.) 

Skiffer does not explain how he knows about the former employee’s actions or provide any basis for a conclusion that he has the personal knowledge required to admit his declaration.  The Court therefore sustains Plaintiff’s objection to Skiffer’s declaration (and to the declaration of Defendant’s counsel).  In the absence of admissible evidence, Defendant has not carried its initial burden on summary judgment. 

The Court denies Defendant’s motion.

CONCLUSION 

The Court DENIES Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff Phylisha Bullock’s complaint. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.