Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV19220, Date: 2025-04-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV19220    Hearing Date: April 23, 2025    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

On August 11, 2023, Plaintiff Maria Perez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Lucien O. Cox, M.D., a professional corporation, Lucien O. Cox, M.D., and Does 1-25 for general negligence and premises liability. 

On October 2, 2023, Defendants Lucien O. Cox, M.D., a professional corporation, and Lucien O. Cox, M.D. (“Defendants”) filed an answer. 

On July 9, 2024, Defendants filed and electronically served a motion for summary judgment. The motion was set for hearing on February 26, 2025.  On February 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition.  On February 14, 2025, Defendants filed a reply.  The Court continued the hearing to April 23, 2025. 

Trial is currently set for August 25, 2025. 

PARTIES’ REQUESTS 

Defendants ask the Court to grant summary judgment. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.   Summary judgment 

“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar)) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) 

When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.”  (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.) 

“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.”  (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.) 

In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) 

B.   Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 

Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 provides: 

“In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.  In no event shall the time for commencement of legal action exceed three years unless tolled for any of the following: (1) upon proof of fraud, (2) intentional concealment, or (3) the presence of a foreign body, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, in the person of the injured person. Actions by a minor shall be commenced within three years from the date of the alleged wrongful act except that actions by a minor under the full age of six years shall be commenced within three years or prior to his eighth birthday whichever provides a longer period. Such time limitation shall be tolled for minors for any period during which parent or guardian and defendant’s insurer or health care provider have committed fraud or collusion in the failure to bring an action on behalf of the injured minor for professional negligence. 

“For the purposes of this section: 

“(1) ‘Health care provider’ means any person licensed or certified pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) of the Business and Professions Code, or licensed pursuant to the Osteopathic Initiative Act, or the Chiropractic Initiative Act, or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1440) of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code; and any clinic, health dispensary, or health facility, licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200) of the Health and Safety Code. ‘Health care provider’ includes the legal representatives of a health care provider; 

“(2) ‘Professional negligence’ means a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.) 

DISCUSSION 

A.   The complaint 

The complaint includes the following allegations: 

On August 24, 2021, Plaintiff slipped and fell in the exam room located at Defendant Lucien O. Cox’s medical office at 1127 Wilshire Boulevard, Unit 700, Los Angeles, CA 90017 (“premises”), causing bodily injury and harm to Plaintiff.  Both of Plaintiff’s wrists were broken as a result of the dangerous condition on the premises. 

B.   Undisputed facts 

On August 24, 2021, Plaintiff presented for a pap-smear examination and for evaluation of itching symptoms.  The Gynecology Flow Record notes that the patient fell while getting off the examination table. 

When detailing the circumstances of the fall, Plaintiff stated that during the examination Dr. Cox “had a lot of lubricant ... on his, hands, on his gloves,” “he was putting a lot of gel on his hands, and I could see that his hands were dripping.” 

Plaintiff testified that she tried to put her feet back on the step but she could not completely reach the step “so only my tippy toes reached, and I tried to step on it and I fell;” “I put my left foot, my toes of my left foot towards the middle of [the stool] . . . That's when I - that's when I slid and I ended up on the left side of the stretcher . . . I mean of the bed.”  Plaintiff confirmed that she “needed help to get off the bed” and “one of them (Defendants) should have known that I needed help.” 

Plaintiff left Defendants' office and called an ambulance, which took her to a hospital.  Plaintiff alleges that she sustained injuries as a result of the fall including fractures to both wrists. 

Plaintiff testified that she contacted an attorney about the incident about three or four days after it occurred on August 24, 2021 because she thought that something was done wrong at Dr. Cox's office.  Plaintiff filed the lawsuit on August 11, 2023. 

C.   Defendants have carried their initial summary judgment burden 

1.    Medical negligence by a health care provider 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s case is barred by the one-year limitation period contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 – part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (“MICRA”) – because (1) Plaintiff has alleged that professional negligence by a health care provider caused her injury and (2) three or four days after her fall on August 24, 2021, Plaintiff contacted an attorney about the incident “because she thought that something was done wrong at Dr. Cox’s office.”  (UMF 11.) 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff was at Dr. Cox’s office for a medical examination and evaluation.  (UMF 1.)  The medical records show that Plaintiff fell while getting off the examination table in Dr. Cox’s office.  (UMF 2.)  Plaintiff testified that when she fell, Dr. Cox was still in the examination room but his back was turned to her.  (Exh. D, pp. 39-40.)  Plaintiff asserts that one of the Defendants should have known that she needed help to get off the table.  (UMF 8.) 

