Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV29991, Date: 2025-06-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV29991 Hearing Date: June 13, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On December 8, 2023, Plaintiffs Reginald Thompson Jr. and Lyric Thompson, by and through their guardian ad litem Caren Stephens, filed this action against Defendants Kon Son Park, Young Mi Park, and Does 1-50 for wrongful death, general negligence, and premises liability.
On April 5, 2024, the Court appointed Caren Stephens to serve as guardian ad litem for minor Plaintiff Reginald Thompson Jr. On April 8, 2024, the Court appointed Caren Stephens to serve as guardian ad litem for minor Plaintiff Lyric Thompson.
On April 12, 2024, Plaintiffs amended the complaint to include Defendant JK Park Corporation as Doe 1.
On January 29, 2025, Plaintiffs Reginald Thompson Jr. and Lyric Thompson, by and through their guardian ad litem Caren Stephens, filed a first amended complaint against Defendants Kon Son Park, Young Mi Park, and Does 1-50 for wrongful death sounding in negligence and wrongful death sounding in premises liability.
On March 26, 2025, Defendants Kon Son Park and Young Mi Park (“Defendants”) filed a general demurrer to the first amended complaint. The demurrer was set for hearing on April 21, 2025. On April 8, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On April 11, 2025, Defendants filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to June 13, 2025.
Trial is currently scheduled for October 31, 2025.
PARTIES' REQUESTS
Defendants ask the Court to sustain the demurrer, arguing it fails to state facts sufficient constitute a cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).
Plaintiffs ask the Court to overrule the demurrer.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Demurrer
“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
* * *
“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, ‘uncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible. . . .”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).)
In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading”].)
“For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not conclusions, deductions, or conclusions of facts or law).” (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2024) ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25, emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).)
“The demurrer should not be sustained where a plaintiff can cure a defective complaint by amendment or where the pleading, liberally construed, can state a cause of action.” (Jager v. County of Alameda (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 294, 297.)
“ ‘To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.’ ” (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:40, p. 7(l)-21, quoting C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
B. Negligence and premises liability
“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)
C. Landowner’s liability for third-party criminal
acts
“Landowners under California law are required to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition.” (Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 654, 663 (Williams), citing Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 (Ann M.).) “The underlying principle, set forth in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), is that “‘[e]veryone is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . .’” (Ibid.) This rule “‘establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.’” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1083 (Vasilenko).)
“ ‘ “ ‘Courts ... invoke[ ] the concept of duty to limit generally “the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act ....” ’ ” ’ ” (Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 663, quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) “Our Supreme Court has explained that an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714 must be “ ‘ “ ‘clearly supported by public policy.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) “Courts look to what are commonly called ‘the Rowland factors’ in determining whether policy considerations favor such an exception.” (Ibid., citing Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) “These are “ ‘ “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” ’ ” (Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 663, quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083; see Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.)
“One well-established limit is that there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.” (Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 663, citing Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 (Delgado).) “In the case of a landlord, however, the general duty of maintenance that is owed to tenants and patrons ‘has been held to include the duty to take reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures.’” (Id. at p. 664, quoting Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 674.) “This exception to the ‘general no-duty-to-protect rule’ comes under the “ ‘ “special relationship” doctrine’” (ibid., quoting Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 235), which courts have found “‘in cases involving the relationship between business proprietors such as shopping centers, restaurants, and bars, and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.’” (Ibid., quoting Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 235.)
“As explained more fully in Ann M., ‘the question of the scope of a landlord's duty to provide protection from foreseeable third party crime ... is determined in part by balancing the foreseeability of the harm against the burden of the duty to be imposed.’” (Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 664, quoting Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 678.) Where “ ‘ “ ‘the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high degree of foreseeability may be required’ ” ’ ” (ibid., quoting Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 678), but “ ‘ “ ‘where there are strong policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of foreseeability may be required.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 678-679.) “ ‘[D]uty in such circumstances is determined by a balancing of “foreseeability” of the criminal acts against the “burdensomeness, vagueness, and efficacy” of the proposed security measures.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 679.)
DISCUSSION
A. The first amended complaint
The first amended complaint includes the following allegations:
On January 11, 2022, Reginald Martin Thompson, Sr. (“Decedent”) was shot in the head and died after he walked out of Louisiana Fried Chicken and Fish in the parking lot located at and near 11415 S. Vermont Avenue in Los Angeles, California 90044 (“premises”).
The premises had experienced previous violent crimes and murders.
