Judge: Loren G. Freestone, Case: 37-2022-00026454-CU-BC-CTL, Date: 2023-09-29 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - September 28, 2023

09/29/2023  10:30:00 AM  C-64 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Loren G. Freestone

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Civil - Unlimited  Breach of Contract/Warranty Discovery Hearing 37-2022-00026454-CU-BC-CTL REYES VS GENERAL MOTORS LLC [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Enrique Reyes's motion to compel Defendant General Motors LLC to provide further responses to requests for production of documents is DENIED.

RFPs 16–21 request a wide swath of documents related to a purportedly widespread 'engine defect' in certain year Chevrolet Silverados. Reyes argues that the documents are relevant to show that his Silverado had such a defect and that GM's failure to repurchase it was willful, thereby entitling him to civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

Documents may only be compelled if they are 'relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action,' and the information is either 'itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) 'Although relevancy to the subject matter is a broader concept than relevancy to the issues, if the information sought to be elicited relates to matters of little or no practical benefit to the party seeking disclosure, a timely objection on the grounds that the question asked is not relevant to the subject matter in the pending action and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence should be sustained by a trial judge.' (Covell v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 39, 42–43; see, e.g., Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 313, 319–320 [expressing skepticism that the claim files relating to every claim similar to the claim at issue in the case was relevant for purposes of discovery].) In addition to the documents being relevant, a motion to compel further responses must 'set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) 'Good cause' should be established by way of declaration. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223–224.) 'To establish good cause, a discovery proponent must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.' (Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224, disapproved on other grounds; see, e.g., Nelson v. Superior Court (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 444, 451–453 [no good cause for the production of all CHP accident investigation reports for all accidents that occurred at or near the scene of the plaintiff's accident].) 'Courts must insist discovery devices be used as tools to facilitate litigation rather than as weapons to wage litigation. These tools should be well calibrated; the lancet is to be preferred over the sledge Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2975585  39 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  REYES VS GENERAL MOTORS LLC [IMAGED]  37-2022-00026454-CU-BC-CTL hammer.' (Calcor Space, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 221.) 'Because of the potential for promiscuous discovery imposing great burdens, even though ultimately the probative value of the discovered material may be questionable, trial judges must carefully weigh the cost, time, expense and disruption of normal business resulting from an order compelling the discovery against the probative value of the material which might be disclosed if the discovery is ordered. A carelessly drafted discovery order may result in cost and inconvenience far outweighing the potential usefulness of the material ordered to be produced.

Because of the difficulty in drawing clear lines as to what is and what is not proper, this danger is particularly great with respect to orders requiring the production of materials.' (Id. at p. 223; see also Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 385 [noting that some types of 'fishing' may be 'entirely improper,' such as when the requests place 'more burden upon the adversary than the value of the information warrants']; Deaile v. General Telephone Co. of California (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 841, 851 ['discovery, like all matters of procedure has ultimate and necessary boundaries,' and a trial court is 'not under any obligation to redraft' patently overbroad requests].) Here, the declaration from Reyes' attorney states: (1) it is his 'understanding that Safety Recalls are essentially repair procedures published by [GM] and distributed to its repair facilities which outline how a common problem should be repaired'; (2) GM issued Recall N212345440, which addresses a coolant leak from the heater outlet pipe near the lower bracket mounted to the engine in 2019–2021 Chevrolet Silverados; and (3) GM performed the recall on the subject vehicle in December 2021.

This evidence demonstrates good cause to require the production of the recall, but that is not what Reyes is requesting. Reyes already has a copy of the recall.

Rather, Reyes essentially wants every single document related in any way to an 'engine defect' in 2021 Chevrolet Silverados,' defined to mean 'such defects which result in symptoms including, but not limited to the vehicle leaking coolant, air pockets in cooling system, heater outlet pipe replacement, Safety Recall N212345440; and any other concern identified in the repair history for the subject 2021 Chevrolet Silverado [emphasis added].' The requests encompass all documents in any way 'concerning or relating to [emphasis added]' such defects in not only Reyes' vehicle, but also every other 2021 Chevrolet Silverado, including (1) any internal analysis or investigation, including investigations to determine root causes, investigations to design a permanent repair procedure, investigations into failure rates of various parts, and cost/savings analyses for implementing/not implementing repair procedures [RFP 16]; (2) any communications [RFP 17]; (3) any decision to issue any notices, letters, campaigns, warranty extensions, technical service bulletins, and recalls [RFP 18]; (4) customer complaints, claims, reported failures, and warranty claims, and GM's response thereto [RFP 19]; (5) failure rates [RFP 20]; and (6) fixes [RFP 21].) Reyes has not demonstrated good cause justifying these extremely broad requests.