This evidence carries Defendants’ initial burden on summary judgment of showing that Plaintiff’s complaint alleges professional negligence by a health care provider caused her injury.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5; Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 79 (Flores) [MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations barred claim of plaintiff whose “injury resulted from alleged negligence in the use and maintenance of equipment needed to implement the doctor’s order concerning her medical treatment” because “[a] hospital’s negligent failure to maintain equipment that is necessary or otherwise integrally related to the medical treatment and diagnosis of the patient implicates a duty that the hospital owes to a patient by virtue of being a health care provider”].) 

2.    Within one year of discovery 

It is undisputed that on August 24, 2021, Plaintiff left Dr. Cox’s office and called an ambulance, which took Plaintiff to the hospital.  (UMF 9.)  It is also undisputed that, three or four days later, Plaintiff contacted an attorney about the incident “because she thought that something was done wrong at Dr. Cox’s office.”  (UMF 11.)  Plaintiff filed her complaint more than one year later, on August 11, 2023.  This evidence carries Defendants’ initial burden on summary judgment of showing that Plaintiff did not file her complaint within “one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury . . . .” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.) 

The burden shifts to Plaintiff. 

D.   Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact 

In applying Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, the Court must “draw a distinction between the professional obligations of hospitals in the rendering of medical care to their patients and the obligations hospitals have, simply by virtue of operating facilities open to the public, to maintain their premises in a manner that preserves the well-being and safety of all users.”  (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 87.)  While Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 applies to “negligence in the rendering of medical care to patients,” the statute does not apply to “ordinary negligence that happens to occur on hospital property.”  (Id. at p. 86.)  “[A]n injury resulting from a hospital’s breach of a generally applicable obligation to maintain its equipment and premises in a safe condition does not fall within section 340.5.”  (Id. at p. 88.) 

In opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 does not apply here because Plaintiff is not alleging professional negligence.  Plaintiff relies on Johnson v. Open Door Community Health Centers (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 153 (Johnson), where the plaintiff tripped over a scale as she was leaving a community health clinic.  (Johnson, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 156-157.) The plaintiff sued the clinic almost two years later. (Id. at p. 156.) The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff’s claims were subject to the one-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. (Ibid.) The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, finding that the alleged negligence occurred in the rendering of professional services because the plaintiff was injured by equipment used to diagnose and treat medical conditions in the course of obtaining medical treatment. (Id. at p. 157.) 

The Court of Appeal reversed.  Citing Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th 75, the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff had alleged an ordinary premises liability claim which was not subject to MICRA’s special one-year limitations period.  (Johnson, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 160; see Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 88 [“an injury resulting from a hospital’s breach of a generally applicable obligation to maintain its equipment and premises in a safe condition does not fall within [Code of Civil Procedure] section 340.5”].) 

Johnson is distinguishable.  While the plaintiff’s care in Johnson had been completed when she tripped on the scale (see Johnson, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 160), here Plaintiff’s care was not completed when she fell from the examination table.  A nurse helped Plaintiff get on the examination table so that Dr. Cox could examine her.  (See exh. D, pp. 34-36.)  Dr. Cox examined Plaintiff on the examination table.  (Exh. D, pp. 34-36.)  Plaintiff remained on the examination table after Dr. Cox examined her.  (Exh. D, pp. 34-36, 38-39.)  Plaintiff believed that she needed help to get off the examination table.  (See UMF 8; exh. D, pp. 40-41.)  However, no one helped Plaintiff get off the examination table.  Wanting to leave, Plaintiff tried to get off the examination table without help and fell to the floor.  (Exh. D, pp. 37, 40.)  Even if Dr. Cox’s examination of Plaintiff was completed, Plaintiff was still receiving medical care in Dr. Cox’s office when she fell. 

In addition, the plaintiff in Johnson was injured “allegedly as a result of a breach of duties [which the defendant] owed generally to all visitors to the Open Door clinic.”  (Johnson, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 160; see Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 89 [if chair in hospital’s waiting room collapses, injuring person sitting in it, “the hospital’s duty with respect to that chair is no different from that of any other home or business with chairs in which visitors may sit”].)  But Defendants here do not owe duties generally to help people safely get off examination tables.  Defendants owe this duty only to patients who are placed on examination tables as part of their diagnosis and treatment.  (See Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 89 [the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the defendant’s alleged negligence “in the use or maintenance of equipment integrally related to her medical diagnosis and treatment”].)  Defendants’ alleged violation of this duty was professional negligence, not ordinary negligence which happened to occur on a medical provider’s premises.

Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact concerning the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 to Plaintiff’s action.  The Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Lucien O. Cox, M.D., a professional corporation, and Lucien O. Cox, M.D. 

Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.