Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV09864, Date: 2023-12-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV09864    Hearing Date: December 7, 2023    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows.  

BACKGROUND 

On May 3, 2023, Plaintiff Mag Cho (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Fully Hope Church (“Church”) and Does 1-50 for general negligence and premises liability. 

On August 3, 2023, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant Hope Sight Mission Association (“Hope Sight”) as Doe 1. 

On September 29, 2023, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendants Sung Chan Park (“Park”) as Doe 2, Ji Min Ahn as Doe 3, Ki Seock Jang as Doe 4, Chung Ik Kim as Doe 5, JNC Properties, LLC (“JNC Properties”) as Doe 6, and John Kwon as Doe 7. 

On October 24, 2023, Church filed an answer. On November 29, 2023, Park and JNC Properties filed an answer. 

On November 1, 2023, Hope Sight filed a demurrer to be heard on December 7, 2023.  Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. 

On December 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed a request to dismiss Hope Sight from the complaint without prejudice. 

Trial is scheduled for October 30, 2024. 

PARTY’S REQUEST 

Hope Sight requests that the Court sustain the demurrer. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.   Demurrer 

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: 

* * * 

“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 

“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, ‘uncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible. . . .” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).) 

In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading”].) 

“For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not conclusions, deductions, or conclusions of facts or law).”  (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25, emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).) 

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550 (Doe).) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) “[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3, citing Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135 (Lickiss).) In addition, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, courts strictly construe a demurrer for uncertainty “because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Lickiss, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135, citing Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) 

B.  Premises liability and negligence 

“‘The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence.’” (Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1207, quoting Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) “Accordingly, the plaintiff must prove, “ ‘ “a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Beacon Residential Community Assn. v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP (2014) 59 Cal.4th 568, 573.) 

DISCUSSION 

A.   The complaint 

The complaint alleges the following:         

          General negligence claim:  On or about October 24, 2021, Plaintiff entered Defendants’ premises located at 1029 South Normandie Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90006 (“premises”) and a stack of chairs fell on Plaintiff.  Plaintiff sustained serious injuries and incurred damages as direct result of the negligence of Defendants in failing to properly and securely stack the chairs so they would not fall. Defendants were further negligent in managing, supervising, controlling and/or operating the premises including, but not limited to, negligently hiring, training, supervising, controlling and/or monitoring employees and agents responsible for the stacking of the chairs as well as inspections, supervision, control and operations; and failing to provide a safe, suitable and adequate premises for individuals using the premises. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that said hazardous, dangerous conditions were caused and created by Defendants. Defendants also failed to warn Plaintiff of the risks and dangers which Defendants created or knew about, or in the existence of reasonable care should have known about, and which were unknown and not readily apparent to Plaintiff.  Defendants' failure to warn was a direct legal cause of Plaintiffs injuries and damages. Defendants had actual and/or constructive notice of the dangerous conditions. 

Premises liability claim:  Plaintiff was injured when negligently and improperly stacked chairs fell on Plaintiff while on the premises, causing injuries/damages to Plaintiff. Defendants are negligent for their failure to provide a safe, adequate premises. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that said hazardous, dangerous conditions were caused by Defendants and/or existed for a sufficient time prior to the incident for Defendants to have corrected, removed, and/or warned Plaintiff of said conditions, which Defendants negligently and carelessly failed to do. Defendants had actual and/or constructive notice. Plaintiff incorporates the facts as set forth in the General Negligence Cause of Action. 

B.   Hope Sight’s demurrer 

Hope Sight argues that it moved out of the premises three years before the alleged incident and no longer owned or controlled the property.  Hope Sight asks the Court to take judicial notice of the following documents which, according to Hope Sight, prove these facts: 

(1) “Grant Deed from Hope Sight to JNC Properties as of March 28, 2018 the subject property at 1029 S. Normandie Ave., Los Angeles, CA which was recorded at the Recorder’s Office of the County of Los Angeles, a copy of which is submitted herewith as Exhibit 1”; 

(2) “Grant Deed from Young Soo Chu to Hope Sight as of March 25, 2018 another property at 1508 6th Ave., Los Angeles, CA which was recorded at the Recorder’s Office of the County of Los Angeles, a copy of which is submitted herewith as Exhibit 2”; 

(3) “bills from Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (“LADWP”) in the years of 2018 and 2019 sent to Hope Sight at 1508 6 Ave., Los Angeles, CA, a copy of which is submitted herewith as Exhibit 3”; 

(4) “Annual Secured Property Tax Bills for the years of 2020 to 2021, and 2021 to 2022, sent to Hope Sight at 1508 6th Ave., Los Angeles, CA, a copy of which is submitted herewith as Exhibit 4”; and 

(5) “the statement of information recorded, as of September 2020 and April 2022, with California Secretary of State specifying Hope Sight’s address as 1508 6th Ave., Los Angeles, CA, a copy of which is submitted herewith as Exhibit 5.” 

The Court takes judicial notice of the documents under Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (h), and 453. 

The grant deed dated March 28, 2018 shows that Hope Sight transferred the premises to JNC Properties, which Plaintiff sued as Doe 6.  (Exh. 1.)  The complaint alleges that the Doe defendants were “agents or employees of other named defendants and acted within the scope of that agency or employment.”  Therefore, the Court cannot rule out the possibility that Hope Sight, through its alleged agent JNC Properties, retains an ownership interest in the premises that exposes it to potential liability under the complaint. 

The Court overrules the demurrer. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court OVERRULES Defendant Hope Sight Mission Association’s demurrer to Plaintiff Mag Cho’s complaint.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days of the date of the hearing.