Judge: Loren G. Freestone, Case: 37-2020-00016950-CU-OR-CTL, Date: 2023-08-11 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - August 10, 2023

08/11/2023  10:30:00 AM  C-64 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Loren G. Freestone

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Civil - Unlimited  Other Real Property Discovery Hearing 37-2020-00016950-CU-OR-CTL TANNER VS SCHWEITZER [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Abhay Schweitzer's motion to compel Plaintiff Ladawn Tanner to provide further responses to requests for admission is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Timeliness In September 2022, Tanner asked whether there was 'any way we can push our deadlines back a few days' (referring to Tanner's deadline to respond to Schweitzer's meet and confer, and Schweitzer's deadline to file a motion to compel). After some additional back and forth, Schweitzer responded that he 'will agree to give you until Monday September 19, to respond' and that his 'motion to compel deadline will now be Friday, September 23.' Tanner never replied objecting to these dates. This was a sufficient agreement to continue the filing deadline. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.060.) The motion was thereafter timely filed on September 21, 2022. In December 2022, the court vacated all dates (including the pending motion to compel) and set a status conference to discuss a 'game plan' for how to proceed with the case. However, this did not foreclose Schweitzer from re-calendaring his motion. (Cf. Guardianship of Walters (1951) 37 Cal.2d 239, 244 ['An off-calendar order is not equivalent to a dismissal and does not divest the court of the jurisdiction which it has acquired']; Guardianship of Lyle (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 153, 156 ['It is permissible for good cause to delay a trial or hearing to a later date or to drop or strike a case from the calendar, to be restored on motion of one or more of the litigants or on the court's own motion'].) This motion is substantively identical to the motion that was timely filed in September 2022 (with the exception of background information regarding the initial hearing being taken off calendar). Schweitzer has, in essence, simply re-noticed that motion. The motion is therefore timely.

RFAs 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 21, 22, and 23 Tanner denied RFAs 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, and 22. These are code-compliant responses. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 2033.230, subd. (b)(2).) Tanner responded that after a reasonable inquiry, she was unable to admit or deny RFAs 2, 3, 16, and 23. These are also code-complaint responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.230, subd. (b)(3), (c).) Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2952039  36 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  TANNER VS SCHWEITZER [IMAGED]  37-2020-00016950-CU-OR-CTL Schweitzer, in essence, argues that these requests all should have been admitted. But a motion to compel cannot be used to force an admission in lieu of a different code-compliant response, even if the fact is 'unquestionably true.' (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Macias (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1028; Holguin v. Superior Court (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 812, 820.) If the requests should have been admitted, then Schweiter's recourse is to seek his costs for proving that fact. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420.) Schweitzer also argues that Tanner's 'preliminary statement' and 'general objections' are improper.

But despite that statement and those objections, Tanner provided complete responses to the requests.

As such, there is 'nothing to address' by way of a motion to compel. (See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 268 [noting, however, that the defendant was entitled to seek cost-of-proof sanctions even though plaintiff had prefaced denials with boilerplate objections].) The motion is therefore denied as to these requests.

RFA 24 Tanner objected to RFA 24 on the ground the term 'consume' was vague and ambiguous, and on the ground that whether he has ever 'consumed' marijuana is irrelevant.

As to the first objection, the term 'consume' is straightforward and does not require any further definition. Tanner must respond, but she may specify the manner of any consumption in her response.

(See St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 780–781 [party may include a brief explanation in denying or admitting an RFA].) As to the second objection, Tanner alleges that she 'is the daughter of a law enforcement officer and lawyer who was employed for approximately 20 years by the California Highway Patrol,' 'is a legal professional,' and 'is opposed to the distribution or sale of marijuana and has maintained a reputation as being a law-abiding citizen.' Tanner further alleges that use of her name in connection with the conditional use permit for the sale of marijuana has damaged her reputation. As such, whether or not Tanner has used marijuana is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) The motion is therefore granted as to this request.

Conclusion The motion is denied as to RFAs 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 21, 22, and 23.

The motion is granted as to RFA 24.

The parties' respective requests for sanctions are denied. Schweitzer was substantially justified in brining this motion, and Tanner was substantially justified in opposing it.

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