Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV13465, Date: 2025-02-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV13465 Hearing Date: February 10, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
A. Prior proceedings
On July 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint.
On August 15, 2023, the Dodgers filed an answer.
On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendants Los Angeles Dodgers Holding Company LLC as Doe 1, Dodger Tickets, LLC as Doe 2, Dodgers Tickets Manager Corp. as Doe 3, LA Holdco LLC as Doe 4, LA Real Estate LLC as Doe 5, LA Real Estate Holding Company LLC as Doe 6, and Realco Intermediary LLC as Doe 7.
On July 29, 2024, Defendants LA Real Estate LLC, REALCO Intermediary LLC, Los Angeles Dodgers Holding Company LLC, LA Real Estate Holding Company LLC, Dodgers Tickets Manager Corp, LA Holdco LLC, and Dodgers Tickets, LLC filed an answer.
On August 21, 2024, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendants LA Real Estate LLC as Doe 8 and Chavez Ravine Land Company LLC (“CRLC”) as Doe 9.
On November 13, 2024, CRLC and the Dodgers filed an answer.
Trial is currently scheduled for September 22, 2025.
B. This motion
On November 13, 2024, the Dodgers and CRLC (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) filed a motion for a protective order. The motion was set for hearing on December 12, 2024. On November 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition and request for sanctions. On December 5, 2024, Moving Defendants filed a reply. On December 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a sur-reply, which the Court has not considered. The Court continued the hearing to February 10, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Moving Defendants ask the Court to issue a protective order.
Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion and impose sanctions on Moving Defendants.
PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Overruled.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Protective order
Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.020 provides in part:
“(a) The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.
“(b) The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. . . .”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subds. (a), (b).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.030 provides:
“(a) The court shall restrict the frequency or extent of use of a discovery method provided in Section 2019.010 if it determines either of the following:
“(1) The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.
“(2) The selected method of discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.
“(b) The court may make these determinations pursuant to a motion for a protective order by a party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.
“(c) The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.030.)
When interrogatories, requests for production of documents, or requests for admission have been propounded, the responding party may promptly move for a protective order. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.090 [interrogatories], 2031.060 [demand for inspection], 2033.080 [requests for admission].) The Court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.090, subd. (b), 2031.060, subd. (b), 2033.080, subd. (b).) A protective order may include a direction that interrogatories need not be answered (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.090, subd. (b)(1)), that documents listed in a demand for production need not be produced (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.060, subd. (b)(1)), or that requests for admission need not be answered (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.080, subd. (b)(1)). The Court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order under these provisions unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.090, subd. (d), 2031.060, subd. (h), 2033.080, subd. (d).)
B. Premises liability and negligence
“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)
DISCUSSION
Moving Defendants ask the Court to issue a protective order directing Plaintiff to propound discovery to the Dodgers and stating that CRLC need not respond to requests for production, special interrogatories, form interrogatories, and requests for admission served on it. According to Moving Defendants, the Dodgers operate, manage, control, and are responsible for the area where Plaintiff allegedly fell, while CRLC and its investors do not maintain, control, or inspect the premises. (Motion p. 3.) In addition, the Dodgers and its insurance would be responsible for paying a judgment against CRLC based on a finding of premises liability or negligence. (Motion p. 4.) Therefore, Moving Defendants argue, the Dodgers “can completely respond to discovery and notices of deposition as to any matter related to [Moving Defendants’] alleged acts and/or omissions relevant to the subject matter of this action. . . . Unnecessarily burdening Dodgers-related entities that do not run, maintain, or control the stadium with duplicative discovery has no other purpose but to improperly generate settlement leverage by unreasonably increasing Defendants’ discovery expenses.” (Motion p. 2.)
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that (1) the motion is untimely, (2) CRLC waived its objections, (3) CRLC owns the property at issue, (4) CRLC has not shown that Plaintiff is seeking confidential, commercially-protected propriety information, (5) CRLC has not presented admissible evidence showing that it does not maintain, control, inspect, or operate the property at issue, and (6) the Dodgers assert that they maintain no documents or information that is typically held by an entity that maintains, controls, and inspects the type of property at issue.
To determine whether the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of Plaintiff’s discovery served on CRLC clearly outweighs the likelihood that that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subd. (a)), the Court would have to resolve disputed factual issues concerning whether CRLC maintains, controls, inspects, or operates the premises where Plaintiff fell. A motion for a protective order is not an appropriate vehicle for determining disputed factual issues. The Court denies the motion.
The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for sanctions. Moving Defendants acted with substantial justification.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Plaintiff Jamie Merchain’s request for sanctions.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.