Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV13892, Date: 2025-05-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV13892 Hearing Date: May 27, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
A. Prior proceedings
On April 26, 2022, Plaintiff Marlen Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants County of Los Angeles (“County”), The Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center Auxiliary dba LAC-USC Medical Center (“Medical Center”), Fujitec America, Inc. dba Fujitec, Doe Elevator Manufacturer, Doe Elevator Maintenance, and Does 1-100 for negligence, premises liability, strict product liability, liability for dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835 et seq., and public employee liability for wrongful acts or omissions under Government Code section 840.2.
On June 17, 2022, the County and the Medical Center filed an answer.
On July 25, 2022, Defendant Fujitec America, Inc. (“Fujitec”) filed an answer.
On September 25, 2023, the Court dismissed the County and the Medical Center without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request.
Trial is scheduled for August 26, 2025.
B. This motion
On June 24, 2024, Fujitec filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. The motion was set for hearing on September 9, 2024. Based on the parties’ stipulation, the Court continued the hearing on the summary judgment motion to March 19, 2025. On February 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On March 12, 2025, Fujitec filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to May 27, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Fujitec asks the Court to grant summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion.
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
A. Plaintiff’s objections
Sustained: 1-3
B. Fujitec’s objections
In Fujitec’s objections 1-23, Fujitec objects to “Plaintiff’s response[s] in opposition to [Fujitec’s] [undisputed material facts] [numbers 19-40] in [their] entirety.” The Court overrules these objections because they do not specify the evidence to which Fujitec is objecting.
Overruled: 24-32
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary judgment and summary adjudication
“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.” (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)
In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) “[A] court cannot grant summary judgment based on inferences that are contradicted by other inferences or evidence. And a triable issue of fact exists when the evidence permits a reasonable trier of fact to find a contested fact in favor of the party opposing the motion. [Citation.] Put slightly differently, a summary judgment may not be granted unless the evidence is incapable of supporting a judgment for the losing party.” (California-American Water Co. v. Marina Coast Water Dist. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1296.)
B. Negligence
“The elements of a negligence cause of action are (1) the existence of a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) injury to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s breach, and (4) actual damages.” (Romero v. Los Angeles Rams (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 562, 567.)
C. Strict products liability
“A manufacturer may be held strictly liable for its product if the plaintiff was injured while using the product in a reasonably foreseeable way.” (Romine v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 990, 1000 (Romine), citing Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 560 (Soule).) “In order for there to be strict liability, the product does not have to be unreasonably dangerous—just defective.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Products liability may be premised upon a theory of design defect, manufacturing defect, or failure to warn. [Citation.] Defective design may be established under two theories: (1) the consumer expectations test, which asks whether the product performed as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended and reasonably foreseeable manner; or (2) the risk/benefit test, which asks whether the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the design. [Citations.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 1000-1001.)
“Under the consumer expectations test, ‘a plaintiff is required to produce evidence of the “objective conditions of the product” as to which the jury is to employ its “own sense of whether the product meets ordinary expectations as to its safety under the circumstances presented by the evidence.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Romine, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001.) “ ‘The consumer expectations test is reserved for cases in which the everyday experience of the products’ users permits a conclusion that the product’s design violated minimum safety assumptions, and is “defective regardless of expert opinion about the merits of the design.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “Therefore, if the minimum safety of a product is within the common knowledge of lay jurors, expert witnesses may not be used to demonstrate what an ordinary consumer should expect. Nonetheless, the inherent complexity of the product itself is not controlling on the issue of whether the consumer expectations test applies; a complex product “may perform so unsafely that the defect is apparent to the common reason, experience, and understanding of its ordinary consumers.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
“Moreover, ‘[t]he fact that expert testimony was required to establish legal causation for plaintiffs' injuries does not mean that an ordinary user of the product would be unable to form assumptions about the safety of the products. . . . In Soule, the court expressly rejected the contention that the consumer expectations test is improper whenever “[‘crashworthiness,’ a complex product, or] technical questions of causation are at issue,” stating that “ordinary consumer expectations are not irrelevant simply because expert testimony is required to prove ... that a condition of the product as marketed was a ‘substantial,’ and therefore ‘legal,’ cause of injury.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Romine, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001.)
“If a plaintiff proceeds under the consumer expectation test, ‘in addition to establishing a prima facie case regarding causation, the plaintiff must also produce evidence that the product failed to satisfy ordinary consumer expectations as to safety.’ ” [Citations.].” (Chavez v. Glock (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1311 (Chavez).)
In Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 121 (Campbell), “the plaintiff, who was injured while riding on a city bus, contended the bus was defectively designed because her seat lacked a handrail or guardrail and, at trial, produced evidence ‘sufficient to establish the objective conditions of the product.’ ” (Chavez, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311, citing Campbell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 126.) “Reversing a nonsuit in favor of the defendant manufacturer, the Supreme Court explained that was sufficient for the case to be submitted to the jury on the consumer expectation theory: ‘The other essential aspect of this test involves the jurors' own sense of whether the product meets ordinary expectations as to its safety under the circumstances presented by the evidence.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Campbell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 126.) “ ‘[I]t is generally sufficient if the plaintiff provides evidence concerning (1) his or her use of the product; (2) the circumstances surrounding the injury; and (3) the objective features of the product which are relevant to an evaluation of its safety.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Campbell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 127.)
“Pursuant
to Campbell, once a plaintiff establishes the consumer expectation test
is properly applied to his or her case, the threshold for withstanding a motion
for summary judgment or nonsuit, thus permitting the jury to determine whether
the allegedly defective product satisfied ordinary consumer expectations, is
quite low.” (Chavez, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311.)
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
The complaint includes the following allegations:
On or about October 29, 2021, Plaintiff was an employee at the Medical Center located at 2051 Marengo St., Los Angeles, CA 90033 (“premises”). When Plaintiff entered the elevator on the premises, the elevator failed to operate properly, injuring Plaintiff. Defendants’ negligence, carelessness, breach of warranty, strict liability and other liability-producing conduct caused the accident and Plaintiff’s injuries.
The complaint asserts claims against Fujitec for negligence (first cause of action) and strict product liability (third cause of action).
B. Undisputed facts
On October 29, 2021, Plaintiff was working as an employee at the Los Angeles General Medical Center (“LAC+USC”). At around 4:15 p.m., Plaintiff attempted to enter the elevator identified as Elevator 8 on the fourth floor of the LAC+USC Inpatient Building.
Plaintiff estimated she was approximately ten steps away from the elevator when she observed two people, a patient and employee, entering Elevator 8. Plaintiff then approached the elevator. Plaintiff estimated it took her approximately three seconds to cover the ten steps to get to Elevator 8. Plaintiff then attempted to enter the elevator. Plaintiff contends that as she was entering the elevator, the right elevator door contacted her right shoulder. Plaintiff does not know how long the elevator doors were open before she tried to enter it.
After the incident, Plaintiff visited the emergency department and then reported the incident to LAC+USC employee Donna Naylor (“Naylor”). Plaintiff informed Naylor of the details of the incident. Plaintiff signed the incident report that Naylor wrote. Naylor wrote in the report that, as a corrective action, Plaintiff should be given “education on using elevators” and that Plaintiff should “enter the elevator as soon as doors are opened.”
C. Fujitec’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication
1. Plaintiff’s negligence claim
a. Fujitec has carried its initial summary judgment burden of showing it lacked actual or constructive notice of problems with the elevator
Fujitec argues the Court should grant summary judgment or summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s negligence claim because Plaintiff cannot show that Fujitec had actual or constructive notice of any problem with the elevator. Harry “Andy” Jones (“Jones”), the Fujitec onsite service technician who inspected and maintained the elevators (Jones dec. ¶ 1), submitted a declaration stating that he would have been notified if issues had been found with Elevator 8's doors before the accident. Jones would have opened a “ticket” in Fujitec’s system and reported the results of his investigation. (Jones dec. ¶ 4.)
In his declaration, Jones states that, in the year prior to the accident, he was not notified about any door issue related to Elevator 8. (Jones dec. ¶ 5.) Likewise, before the accident, Fujitec did not receive any complaints about Elevator 8’s doors closing too fast or striking individuals. (Jones dec. ¶ 5.) Jones conducted a search of Fujitec’s documents and systems to confirm that no such complaints had been received. (Jones dec. ¶ 7.) Fujitec did not learn about a complaint concerning Elevator 8’s door until Plaintiff filed and served this lawsuit. (Jones dec. ¶ 7.)
Based on this evidence, Fujitec has carried its initial burden on summary judgment or summary adjudication of showing that it lacked actual or constructive knowledge of any problem with the elevator and therefore cannot be liable on a negligence theory. The burden shifts to Plaintiff.
b. Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact regarding notice
Plaintiff has presented evidence that Fujitec received information about problems with Elevator 8 on March 20, 2021, April 25, 2021, July 22, 2021, October 6, 2021, and October 21, 2021. (See Work Orders (exh. D to Azizi dec.); John Anderson depo. pp. 9-10, 13 (exh. to Azizi Dec.); Jones dec. pp. 82-83 (exh. A to Azizi dec.).) Specifically:
· A work order dated March 20, 2021 states that Elevator
8 “keeps opening and closing and beeping.”
