Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV20082, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 23STCV20082 Hearing Date: February 19, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the demurring and opposition papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On August 22, 2023, Plaintiff Raymond Joshua Rios (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Jacob Emilio Sanchez (“Sanchez”), Gregory Santone (“Santone”), City of Montebello (“City”), County of Los Angeles (“County”), California Department of Transportation, and Does 1-50 for negligence, negligent entrustment, and dangerous condition of public property.
On October 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against Defendants County, City, California Department of Transportation, Sanchez, Santone, and Does 1-50 for negligence, negligent entrustment, and dangerous condition of public property.
On November 28, 2023, the County filed an answer. On December 29, 2023, the Court dismissed the County without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request.
On December 6, 2023, Sanchez and Santone filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants City, County, California Department of Transportation, and Roes 1-20 for equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief. On December 29, 2023, the Court dismissed the County from the cross-complaint without prejudice at the request of Sanchez and Santone. On January 26, 2024, the Court dismissed the City from the cross-complaint without prejudice at the request of Sanchez and Santone.
On December 12, 2023, the City filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. On January 11, 2024, the Court dismissed the City without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request.
On December 22, 2023, Defendant and Cross-Defendant The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation (erroneously sued as California Department of Transportation) (“the State”) filed an answer to the cross-complaint of Sanchez and Santone.
On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant RCS Safety, LLC, dba Roadway Construction Service as Doe 1 and Doe 26 (“RCS”). On February 26, 2024, RCS filed an answer to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and a cross-complaint against Cross- Defendants California Department of Transportation and Roes 1-20 for equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief. On March 21, 2024, the State filed an answer to RCS’s cross-complaint.
On August 6, 2024, the Court sustained the State’s demurrer to the claim for dangerous condition of public property in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint with leave to amend.
On September 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against Defendants County, City, State, Sanchez, Santone, and Does 1-50 for negligence, negligent entrustment, and dangerous condition of public property.
On October 8, 2024, Sanchez, Santone, and RCS filed an answer to Plaintiff's second amended complaint.
On October 24, 2024, the State filed a demurrer to the claim for dangerous condition of public property in Plaintiff's second amended complaint. The demurrer was set for hearing on January 3, 2025. On December 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. The Court continued the hearing to February 19, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
The State asks the Court to sustain its demurrer to Plaintiff’s claim for dangerous condition of public property.
Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the demurrer or grant leave to amend.
THE STATE’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 453.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Demurrer
“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
* * *
“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, ‘uncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible. . . .”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).)
In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading”].)
“For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not conclusions, deductions, or conclusions of facts or law).” (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2024) ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25, emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).)
“The demurrer should not be sustained where a plaintiff can cure a defective complaint by amendment or where the pleading, liberally construed, can state a cause of action.” (Jager v. County of Alameda (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 294, 297.)
"A demurrer may be filed to one of several causes of action in the complaint, without answering the other causes of action." (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:34.1, p. 7(l)-19.)
“ ‘To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.’ ” (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:40, p. 7(l)-21, quoting C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
B. Public entity liability for injury caused by dangerous condition of property
Government Code section 835 provides:
“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:
“(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or
“(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”
(Gov. Code, § 835.)
Government Code section 835.2 provides:
“(a) A public entity had actual notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subdivision (b) of Section 835 if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character.
“(b) A public entity had constructive notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subdivision (b) of Section 835 only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. On the issue of due care, admissible evidence includes but is not limited to evidence as to:
“(1) Whether the existence of the condition and its dangerous character would have been discovered by an inspection system that was reasonably adequate (considering the practicability and cost of inspection weighed against the likelihood and magnitude of the potential danger to which failure to inspect would give rise) to inform the public entity whether the property was safe for the use or uses for which the public entity used or intended others to use the public property and for uses that the public entity actually knew others were making of the public property or adjacent property.
“(2) Whether the public entity maintained and operated such an inspection system with due care and did not discover the condition.”
(Gov. Code, § 835.2.)
Government Code section 830.2 provides:
“‘Dangerous condition’ means a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property . . . is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (a).) “A condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property . . . was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.”
(Gov. Code, § 830.2.)
Government Code section 830.4 provides:
“A condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter merely because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, or speed restriction signs, as described by the Vehicle Code, or distinctive roadway markings as described in Section 21460 of the Vehicle Code.”
(Gov. Code, § 830.4.)
Government Code section 830.8 provides:
“Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this chapter for an injury caused by the failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings or devices described in the Vehicle Code. Nothing in this section exonerates a public entity or public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by such failure if a signal, sign, marking or device (other than one described in Section 830.4) was necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care.”
(Gov. Code, § 830.8.)
C. Claim presentation requirement
“The Government Claims Act ‘established a standardized procedure’ for bringing personal injury claims against local governmental entities.” (Hernandez v. City of Stockton (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1230 (Hernandez).) “As a general rule, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity until a written claim, known as a government claim, is presented to and rejected by that entity.” (Ibid.) “The required contents of a government claim are set forth in section 910 of the Government Claims Act.” (Ibid.) “Among other mandatory contents, section 910 specifies that a claim ‘shall’ include ‘[t]he date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted,’ ‘[a] general description of the . . . injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim,’ and ‘[t]he name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1230-1231.) “The failure to timely file a proper government claim is fatal to the maintenance of a civil action against a public entity.” (Id. at p. 1231.)
