Judge Lisa R. Jaskol, Case Number: 23STCV26754, Date: 2025-05-01 Tentative Ruling

Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On February 28, 2024, the Court sustained the City’s demurrer to Reedy’s complaint with 20 days leave to amend and dismissed the City without prejudice.

On April 23, 2024, the Court sustained De Leon’s demurrer to Reedy’s complaint with 20 days leave to amend.

On July 29, 2024, the Court overruled De Leon’s demurrer to the first amended complaint.

On August 8, 2024, De Leon filed an answer to the first amended complaint and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Reedy and Roes 1-20 for assault, battery, stalking, and false imprisonment.

On January 31, 2025, De Leon filed a motion for change of venue. The motion was set for hearing on April 2, 2025. On February 14, 2025, Reedy filed an opposition. On March 26, 2025, De Leon filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to May 1, 2025.

On January 31, 2025, De Leon filed a motion for a protective order and for sanctions. The motion was set for hearing on April 2, 2025. On February 14, 2025, Reedy filed an opposition. On March 26, 2025, De Leon filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to May 1, 2025.

De Leon asks the Court (1) to order a change of venue and (2) to issue a protective order staying discovery and impose sanctions on Reedy and his counsel.

“(b) When there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had therein.”

“(a) Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

“(b) The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions:

“(3) That a video recording of the deposition testimony of a treating or consulting physician or of any expert witness, intended for possible use at trial under subdivision (d) of Section 2025.620, be postponed until the moving party has had an adequate opportunity to prepare, by discovery deposition of the deponent, or other means, for cross-examination.

“(4) That the deposition be taken at a place other than that specified in the deposition notice, if it is within a distance permitted by Sections 2025.250 and 2025.260.

“(5) That the deposition be taken only on certain specified terms and conditions.

“(6) That the deponent’s testimony be taken by written, instead of oral, examination.

“(7) That the method of discovery be interrogatories to a party instead of an oral deposition.

“(8) That the testimony be recorded in a manner different from that specified in the deposition notice.

“(11) That all or certain of the writings or tangible things designated in the deposition notice not be produced, inspected, copied, tested, or sampled, or that conditions be set for the production of electronically stored information designated in the deposition notice.

“(12) That designated persons, other than the parties to the action and their officers and counsel, be excluded from attending the deposition.

“(13) That a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only to specified persons or only in a specified way.

“(14) That the parties simultaneously file specified documents enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.

“(15) That the deposition be sealed and thereafter opened only on order of the court.

“(16) That examination of the deponent be terminated. If an order terminates the examination, the deposition shall not thereafter be resumed, except on order of the court.

“ (h) The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. . . .”

De Leon asks the Court to grant a change of venue under Code of Civil Procedure section 397, subdivision (b), arguing he cannot receive a fair trial in Los Angeles.^{^[1]}

To support this argument, De Leon asserts that “the jury pool will be made up of Mr. de Leon's former constituents” (Motion p. 4) and Reedy’s counsel believes “public opinion will influence the jury pool” (Motion p. 4). De Leon also contends that Reedy’s counsel is facing State Bar disciplinary charges.

The motion lacks merit. While De Leon expresses concern that a jury would not be impartial, no party has posted jury fees. “ ‘[T]he prospect of jury trial is extremely important, if not crucial, in determining whether “there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had” in the court where the matter is pending.’ [Citation.]” (Nguyen v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1781, 1791 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for change of venue under Code of Civil Procedure section 397, subdivision (b), where petitioners did not offer evidence to establish they could not receive a fair court trial].)

In addition, while the case is currently pending in the downtown Los Angeles Spring Street Courthouse, the case may be assigned for trial to a courthouse not located in De Leon’s former council district.

Also, “[a]ny Notice of Disciplinary Charges filed by the State Bar contains only allegations of professional misconduct. The licensee is presumed to be innocent of any misconduct warranting discipline until the charges have been proven.” (State Bar website.)

Even assuming that a jury trial in this case would take place in De Leon’s former council district, De Leon has not presented evidence showing that he could not receive an impartial trial.

De Leon asks the Court to issue a protective order under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420 staying “discovery and all discovery proceedings, including the deposition of former council member Kevin De Leon, until the California State Bar disciplinary proceedings of [Reedy's] counsel, Mr. Dermot Givens, are resolved.” (Motion p. 2.) De Leon argues a stay of discovery “is necessary to prevent unnecessary litigation and will ensure that Parties do not engage in settlement discussions with an attorney facing allegations of financial misconduct.” (Motion p. 2.) Claiming that Reedy’s counsel is “morally questionable and dishonest” (Motion p. 4), De Leon asks the Court to impose $3,425.00 in sanctions on Reedy and his counsel.

The Court denies the motion. De Leon does not show how disciplinary charges against Reedy’s attorney threaten De Leon with “unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense” in defending Reedy’s case against De Leon or litigating De Leon’s cross-complaint against Reedy. De Leon’s contention that the disciplinary charges against Reedy’s attorney “create a substantial risk that any resolution reached in this case could later be challenged or invalidated, rendering current discovery efforts futile” is based on speculation and does not support an order staying discovery.

Reedy does not request sanctions or provide information which would allow the Court to calculate a sanctions award against De Leon and his counsel. Therefore, the Court does not impose sanctions on De Leon and his counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, subdivision (h).

The Court DENIES Defendant and Cross-Complainant Kevin De Leon’s motion for a protective order and for sanctions.

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

[1] De Leon also cites Code of Civil Procedure section 397, subdivision (c), which authorizes a change in venue when “the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.” (Motion p. 3.) However, De Leon provides no argument or evidence to support a motion under this provision.