Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV20076, Date: 2025-01-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV20076 Hearing Date: January 2, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On January 5, 2022, Plaintiff Armaund Aaron Urquidez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Jose Almanza and Does 1-10 for motor vehicle tort in Ventura County Superior Court.
Plaintiff later amended the complaint (1) to include Defendant G&J Neon Signs, Inc. (“G&J”) as Doe 1 and (2) to replace the name “Jose Almanza” with the correct name, Jose Adrian Gonzales Saldana (“Saldana”).
On February 1, 2023, Saldana filed an answer. On July 6, 2023, G&J filed an answer.
On August 22, 2023, the case was transferred to Los Angeles County Superior Court.
On October 30, 2024, Saldana and G&J (“Defendants”) filed a motion for a protective order limiting the scope of the deposition of Plaintiff’s retained expert Kendal Wagner, M.D., and for sanctions. The motion was set for hearing on December 23, 2024. On December 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition and request for sanctions. On December 16, 2024, Defendants filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to January 2, 2025.
Trial is currently scheduled for January 22, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Defendants ask the Court to limit the scope of the deposition of Plaintiff’s retained expert Kendal Wagner, M.D. and impose sanctions on Plaintiff.
Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion and impose sanctions on Defendants’ counsel.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420 provides in part:
“(a) Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.
“(b) The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions:
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(10) That the scope of the examination be limited to certain matters.
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(Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subds. (a), (b)(5), (b)(9), (b)(10), (g), (h).)
DISCUSSION
Defendants assert that Plaintiff designated Dr. Wagner to testify about Plaintiff’s lower extremity injuries and designated another expert, Dr. Kasimian, to testify about Plaintiff’s spine injuries. According to Defendants, Plaintiff now wants Dr. Wagner’s deposition to include his opinions about Plaintiff’s spine injuries even though (1) Dr. Wagner was not designated on this subject, (2) Plaintiff has not amended or augmented his expert witness list, and (3) Defendants have already deposed Dr. Kasimian about Plaintiff’s spine injuries. Based on these arguments, Defendants ask the Court to issue a protective order excluding Dr. Wagner’s opinions about Plaintiff’s spine injuries from Dr. Wagner’s deposition.
Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing (among other things) that his designation of Dr. Wagner encompassed Dr. Wagner’s opinion about Plaintiff’s spine injuries.
Plaintiff’s expert designation served on August 26, 2024 stated that Dr. Kasimian was “a qualified, board-certified physician in Orthopedics focusing on spine injuries” who would “offer opinions regarding causation and damages focusing on Plaintiff’s spine injuries.” The designation also stated:
“[Dr. Kasimian’s] testimony is expected to include, but is not limited to, the following areas: orthopedic injuries suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Defendant rear- ending Plaintiffs’ vehicle; review of medical records and films concerning Plaintiff; nature and extent of orthopedic injuries suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Defendant rear-ending Plaintiff’s vehicle; reasonableness of medical care provided to Plaintiff as a result of Defendant rear-ending Plaintiff’s vehicle; Plaintiff’s diagnosis; Plaintiff’s prognosis; reasonable cost of past medical care provided to Plaintiffs as a result of Defendant rear-ending Plaintiff’s vehicle; reasonable cost of future medical care for Plaintiff as a result of Defendant rear-ending Plaintiff’s vehicle; any and all issues raised by Defendants, Defendants’ counsel, and Defendants’ expert witnesses within his areas of expertise.”
Plaintiff’s expert designation stated that Dr. Wagner was “a qualified, board-certified physician in Orthopedics focusing on lower extremity injuries” who would “offer opinions regarding causation and damages focusing on Plaintiff’s lower extremity injuries.” The designation also stated:
“[Dr. Wagner’s] testimony is expected to include, but is not limited to, the following areas: orthopedic injuries suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Defendant rear-ending Plaintiffs’ vehicle; review of medical records and films concerning Plaintiff; nature and extent of orthopedic injuries suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Defendant rear-ending Plaintiff’s vehicle; reasonableness of medical care provided to Plaintiff as a result of Defendant rear-ending Plaintiff’s vehicle; Plaintiff’s diagnosis; Plaintiff’s prognosis; reasonable cost of past medical care provided to Plaintiffs as a result of Defendant rear-ending Plaintiff’s vehicle; reasonable cost of future medical care for Plaintiff as a result of Defendant rear-ending Plaintiff’s vehicle; any and all issues raised by Defendants, Defendants’ counsel, and Defendants’ expert witnesses within his areas of expertise.”
Plaintiff’s designation of Dr. Wagner is fairly read to include his opinions about Plaintiff’s “orthopedic injuries” resulting from the accident, including spine injuries. The designation does not restrict Dr. Wagner to expressing opinions only about Plaintiff’s lower extremity injuries, although the designation states that these injuries would be Dr. Wagner’s “focus.”
The Legislature did not intend that the an expert designation's “brief narrative statement” containing the “general substance” of an expert’s testimony (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.260, subd. (c)(2)) be written in strict legal terms. (See Castaneda v. Bornstein (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1828, disapproved of on other grounds by Bonds v. Roy (1999) 20 Cal.4th 140.) “[T]hese ‘brief narrative statements’ were intended to give the opposing party fair notice of the subject areas the expert would address in trial testimony in order for the opposing party to prepare cross-examination and rebuttal.” (Ibid. [expert witness declaration put defendant on notice that expert would testify about both breach of duty and causation; if defendant chose not to depose the expert on these issues “based on a narrow, technical interpretation of the narrative statement, we find he has no justification to complain”].)
Defendants have cited no authority preventing a party from designating experts with duplicative or overlapping areas of expertise. In light of the identical language contained in the expert designations of Dr. Kasimian and Dr. Wagner, Defendants should have been on notice that Dr. Wagner might testify about the same subjects Dr. Kasimian testified about at his deposition. Defendants do not explain why they did not confirm with Plaintiff, prior to Dr. Kasimian's deposition, that this would not happen.
The Court denies Defendants’ motion to limit the scope of Dr. Wagner’s deposition.
Plaintiff requests $2,000.00 in monetary sanctions against Defendants’ counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, subdivision (h), based on four hours of attorney time at a rate of $500.00 per hour. The Court imposes sanctions of $750.00 based on three hours of attorney time at a reasonable rate of $250.00 per hour.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES the motion for a protective order filed by Defendants Jose Adrian Gonzales Saldana and G&J Neon Signs, Inc.
The Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff Armaund Aaron Urquidez’s request for sanctions and orders Defendants’ counsel to pay Plaintiff $750.00 by February 3, 2025. In all other respects, the Court denies Plaintiff’s sanctions request.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.