Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 23STCV31451, Date: 2024-10-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV31451 Hearing Date: October 28, 2024 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving and opposition papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On December 26, 2023, Plaintiff Marcelo Luizzi (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Manning James Terrace LLC, Wong 2015 LLC, Chan 2017 LLC, EGL Management, and Does 1-100 for wrongful eviction, premises liability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On July 9, 2024, Defendants Manning James Terrace, LLC, Wong 2015 LLC, Chan 2017 LLC, and EGL Management (“Defendants”) filed a demurrer and a motion to strike. The demurrer and motion to strike were set for hearing on August 7, 2024. On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed oppositions. The Court continued the hearing to October 28, 2024.
Trial is scheduled for June 24, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Defendants ask the Court to sustain the demurrer to Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and to grant the motion to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims.
Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the demurrer and deny the motion to strike.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Demurrer
“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
* * *
“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).)
In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading”].)
“For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not conclusions, deductions, or conclusions of facts or law).” (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2024) ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25, emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).)
"A demurrer may be filed to one of several causes of action in the complaint, without answering the other causes of action." (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:34.1, p. 7(l)-19.)
B. Motion to strike
“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The Court may “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading of from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)
“In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Ibid.)
C. Intentional infliction of emotional distress
In addition, the extreme and outrageous conduct ‘ “must be . . . directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of the plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” [Citation.] “The requirement that the defendant's conduct be directed primarily at the plaintiff is a factor which distinguishes intentional infliction of emotional distress from the negligent infliction of such injury.” ’ ” (Berry, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1273, quoting Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1002.)
D. Punitive damages
Civil
Code section 3294 provides in part:
“(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
“(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.
“(c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:
“(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
“(2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.
“(3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (b), (c).)
“Simple negligence will not justify an award of punitive damages.” (Spencer v. San Francisco Brick Co. (1907) 5 Cal.App.126, 128.)
However, “nonintentional torts support punitive damages when the defendant's conduct ‘involves conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others’ . . . .” (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299 (Pfeifer), quoting Gawara v. United States Brass Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1361.) “As defined in the punitive damages statute, ‘[m]alice’ encompasses ‘despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others,’ and ‘[o]ppression’ means ‘despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (c)(1), (2).) “The term ‘ “despicable,” ’ though not defined in the statute, is applicable to ‘circumstances that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)
“Under the statute, ‘malice does not require actual intent to harm. [Citation.] Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. [Citation.] Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences. [Citation.]’ ” (Pfeifer, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1299, quoting Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228.)
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
1. Wrongful eviction claim
On the first cause of action for wrongful eviction, Plaintiff alleges the following:
Plaintiff occupied Apartment 302 located at 7225 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90046 (“premises”), Apartment 302 (hereinafter the "Premises"). In December 2022, Plaintiff became severely ill while occupying the premises, resulting in a prolonged hospitalization.
In January 2023, after his hospitalization, Plaintiff came to believe that he had been exposed to mold or other toxic substances while occupying the premises. Plaintiff reported the potential exposure to the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health (“Department”). The Department issued a Notice to Abate the dangerous condition and instituted an investigation.
Meanwhile, to protect himself, Plaintiff temporarily moved out of the premises while maintaining his tenancy at the premises.
Afterwards, Defendants -- which are business organizations of an unknown form --systematically and deliberately sought to prevent the authorities from investigating the premises and sought to thwart Plaintiff’s rights. Defendants informed Plaintiff that he was no longer permitted to maintain his tenancy and by tr[i]ck and device convinced him to move elsewhere. Plaintiff did not realize that by agreeing to move he would be preventing any investigation of the premises. Defendants intended by their actions to subvert Plaintiff's effort to determine the extent of his exposure to a toxic substance.
Defendants engaged in self-help actions amounting to deliberate eviction of Plaintiff.
As a result, Plaintiff was prevented from ascertaining to the extent to which toxic or dangerous materials were in the premises during his tenancy.
Defendants’ acts were deliberate, willful and in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages.
Defendants' conduct was a direct and proximate cause of injury to Plaintiff including violation of his tenant rights, avoidance of payment to him, move out entitlements, imposition of increased rents, and emotional and mental distress.
2. Premises liability claim
On the second cause of action for premises liability, Plaintiff also alleges the following:
The mold or other toxic substances created a dangerous condition within the premises. Defendants had a duty to warn, caution, inspect. detect and correct the dangerous condition. Defendants negligently owned, maintained, managed and operated the premises, breaching their duty of care to Plaintiff. Defendants’ breach was the actual and proximate cause of harm to Plaintiff. As the result of Defendants’ breach, Plaintiff sustained personal injuries and other damages.
3. Intentional infliction of emotional distress
On the third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of the first and second causes of action and also alleges the following:
Defendants’ conduct was outrageous. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff was particularly vulnerable to infliction of emotional distress by virtue of his recent illness and continuing physical, mental and emotional issues.
Defendants’ conduct was particularly designed to vex, annoy and injure Plaintiff and was done with conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights and safety. Defendants held positions of trust as to Plaintiff and exercised a degree of power and authority over Plaintiff as persons and entities in charge of his living quarters. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff needed to know the exact nature and extent of his exposure to toxic materials while a resident of the premises.
Defendants acted with malicious intent to prevent Plaintiff from ascertaining the full nature and extent of his exposure to toxic materials while at the premises by deceiving and tricking Plaintiff into leaving the premises, thwarting his efforts to investigate and ascertain the true nature of his exposure to toxic materials.
Defendants’ conduct is outrageous and repugnant and worthy of disrepute, forming a basis for the imposition of punitive damages. Defendants’ conduct has also resulted in grave emotional and mental distress as well as physical manifestations of same, all to the detriment of Plaintiff, and justifying an award of punitive damages for pain and suffering.
B. Defendants’ demurrer
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege extreme or outrageous conduct, conduct intended to inflict injury, or conduct engaged in with the realization that injury would occur. (Demurrer pp. 5, 7.)
A plaintiff may plead a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress by alleging facts that show “(1) defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct (conduct so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized community) with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard [of] the probability of causing, emotional distress; and (2) as a result, plaintiff suffered extreme or severe emotional distress.” (Berry, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1273, citing Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1001.)
C. Defendants’ motion to strike
Defendants
argue the complaint “does not contain sufficient factual allegations of malice,
fraud, or oppression to support an award of punitive damages” under Civil Code
section 3294. (Motion p. 2.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s complaint
contains only “conclusory” allegations.
(Motion p. 4.)
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS the motion to strike filed by Defendants Manning James Terrace, LLC, Wong 2015 LLC, Chan 2017 LLC, and EGL Management and strikes the following language from Plaintiff Marcelo Luizzi’s complaint with 30 days leave to amend:
(1) Paragraph 14a(2): “punitive damages”
(2) In the first cause of action for wrongful eviction: “The
acts of Defendants were deliberate, willful and in conscious disregard of the
rights of plaintiff thus entitling him to punitive damages in an amount
according to proof, designed to publish defendants and discourage such future
conduct.”
(3) In the third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress: “The conduct complained of above is, by any reasonable metric, outrageous and repugnant, and worthy of disrepute, thus forming a basis for the imposition of punitive damages. Said conduct has also resulted in grave emotional and mental distress as well as physical manifestations of same, all to the detriment of Plaintiff, and justifying an award of punitive damages for pain and suffering, in an amount according to proof.”
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling.
Moving
parties are ordered to file proof of service of the Court’s ruling within five
days.