Defendants owned, possessed, controlled, maintained, managed, operated, and entrusted the premises, which were open to the public.
Defendants were aware of the repeated and ongoing violent crime including shootings and murders at the premises. Defendants failed to take affirmative steps to protect against the reasonably anticipated third parties’ criminal acts on the premises, including:
· Failure to discover criminal acts were being done or
were likely to be done.
· Failure to secure areas under the Defendants’ control.
· Failure to give a warning adequate to enable visitors
to avoid the harm of criminal acts.
· Failure to protect visitors from the harm of criminal
acts.
· Failure to provide security guards to protect the
safety of patrons despite heightened foreseeability.
· Failure to dispatch security guards to protect the
safety of patrons despite heightened foreseeability.
· Failure to inspect the areas under the Defendants’
control.
1. The premises
Defendants have filed a general demurrer, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. First, Defendants contend that the first amended complaint “fails to allege that the incident actually happened within the premises controlled by Defendants . . . .” (Demurrer p. 6.) This is because, according to Defendants, the first amended complaint’s definition of the “premises” where Decedent was killed is unclear. The first amended complaint alleges:
“On January 11, 2022, Decedent was shot in the head and died after he walked out of Louisiana Fried Chicken and Fish in the parking lot located at and near 11415 S. Vermont Avenue in Los Angeles, California 90044 (the Premises).” (FAC ¶ 7.)
The first amended complaint alleges that “Defendants owned, possessed, controlled, maintained, managed, operated, and entrusted the Premises. . . .” (FAC ¶ 11.) The Court accepts this allegation as true for purposes of the demurrer. (See Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:44, pp. 7(l)-25 to 7(l)-26 [“The sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pleaded state a valid cause of action—not whether they are true. Thus, no matter how unlikely or improbable, plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for purposes of ruling on the demurrer”].) The Court concludes that the first amended complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendants owned or controlled the premises where Decedent was shot and killed.
Even assuming that the first amended complaint is unclear about the areas included in the “premises,” “[c]larity of pleadings is not essential to overcome a general demurrer: ‘Objections that a complaint is ambiguous or uncertain, or that essential facts appear only inferentially, or as conclusions of law, or by way of recitals, must be raised by special demurrer, and cannot be reached on general demurrer.’ ” (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:42.5, p. 7(l)-23, quoting Johnson v. Mead (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 156, 160.) Therefore, any lack of clarity in the term “premises” does not support Defendants’ general demurrer.
2. Dangerous condition
Defendants also argue the first amended complaint does not allege the existence of a dangerous condition on the premises or that Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition.
The first amended complaint alleges that “the Premises had and have an extensive history of violent Crime and murder, including but not limited to [the deaths of four people who were shot at the premises between November 2005 and June 2020].” (FAC ¶ 8.) It also alleges that “Defendants were aware of, at all times relevant, the repeated and ongoing violent Crime including shootings and murders at the Premises.” (FAC ¶ 12.)
The first amended complaint's allegations concerning the existence and Defendants’ knowledge of a dangerous condition on the premises and the foreseeability of Decedent’s shooting are sufficient to withstand a demurrer.
3. The shooter’s location
Defendants contend the first amended complaint does not allege the shooter’s location. Defendants cite Hassoon v. Shamieh (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1196-1197 (Hassoon) for the proposition that “[a]bsent a right of control over the off-premises dangers, the landowner or possessor of land cannot be liable to persons injured thereby even if the injury occurs on the property.” (Demurrer p. 7.) Even assuming for the sake of arguments that Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pages 242-244 overruled Hassoon on other grounds as Defendants contend, Hassoon does not require a plaintiff to allege facts showing the shooter’s location to avoid a demurrer.
4. Foreseeability
Defendants argue that the first amended complaint does not allege facts showing the shooting was sufficiently foreseeable to support the duty which Plaintiffs seek to impose on Defendants. Based on the alleged facts cited above, the Court finds that the first amended complaint sufficiently pleads foreseeability for purposes of a demurrer.
5. Sufficiency of pleading
Last, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded their claim for negligence (wrongful death). The Court finds that the first amended complaint sufficiently pleads facts showing that Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty, Defendants breached that duty, and the breach caused Plaintiff’s injuries.
The Court
overrules the demurrer.
CONCLUSION
The Court OVERRULES the demurrer of Defendants Kon Son Park and Young Mi Park to the first amended complaint filed by Plaintiffs Reginald Thompson Jr. and Lyric Thompson, by and through their guardian ad litem Caren Stephens.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.