“The purpose of the Government Claims Act is ‘ “to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” ’ ” (Hernandez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1231.)
“Although a government claim need not contain the detail and specificity required of a pleading in a civil action, it nevertheless must ‘ “fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done.” ’ ” (Hernandez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1231.) “When a civil action is filed following the rejection of a government claim, it is acceptable for the complaint to elaborate or add further details to a government claim, but the complaint may not completely ‘shift [the] allegations’ and premise liability on facts that fundamentally differ from those specified in the government claim.” (Ibid.) “In other words, the factual basis for recovery in the complaint must be ‘fairly reflected’ in the government claim.” (Ibid.; see Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 376 [“In order to comply with the claim presentation requirement, the facts alleged in a complaint ... must be consistent with the facts contained within the government claim”]; Castaneda v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1060 [“the factual circumstances set forth in the [government] claim must correspond with the facts alleged in the complaint”].)
“A complaint is subject to dismissal if it alleges a factual basis for recovery which is not ‘fairly reflected’ in the government claim.” (Hernandez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1231.)
DISCUSSION
A. The second amended complaint
The second amended complaint includes the following allegations:
On or about May 19, 2022, Sanchez negligently drove a motor vehicle into the intersection of Telegraph Road and the off-ramp of the I-5 Freeway at Exit 126B/Slauson Ave/N, City of Montebello, in Los Angeles County. Santone owned the vehicle Sanchez was driving. Sanchez’s vehicle collided with the vehicle that Plaintiff was driving on Telegraph Road, injuring Plaintiff.
The State and other defendants (1) “owned and operated I-5 off ramp at Exit 126B/Slauson Ave/N, City of Montebello, County of Los Angeles, State of California,” (2) had a duty to Plaintiff and the general public “to inspect, repair and maintain their property free of any hazardous, dangerous, and defective conditions,” and (3) “owned, leased, operated, managed, maintained and/or controlled I-5 Freeway off ramp at Exit 126B/Slauson Ave/N at Telegraph Road.”
Plaintiff was injured when he encountered a dangerous intersection.
The property which Defendants owned and controlled was unsafe and was a dangerous condition.
Defendants
were aware of the defects in the property with sufficient time prior to the
accident to repair the defects or warn Plaintiff of the danger.
B. Demurrer
1. Plaintiff’s government claim
The State argues that Plaintiff’s complaint does not fairly reflect the facts asserted in Plaintiff’s written tort claim, requiring the Court to sustain the State’s demurrer.
The State waived this argument by failing to raise it in the previous demurrer. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (b) [“A party demurring to a pleading that has been amended after a demurrer to an earlier version of the pleading was sustained shall not demur to any portion of the amended complaint . . . on grounds that could have been raised by demurrer to the earlier version of the complaint”].)
Even if the State had not waived the argument, it would not support the State’s demurrer. In response to the claim form’s question why the claimant believed the State was responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries, Plaintiff stated, “Dangerous condition that resulted on [sic] Plaintiff’s injuries.” The second amended complaint “elaborate[s] or add[s] further details” to Plaintiff’s government claim without “completely ‘shift[ing] [the] allegations’ ” to base liability on “facts that fundamentally differ from those specified in the government claim.” (See Hernandez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1231.) The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint do not contradict the facts asserted in Plaintiff’s claim.
2. Pleading sufficiency
In ruling on the State’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, the Court acknowledged that Plaintiff alleged that a dangerous condition existed not only due to inadequate traffic control devices but also due to the failure to provide a clear sight line for vehicles approaching the intersection, the creation of an unsafe gap in traffic, and the high accident history. However, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint did not plead these additional factors with the required particularity. (See Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 882, 886 [a plaintiff must plead with particularity every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability].) The first amended complaint did not explain how or in what manner the State allegedly “fail[ed] to provide a clear sight line for vehicles approaching the intersection” or “create[ed] an unsafe gap in traffic thereby allowing vehicles to enter and pass through the intersection uncontrolled.”
The State argues that Plaintiff’s “new allegations with respect to sight distance issues and any unsafe gaps in traffic” (Demurrer p. 9) in the second amended complaint do not cure the defects in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. But these new allegations include additional facts explaining how or in what manner the State allegedly “fail[ed] to provide a clear sight line for vehicles approaching the intersection” (see, e.g., SAC ¶ 37(a)-(f); compare, FAC ¶ 30) and “create[ed] an unsafe gap in traffic thereby allowing vehicles to enter and pass through the intersection uncontrolled” (see, e.g., SAC ¶ 37(h); compare, FAC ¶ 30).
The second amended complaint pleads Plaintiff's claim for dangerous condition of public property with sufficient particularity. The Court therefore overrules the demurrer.
CONCLUSION
The Court OVERRULES the demurrer of Defendant The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation, to the third cause of action for dangerous condition of public property in Plaintiff Raymond Joshua Rios’s second amended complaint.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling within five days.