Reyes asserts that 'courts routinely compel production of documents similar to those requested here.' As support Reyes cites Doppes v. Bentley Motors Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967 and Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138. Neither Doppes nor Donlen involved the appropriate scope of discovery in a lemon law case.

In Doppes, both the trial court and a discovery referee ordered Bentley to produce a variety of documents (e.g., communications, customer complaints, warranty repairs, service orders, vehicle tests, court proceedings) related to an issue whereby the rust inhibitor would cause an obnoxious odor in certain year Bentley Arnages. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972–979.) Bentley repeatedly failed to comply resulting in monetary sanctions and issue sanctions. (Id. at pp. 975–986.) On appeal, Bentley did 'not challenge the discovery referee's findings,' nor did it 'deny it misused the discovery process.' (Id. at p. 993.) Bentley argued 'only that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose terminating sanctions.' (Ibid.) Thus, the issue in Doppes was the appropriate remedy for failure to comply with four admittedly proper court orders. (See id. at pp. 991–996.) The propriety of the discovery requests themselves was not at issue. (See ibid.) In Donlen, Ford moved in liminie 'to exclude evidence of any vehicle other than plaintiff's truck' on the Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2975585  39 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  REYES VS GENERAL MOTORS LLC [IMAGED]  37-2022-00026454-CU-BC-CTL grounds that such evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. (Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 143–144.) The trial court denied the motion, and the jury heard evidence from the plaintiff's expert that the transmission installed in the subject vehicle 'was known in the automotive repair industry as 'problematic,'' and evidence that Ford had issued technical service bulletins and a recall related to the transmission. (Id. at pp. 144, 153.) The court found no error because 'everything about which he testified that applied to other vehicles applied equally to plaintiff's vehicle.' (Id. at p. 154.) Thus, the issue in Donlen was the admissibility of expert opinion on the reputation of a vehicle component, and remedial solutions Ford implemented to address a common issue (similar to the recall GM issued in this case). Neither discovery requests nor the types of documents sought here were at issue.

In contrast, the court in MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1036, at least somewhat addressed the trial court's refusal to compel the production of 'records of the same defect appearing in other cars of the same year, make, and model as [the plaintiff's] car.' (Id. at p. 1042.) After the jury found the failure to repurchase the vehicle was not willful, the plaintiff appealed. (Id. at p. 1043.) The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion, because even assuming error, it was not reasonably probable that the documents would have caused the jury to reach a different verdict. (Id. at pp. 1045–1046.) Moreover, most federal courts to have addressed the propriety of this type of sweeping discovery have concluded that the information is not relevant, overbroad, and/or of limited probative value that is not warranted by the nature of the case. (See, e.g., Ralls v. BMW of North America, LLC (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2023) 2023 WL 3151860, at * 8–9; Park v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (S.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2020) 2020 WL 4784740, at *–8; Velasco v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2019) 2019 WL 6825744, at *1; Kooner v. BMW of North America, LLC (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2018) 2018 WL 3956021, at *3; Koeper v. BMW of North America, LLC (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2018) 2018 WL 6016915, at *1–2; Putman v. BMW of North America, LLC (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2018) 2018 WL 6137160, at *3–5.) At trial, the focus will be on Reyes' vehicle. The key issues will be whether GM successful repaired the coolant leak in his specific vehicle within a reasonable number of repair attempts, and if not, whether GM's failure to repurchase his specific vehicle was willful. (CACI 3201, 3244.) Specifically, Reyes brought his vehicle in on three occasions. On the first occasion, the dealer confirmed a coolant leak and performed Recall N212345440 by recalling the heater outlet pipe. On the second occasion, the dealer confirmed that the vehicle had a low coolant level and that there were air pockets present from the prior repair, and it addressed those issues by topping off the coolant and priming out the air pockets. On the third occasion, Reyes brought the vehicle in because he believed it was still leaking coolant and overheating, but the dealer technician determined that the coolant level was appropriate and that there was no leaks or overheating present. And therein lies the crux of this case-did Reyes' vehicle in fact still have a coolant leak when it was brought in for a third time, and if so, did GM unreasonably fail to repurchase it at that time.

Given the relatively straightforward issues in this case, Reyes has failed to demonstrate sufficient relevance-much less good cause-to order production of the trove of information sought by way of RFPs 16–21. As such, the motion to compel is denied.

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