Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV09001, Date: 2025-05-02 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 23STCV09001 Hearing Date: May 2, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the documents submitted in support of applications for default judgment, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On April 24, 2023, Plaintiffs Keenan Conroy (“Conroy”), Juan Delgado (“Delgado”), Melissa Cossio (“Cossio”), and Juan Antonio Gutierrez (“Gutierrez”) filed this action against Defendants Shannon Eileen Dufficy (“Defendant”) and Does 1-20 for negligence and loss of consortium.
On March 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an amended proof of service showing substituted service of the summons, complaint, statements of damages, and other documents on Defendant on April 27, 2023. The same day, the clerk entered Defendant’s default.
On April 22, 2024, Falls Lake Fire and Casualty Company (“Intervenor”) filed a motion for leave to file a complaint-in-intervention. On July 10, 2024, the Court granted the motion. On August 7, 2024, Intervenor filed a complaint-in-intervention against Defendant and Does 1-20 for motor vehicle tort, general negligence, and subrogation under Labor Code section 3850 et seq. Intervenor alleged that it was the workers’ compensation insurance carrier and administrator for Plaintiffs’ employer and Intervenor’s insured, Brea Glass and Mirror, Inc. Intervenor sought “recovery of all workers’ compensation benefits paid to or on behalf of injured workers Juan Delgado, Keenan Conroy, and Juan Gutierrez” as the result of Defendant’s alleged negligence.
On November 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed statements of damages listing the following damages:
For Conroy and Delgado:
Pain, suffering, and inconvenience
$250,000.00
Emotional
distress $250,000.00
Medical
expenses to date $300,000.00
est.
Future
medical expenses (present value) $200,000.00 est.
Loss of
earnings to date $15,000.00 est.
Loss of
future earning capacity (present value) $200,000.00
est.
Property
damages $10,000.00 est.
Punitive damages $1,000,000.00
For Cossio:
Loss of consortium
$75,000.
Emotional
distress $50,000.00
Medical
expenses to date $15,000.00 est.
Future
medical expenses (present value) $75,000.00 est.
Loss of
earnings to date $15,000.00 est.
Loss of
future earning capacity (present value) $30,000.00
est.
Property
damages $10,000.00 est.
Punitive
damages $1,000,000.00
On December 5, 2024, the Court dismissed the Doe defendants without prejudice at Plaintiffs’ request.
On December 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed applications for default judgment.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter default judgments against Defendant and award Plaintiffs the following amounts:
Conroy: $2,225,404.09, consisting of $725,000.00 in special damages, $500,000.00 in general damages, $1,000,000.00 in punitive damages, and $404.09 in costs.
Delgado: $2,225,404.08, consisting of $725,000.00 in special damages, $500,000.00 in general damages, $1,000,000.00 in punitive damages, and $404.08 in costs.
Cossio: $75,000.00, consisting of $75,000.00 in special damages.
Gutierrez: $1,245,404.08, consisting of $145,000.00 in special damages, $100,000.00 in general damages, $1,000,000.00 in punitive damages, and $404.08 in costs.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Default judgment
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a), provides:
“[With exceptions that do not apply here,] [a] party seeking a default judgment on declarations must use mandatory Request for Entry of Default (Application to Enter Default) (form CIV-100) . . . The following must be included in the documents filed with the clerk:
“(1) Except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim;
“(2) Declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested;
“(3) Interest computations as necessary;
“(4) A memorandum of costs and disbursements;
“(5) A declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought;
“(6) A proposed form of judgment;
“(7) A dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment against specified parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment;
“(8) Exhibits as necessary; and
“(9) A request for attorney fees if allowed by
statute or by the agreement of the parties.”
(Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a).)
B. Damages
On a request for default judgment, “[w]here a cause of action is stated in the complaint, plaintiff merely needs to introduce evidence establishing a prima facie case for damages.” (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2024) ¶ 5:213.1, p. 5-56, citing Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361 [trial court erred in applying preponderance of the evidence standard].)
The relief granted to a plaintiff upon entry of a defendant's default cannot exceed the amount demanded in the complaint or, for personal injury cases where damages may not be stated in the complaint, the amount listed in the statement of damages. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580, subd. (a), 585, subd. (b).) “The notice requirement of section 580 was designed to insure fundamental fairness.” (Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 494.) The statute insures that “defendants in cases which involve a default judgment have adequate notice of the judgments that may be taken against them. [Citation.] ‘If a judgment other than that which is demanded is taken against him, [the defendant] has been deprived of his day in court—a right to a hearing on the matter adjudicated.’ ’’ (Id. at p. 493.) A trial court exceeds its jurisdiction if it awards damages in excess of the amount specified in the complaint or statement of damages. (Id. at p. 494.)