(Exh D. to Azizi dec.)
· A work order dated April 25, 2021 states that Elevator
8’s door “won’t open.” The work order
reported: “Engineer found door open but it was jerking sometime. Referred to
elevator [mechanic] to check.” (Exh D. to Azizi dec.)
· A work order dated July 22, 2021 states that Elevator 8’s
doors “are not open and making noise.” (Exh D. to
Azizi dec.)
· A work order dated October 6, 2021 states that Elevator
8 was “stuck.” The work order reports: “Fujitec
elevator making the needed repairs.” (Exh
D. to Azizi dec.)
· A work order dated October 21, 2021 states that “Elevator
#8 door won’t open on 4th floor.”
Fujitec contends that the work orders do not show that Fujitec knew or should have known that Elevator 8’s doors might close too quickly. (Reply pp. 4-7.) Even though the work orders do not mention this specific possibility, the Court finds that, viewing all the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to Plaintiff (see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843), Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact concerning whether Fujitec had actual or constructive knowledge about the allegedly dangerous condition in sufficient time before Plaintiff’s accident to have corrected the problem or warned Plaintiff.
2. Plaintiff’s strict products liability claim
Fujitec asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment or summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s strict products liability claim because “Plaintiff cannot show any malfunction occurred with Elevator 8, and thus she will be unable to show that any defect was the cause of any injuries.” (Motion p. 17.) Fujitec also argues that Plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a manufacturing defect or a design defect and cannot establish that Fujitec had a duty to warn Plaintiff.
To support these arguments, Fujitec points to Jones’s statement in his declaration that, based on his background, training, and experience, “when elevators like Elevator 8 have doors that fail, the doors fail by remaining open. Once the doors remain open, the elevator will not continue to operate. Had Elevator 8’s doors failed or malfunctioned at the time of the incident, the doors would have failed by opening and remaining open. Here, after Plaintiff’s claimed incident, Elevator 8 continued to function normally.” (Jones dec. ¶ 6.) Fujitec contends that, because Elevator 8 closed and continued to operate after its door allegedly contacted Plaintiff, Elevator 8 did not malfunction and was not defective. (Motion p. 17, citing UMF Nos. Nos. 27-30, 40.)
At her deposition, however, Plaintiff testified when she reported the incident to Naylor, Plaintiff stated that the elevator “closed fast” and “moved faster than it normally does.” (Sanchez depo. p. 58.) Plaintiff testified: “As I walked in, the door hit me really hard. That's how I know it was faster than normal because the door -- the doors usually don't -- don't move that fast. I felt the hit really hard.” (Sanchez depo. p. 59.) Plaintiff also testified: (1) she did not see the elevator doors start to close when she entered the elevator (Sanchez depo. p. 51), (2) she did not see the elevator door moving before she entered the elevator (Sanchez depo. p. 54), (3) the elevator was not closing when Plaintiff entered it. (Sanchez depo. p. 54), and (4) as Plaintiff was entering the elevator, the elevator door closed and hit Plaintiff on her right shoulder (Sanchez depo. pp. 54, 57-58.)
Based on Plaintiff’s testimony, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that a malfunction caused the elevator door to close more quickly than normal and more quickly than Plaintiff expected, striking Plaintiff’s right shoulder. Although Jones’s declaration could support a different conclusion, it does not foreclose a finding in Plaintiff's favor.
Fujitec also cites evidence that an inspection several months after the incident “found that there was nothing wrong with the [Elevator 8] door.” (Motion p. 18.) However, Plaintiff has presented a work order dated April 14, 2022 (after the incident) which states, “Elevator #8 door getting stuck.” (Exh. D to Azizi dec.) Plaintiff’s expert states this work order “is further evidence that there was an ongoing problem with the doors which was not being adequately addressed by Fujitec.” (Cotton dec. ¶ 8.)
Fujitec
has failed to carry its initial burden on summary judgment or summary
adjudication of showing that Plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a defect
under the consumer expectation test. The Court denies Fujitec's motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication of the strict products liability claim.
3. Fujitec's requests for summary adjudication
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Fujitec's requests for summary adjudication of issues.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Defendant Fujitec America, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.