Judge: Loren G. Freestone, Case: 37-2023-00001919-CU-PO-CTL, Date: 2023-09-15 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - September 14, 2023

09/15/2023  10:30:00 AM  C-64 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Loren G. Freestone

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Civil - Unlimited  PI/PD/WD - Other Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2023-00001919-CU-PO-CTL FURCH VS ANTHEM REAL ESTATE VENTURES INC [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Anthem Real Estate Ventures Inc.'s demurrer to the fifth cause of action in Plaintiff Mary Furch's first amended complaint is OVERRULED.

Furch's fifth cause of action is for violation of the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) The UCL prohibits 'unfair competition,' broadly defined to include for 'any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.' (Id. at § 17200.) The statute is written in the disjunctive, and therefore a UCL claim may be based on any of the three varieties of unfair competition. (See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2010) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) 'The UCL's unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and makes those unlawful practices actionable under the UCL. Virtually any law or regulation-federal or state, statutory or common law-can serve as a predicate for an unlawful prong violation.' (Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 988, 994.) 'The unfair competition statute is not confined to anticompetitive business practices.' (Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 499, 519.) Rather, the 'statute has been found to prohibit wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity might occur,' including '[t]he renting of residential housing.' (People ex rel. City of Santa Monica v. Gabriel (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 882, 888; see, e.g., People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 634 [complaint adequately alleged unfair competition based on mobile home park operators' failure to adequately maintain proper mechanical, electrical, sanitary, safety and other installations within the park, and their neglect to enforce licensing, registration, and other requirements for vehicles within the park].) Furch's second cause of action is for negligence. It can be a violation of Civil Code section 1714 (a codification of common law) for a landlord to negligently permit its tenants to keep dogs that the landlord knows are dangerous. (See Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 411–416; see generally Donchin v. Guerrero (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1832.) Furch's third cause of action is for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. It can be a violation of Civil Code section 1927 (also a codification of common law) for a landlord to breach the covenant by failing to take action against a troublesome neighbor. (See Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588–593.) Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3003833  25 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  FURCH VS ANTHEM REAL ESTATE VENTURES INC [IMAGED]  37-2023-00001919-CU-PO-CTL Furch's fourth cause of action is for nuisance. It can be a violation of Civil Code section 3479 (another codification of common law) for a landlord to permit a dangerous condition at rented property. (See Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 919–920.) Citing Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 965, Anthem argues that conduct is not 'unlawful' for purposes of the UCL when the 'alleged conduct sounds in mere negligence.' The plaintiff in Klein filed a UCL claim against a pet food manufacturer alleging it had sold her a contaminated product. It was undisputed that the manufacturer had 'no knowledge that its products were unmerchantable' and 'acted promptly to recall the contaminated products, advertised the recall effort and afforded restitution to customers,' conduct the court characterized as 'exemplary.' (Id. at pp.

967–970.) The plaintiff argued that the conduct was nonetheless 'unlawful' for purposes of the UCL 'under the doctrines of strict products liability and breach of the implied warranty of fitness.' (Id. at p. 969.) Emphasizing that the plaintiff had 'not presented any argument or evidence to back up his claim that [the manufacturer] broke any law by unwittingly distributing contaminated food,' the court affirmed summary judgment, holding that 'the unintentional distribution of a defective product is beyond the scope and policy of the 'unlawful' prong of section 17200.' (Ibid.) Klein is distinguishable. The defendant in Klein was not negligent, and the holding of the case is limited to 'the unintentional distribution of a defective product.' That is not the issue here. Moreover, unlike the defendant's 'exemplary' conduct in Klein, Anthem has allegedly long had knowledge about vicious dogs at the property and has never taken appropriate steps to rectify the situation. And whereas the plaintiff in Klein failed to present any argument that the manufacturer's conduct was unlawful, Furch specifically identified Civil Code sections 1927 and 3479 in her complaint.

Anthem does not challenge the sufficiency of the second, third, and fourth causes of action. For the reasons set forth above, those claims are sufficient to support the fifth cause of action for unfair competition based on the unlawful prong. It is therefore unnecessary to address whether the alleged conduct is also 'unfair' or 'fraudulent.' (See Elder v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 841, 856, fn. 14.) In light of the above, the demurrer is overruled. Anthem shall file an answer within 10 days.

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