DISCUSSION
A. Keenan Conroy, Juan Delgado, and Juan Antonio Gutierrez
1. Special damages
In a declaration supporting Plaintiffs’ requests for default judgment, Plaintiffs’ counsel states that “all medical treatment [for Conroy, Delgado, and Gutierrez] was secured through their employer[’]s workers compensation insurance . . . .” (Paoli dec. ¶ 6.) “[A]ll of the medical care [for Conroy, Delgado, and Gutierrez] was administered through the workers compensation system . . . .” (Paoli dec. ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs’ counsel did not learn about “[t]he payments of benefits for Plaintiffs[’] medical care” until Intervenor filed its action in intervention. (Paoli dec. ¶ 9.)
Similarly, Conroy, Delgado, and Gutierrez each state that Intervenor is asserting a subrogation lien for payments “that [Intervenor] has claimed it paid in medical bills and payments to me as a direct result of the injuries I suffered as a result of the collision caused by Defendant . . . .” (Conroy dec. ¶ 4; Delgado dec. ¶ 5; Gutierrez dec. ¶ 5.)
“Plaintiff is entitled to recover the ‘reasonable cost’ of past medical care necessitated by defendant’s tortious conduct. However, the fundamental purpose of compensatory damages is to make plaintiff ‘whole’—not to bestow a ‘profit’ or windfall [citation]. Hence, ‘reasonable’ compensation for past medical expenses may not exceed the amount actually paid or incurred—whether by plaintiff directly or by private insurance, Medi-Cal, Medicare, plaintiff’s employer or any ‘collateral source.’ ” (Z. Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury (Rutter 2023) ¶ 3:352, p. 3-59 (“Personal Injury Practice Guide”).)
“Where plaintiff’s medical insurer negotiates an amount [of medical expenses] less than the medical provider’s ordinary rates, plaintiff may not recover the ‘negotiated amount differential.’ This is so even if the full or ordinary rates arguably represent the ‘reasonable value’ of the medical services: ‘Having never incurred the full bill, plaintiff could not recover it in damages for economic loss.’ ” (Personal Injury Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 3:353, p. 3-59, quoting Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541, 560-567 (Howell) [plaintiff not entitled to $189,979 “reasonable value” of services rendered by medical providers who accepted $59,692 pursuant to agreement with plaintiff’s insurer].)
Here, Plaintiffs have not explained whether, in light of the apparent payment of their medical expenses by their employer's workers' compensation insurer, their request for medical expenses as an element of special damages complies with the rule stated in Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th 541.
In addition, Plaintiffs do not explain how they calculated their requests for special damages or how much they are requesting for each element of special damages. As a result, the Court cannot determine if Plaintiffs have put Defendant on notice of these amounts in their statements of damages. If Plaintiffs’ requests for special damages include requests for future medical expenses, loss of earnings to date, loss of future earning capacity, or property damage, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence to support these requests.
2. General damages
Conroy and Delgado each request $500,000.00 in general damages and Gutierrez requests $100,000.00 in general damages. Plaintiffs have not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case for general damages awards in these amounts.
3. Punitive damages
Conroy, Delgado, and Gutierrez each request $1,000,000.00 in punitive damages. However, Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence of Defendant's financial condition, which is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages on which Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. (See Del Junco v. Hufnagel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 789, 791 [reversing default judgment's punitive damage award because record contained no proof of defendant's financial condition].) The Court cannot grant the requests for punitive damages on this record.
B. Melissa Cossio
Melissa Cossio has not submitted a declaration supporting her request for $75,000.00 in damages for loss of consortium.
Delgado states in his declaration: “My life has not been the same since the collision. Since the date of the collision, I have been unable to fully participate in my typical marital responsibilities with my wife, MELISSA COSSIO. As a result, our intimacy suffered while I was recovering for at least six months and the chores I was typically responsible for fulfilling at home, such as taking out trash, helping with dinner, and the like, all fell on her shoulders.” (Delgado dec. ¶ 6.)
Delgado’s statement about the effect of the collision on his life does not support an award of $75,000.00 to Cossio for loss or consortium.
The Court denies Plaintiffs’ applications without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff Keenan Conroy’s application for default judgment against Defendant Shannon Eileen Dufficy filed on December 16, 2024.
The Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff Juan Delgado’s application for default judgment against Defendant Shannon Eileen Dufficy filed on December 16, 2024.
The Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff Melissa Cossio’s application for default judgment against Defendant Shannon Eileen Dufficy filed on December 16, 2024.
The Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff Juan Antonio Gutierrez’s application for default judgment against Defendant Shannon Eileen Dufficy filed on December 16, 2024.
Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of this ruling.