Judge Lon F. Hurwitz, Case 2022-01251769 2023-04-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lon F. Hurwitz, Case: 2022-01251769, Date: 2023-04-14 Tentative Ruling

Demurrer to Complaint

Defendant Kaiser Foundation Hospitals demurs on the following grounds. It does not specify whether the demurrer is a general or special demurrer.

1. Demurrer to all seven causes of action on the grounds that they fail to state a cause of action per CCP 430.10(e);

2. Demurrer to the first, second, third, and fifth causes of action on the grounds it is based on the “false premises” that Plaintiff was classified as non-exempt;

3. Demurrer to the first through sixth causes of action on the grounds Plaintiff does not have standing. (Martin v. Bridgeport Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal. App. 4th 1024, 1031; CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal. App. 4th 300, 307-08.);

4. Demurrer to the third cause of action on the grounds that it is falsely premised on her wage statements and entitlement to additional compensation; and

5. Demurrer to the seventh cause of action on the grounds Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies. (Labor Code § 2699.3(a).)

While the caption states Defendant moves to strike in the alternative, the Notice itself does not request that the Court strike any portion of the pleadings, nor does it state what portions of the complaint it seeks to be stricken, in violation of Rule of Court 3.1322(a). As Defendant did not properly move to strike, only the demurrer is considered below.

RULING:

Before the Court is Defendant Kaiser Foundation Hospitals’ (“Kaiser”) demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint. The demurrer is overruled.

“A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Redfearn v. Trader Joe’s Co. (2018) 20 Cal. App. 5th 989, 996.) The Court must determine “whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The Court assumes “the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Id.) “A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 97, 119.)

“As a general rule in testing a pleading against a demurrer the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be,” unless the “complaint contains allegations of fact inconsistent with attached documents, or allegations contrary to facts which are judicially noticed.” (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 604.) Courts “construe the complaint ‘liberally ... with a view to substantial justice between the parties[.]’” (Goncharov v. Uber Techs., Inc. (2018) 19 Cal. App. 5th 1157, 1165.)

Standing

Kaiser contends Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a class claim or a PAGA representative action. “‘Standing is a jurisdictional issue that … must be established in some appropriate manner.’ [Citation.]” (Reynolds v. City of Calistoga (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 865, 871 [citing Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 480].) Jurisdiction is therefore a proper ground for a demurrer. (CCP § 430.10(a).)

Kaiser’s primary argument is premised on the status of Plaintiff as an exempt employee.

Turning to the facts in the pleading, Plaintiff specifically pleads, “Plaintiff has been employed by Defendants as a non-exempt employee, from approximately 2010 through May 28, 2021.” (ROA 2, Complaint, ¶7 [emphasis added].) The Court must assume the truth of properly pleaded factual allegations, and Plaintiff has alleged she was a non-exempt employee. To the extent that Kaiser disputes this, it is a question of fact.

Turning to the Request for Judicial Notice, Kaiser asks the Court to take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s wage statements under Evid. Code § 452(h), which permits (but does not require) the Court to take judicial notice of “acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” Under the plain language of the evidence code, the Court cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the wage statements—specifically, the “exempt” designation contained therein, because that is a designation that was apparently determined by Kaiser; not a source of “reasonably indisputable accuracy”. Therefore, this request is denied. As demonstrated by the Complaint, moving and opposition papers, and meet and confer efforts, Plaintiff’s status as an exempt or non-exempt employee is a contested issue.

Complaint Deficiency

Kaiser contends that the Plaintiff’s complaint contains only conclusions to support her claims, not facts. Therefore, it is subject to demurrer. (CCP § 430.10(e).)

“[T]he California Supreme Court has mandated that a candidate complaint for class action consideration, if at all possible, be allowed to survive the pleading stages of litigation.’” (Gutierrez v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 969, 976 [citing Tarkington v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1510].)

“In keeping with the rule that allegations of fact should be made in ‘ordinary and concise language” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10), “plaintiffs may, and should, allege the foregoing facts succinctly, and may do so in a conclusory fashion if their knowledge of the precise cause of injury is limited. (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1194-1195.)

Plaintiff has pleaded adequate facts to support her individual, class, and PAGA claims in ordinary and concise language. Her conclusory language is acceptable as her knowledge of the class claims and PAGA action are limited. Kaiser offers no authority to establish that “boilerplate” facts are insufficient.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Kaiser claims the PAGA action (COA 7) fails because Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies as to minimum wage, overtime, rest periods, final wages, or inaccurate wage statements. In response, Plaintiff points to the LWDA letter attached to the Complaint.

Labor Code § 2699.3(a)(1)(A) requires a party to give written notice to the LWDA and the employer “of the specific provisions of this code alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories to support the alleged violation.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff’s LWDA letter is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint (ROA 2). The letter only provides facts for the meal period and expense reimbursement claims. As a result, Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the PAGA representative action for minimum wage, overtime, rest periods, final wages, or inaccurate wage statements. However, a demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained. (Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 97, 119.) Therefore, the demurrer to the seventh cause of action is also overruled. However, Plaintiff is cautioned that any deficiencies in the LWDA letter may affect approval of settlement or trial in this matter.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted as to the existence of the subject complaints, but denied as to the factual matters asserted in the documents. “A court may take judicial notice of the [e]xistence of each document in a court file, but can only take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments.” (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal. 4th 261, 280.) Where a party does not argue that the existence of a filing, but rather asserts its content as truth, “we deny his request for judicial notice.” (Id.) In both the moving and opposition papers, both parties refer the Court to cases in other venues involving the same counsel and the same overarching set of issues—however, neither party provides authority for the proposition that any of these other cases are controlling or persuasive. Therefore, in crafting its ruling, the Court looked solely at the pleading before it (ROA 2) and the facts pleaded therein.

Finally, while the caption states Defendant moves to strike in the alternative, the Notice itself does not request that the Court strike any portion of the pleadings, nor does it state what portions of the complaint it seeks to be stricken, in violation of Rule of Court 3.1322(a). As Defendant did not properly move to strike, the Court only considers the demurrer.

Plaintiff to give notice. Defendant to file an answer within thirty days of this Order.