Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV11368, Date: 2023-08-31 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV11368 Hearing Date: August 31, 2023 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On May 19, 2023, Plaintiff Kyle Jones (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Josue Galvez Navarro (“Defendant”) and Does 1-20 for negligence.
On July 21, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to strike to be heard on August 31, 2023.
Trial is currently scheduled for November 15, 2024.
PARTY’S REQUESTS
Defendant requests the Court strike the language “under the influence (despicable conduct)” from the complaint, as well as the request for punitive damages and attorneys' fees.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to strike
“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The Court may “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) “Where the motion to strike is based on matter of which the court may take judicial notice pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, such matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (b).)
“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 (Clauson).) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Ibid.) “In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Ibid.)
B. Punitive damages
“(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
* * *
“(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
“(2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.
“(3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (c).)
“In addition to the requirement that the operative complaint set forth the elements as stated in section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages.” (Today's IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193, citing Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872 (Brousseau).) “Punitive damages may not be pleaded generally.” (Ibid., citing Brousseau, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 872.)
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
Plaintiff alleges that on July 18, 2022, Defendant negligently operated an automobile while under the influence “and, as a proximate result of that negligent operation, collided with plaintiff's automobile.” Defendant “negligently entrusted, maintained, controlled, managed, drove, manufactured, operated, repaired, distributed, inspected, and repaired said automobile so as to cause their vehicle, or the vehicle carrying them, to collide and come into direct contact with Plaintiff’s person; thereby causing Plaintiff to suffer and sustain sever[e] injuries and damages.” (Complaint ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “knew, or in exercise of reasonable care customary for entrustment, maintenance, control, management, driving, manufacture, operation, repair, inspection, of said automobile, should have known such actions and omissions constituted a dangerous and an unreasonable risk of harm, of which Plaintiff was at all times unaware of.” Defendant “negligently failed to take steps to either make the condition safe or warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition, thereby causing the hereinafter described injuries and damages to Plaintiff.” (Complaint ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees.
B. Defendant’s motion to strike
Defendant
moves to strike the allegation that he was “under the influence” and the
prayers for punitive damages and attorney fees, arguing Plaintiff “has not
alleged facts sufficient to support the legal conclusion that defendant was
driving under the influence or acted despicably, or to support the prayers for
punitive damages or attorneys’ fees.”
1. Driving under the influence
On a motion to strike a claim for punitive damages, the Court assumes the truth of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations and decides, based on the face of the challenged pleading and judicially noticed matters, if the plaintiff has alleged ultimate facts showing an entitlement to this relief. (Clauson, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255.)
The complaint’s allegation that Defendant was driving under the influence is sufficiently specific to withstand a motion to strike. The Court denies the motion to strike the driving under the influence allegation.
2. Punitive damage claim
Defendant argues the complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating malice, fraud, or oppression. The Court has concluded the complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant drove while under the influence at the time of the accident. The question, then, is whether the allegation supports a claim for punitive damages for purposes of a motion to strike.
“Simple negligence will not justify an award of punitive damages.” (Spencer v. San Francisco Brick Co. (1907) 5 Cal.App.126, 128.) But a complaint states facts that support a punitive damage claim when its gravamen is that “‘[d]efendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby’” (Peterson v. Superior Court (1983) 31 Cal.3d 147, 163, quoting Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896 (Taylor).) “[T]he act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probably dangerous consequences.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 892.)
“There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 896-897.)
Applying this standard, the Court concludes that the complaint fails to allege facts showing that Defendant acted with “malice” (“despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others”) or “oppression” (“despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights”) for purposes of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c). The complaint does not allege facts showing that Defendant knew he created a safety hazard by driving under the influence or that he willfully consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication knowing that he would then drive in an impaired state. The Court therefore grants the motion to strike the punitive damage claim.
3. The attorney fee request
The complaint requests attorney fees as part of the judgment. The Court agrees with Defendant that the complaint does not allege a contractual, statutory, or other legal basis for an attorney fee award. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10) [court may award attorney fees as an item of costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law].)
The Court grants the motion to strike the request for attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Defendant Josue Galvez Navarro’s motion to strike the complaint’s allegation that Defendant drove while under the influence.
The Court GRANTS Defendant Josue Galvez Navarro’s motion to strike the complaint’s punitive damage claim with 30 days leave to amend.
The Court GRANTS Defendant Josue Galvez Navarro’s motion to strike the complaint’s request for attorney fees with 30 days leave to amend.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.