Judge: Loren G. Freestone, Case: 37-2023-00001936-CU-PO-CTL, Date: 2024-01-26 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - January 25, 2024

01/26/2024  10:30:00 AM  C-64 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Loren G. Freestone

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Civil - Unlimited  PI/PD/WD - Other Motion Hearing (Civil) 37-2023-00001936-CU-PO-CTL DOE VS LYFT INC [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendant, LYFT, INC's Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

This case stems from an incident in December, 2022, in which Plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries following an alleged physical altercation with a Lyft driver, Defendant Perry. Plaintiff used the Lyft application, website, and technology platform to arrange a ride with Defendant, and Plaintiff alleges DNO Perry caused her injury 'while performing his job duties.' (See Complaint ¶¶ 51, 59, 74, 85.) Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant asserting the following causes of action: (1) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, & Retention; (2) Respondeat Superior Negligence; (3) Battery; (4) Assault; (5) Gender Violence; (6) False Imprisonment; (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (8) Fraud; (9) Common Carrier Liability (Cal. Civ. Code §2100 et seq.).

In addition to suing the driver, Perry for the alleged Incident, Plaintiff brings derivative claims against Lyft for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention and respondeat superior premised on Defendant Perry's alleged wrongful conduct while 'performing his job duties' on the Lyft platform. Further, Plaintiff claims Lyft is directly liable for her alleged damages based on common carrier liability. (See Complaint ¶¶ 99-101.) Defendant relies on an arbitration agreement in the Terms of Service that plaintiff affirmatively agreed to on 5 separate occasions. There is no real dispute here that plaintiff agreed to the Terms of Service.

While plaintiff Jane Doe provides a declaration in Opposition, she does not deny Lyfts' position that plaintiff agreed to the Terms of Service, which required arbitration. The argument by plaintiff focuses on scope of the agreement.

Generally, courts look to the scope of the arbitration provision to determine what is arbitrable and 'claims framed in tort are subject to contractual arbitration provisions when they arise out of the contractual relationship between the parties. RN Solution (165 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1522 (2008) quoting Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, 40 Cal.3d 406, 418, fn. 12 (1985).) In this case, the Terms of Service require Lyft and Plaintiff to submit 'ALL DISPUTES AND CLAIMS BETWEEN' them to arbitration, including those 'arising out of or relating to ... the Lyft Platform, the Rideshare Services, ... any other goods or services made available through the Lyft Platform' and 'all other federal and state statutory and common law claims.' (Simmons Decl. at Exhibit 5 at ¶17(a).) The arbitration agreement expressly states that it is 'intended to require the arbitration of every claim or dispute that can lawfully be arbitrated' except for certain claims expressly excluded (none of which apply here). (Id.; Lewsadder v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc. (1973), 36 Cal.App.3d 255, 259 (the parties' agreement to arbitrate 'any controversy...arising out of [plaintiff's] employment' was 'sufficiently broad' to encompass the plaintiff's claims) Here, Plaintiff's Complaint expressly alleges the Incident occurred because she accepted a ride from DNO Perry after connecting with him via the Lyft platform.

Note also that there is a delegation clause in the agreement. Any such dispute must be resolved by the Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3001254  54 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  DOE VS LYFT INC [IMAGED]  37-2023-00001936-CU-PO-CTL arbitrator and not this Court. Whether the arbitration agreement applies to Plaintiff's claims has been explicitly and exclusively delegated to the arbitrator: Section 17(a) of the Terms of Service states: 'All disputes concerning the arbitrability of a Claim (including disputes about the scope, applicability, enforceability, revocability or validity of the Arbitration Agreement) shall be decided by the arbitrator' (except in very limited circumstances that do not apply here). (Simmons Decl. at Exhibit 5, ¶17(a).) An 'agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue' through a delegation clause like the one in Lyft's Terms of Service 'is simply an additional, antecedent agreement,' and 'the FAA operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any other.' (Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S.

63, 70.) Indeed, both the United States Supreme Court and California courts agree that parties may delegate the issue of arbitrability and 'courts must respect the parties' decision as embodied in the contract'-particularly where (as here) the delegation clause is clear and unmistakable. (Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 139 S.Ct. 524, 528; see Chin v. Advanced Fresh Concepts Franchise Corp. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 704, 709; Peterson, 2018 WL 6047085, at *2-4; Loewen, 129 F.

Supp. 3d at 966 (applying California law) (holding delegation clause in Lyft's Terms of Service enforceable, such that the arbitrator must resolve the parties' dispute as to arbitrability) Intentional Torts Plaintiff takes the position that the alleged intentional tort claims cannot be arbitrated under the law.

Plaintiff relies on RN Solution, Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare West to argue that assault-related claims are not arbitrable. (165 Cal.App.4th 1511 (2008).) However, in that case, the Court determined, after examining the agreement between two corporate entities, that the contract required arbitration of business torts and did not cover an assault-related claims against an individual defendant. The companies' agreement to arbitrate did not cover tort claims between employees of the two companies 'in the context of an intimate domestic relationship between them.' Id. at 1523.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges the Driver committed various intentional and negligent torts 'while performing his job duties.' (Complaint ¶ 92.) Plaintiff's claims, against Lyft, are based on the use of Lyft's services, the Lyft Platform through which they were procured, and her use of the Rideshare Services.

Plaintiff's claims are encompassed by the agreement.

Whether the arbitration agreement is vague as to who it applies to Plaintiff also argues the arbitration agreement lacks clarity regarding whether specific provisions pertain to the Plaintiff as a user of the platform or to the driver as a service provider. (See Decl. of Ronald Yoosefian, ¶ 4, Exh. 1 'Arbitration Agreement,' page 16 of 38). Plaintiff argues 'the focus of the arbitration agreement at issue here is geared towards employment claims for Lyft service providers instead of the users of the platform.' The plain text of the Arbitration Agreement provides: all claims arising from Rideshare Services are arbitrable unless expressly excluded. The broad Arbitration Agreement in Lyft's Terms of Service ('TOS') expressly extends to Plaintiff's claims in this matter by referring to 'any dispute, claim or controversy...arising out of or relating to: ... the Lyft Platform, the Rideshare Services...[Plaintiff's] relationship with Lyft...harassment, retaliation, fraud, defamation, emotional distress...and all other federal and state statutory and common law claims.' Unconscionability Plaintiff argues that the agreement is unconscionable. Procedural and substantive unconscionability must both be present for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce an arbitration provision under the doctrine of unconscionability. (See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, 24 Cal.4th 83, 114 (2000).) The two types of unconscionability are evaluated on a sliding scale whereby ''the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.'' Plaintiff argues that 'intended beneficiaries' of the agreement is confusing at best and the meaning of 'you' renders the Arbitration Agreement substantively unconscionable. 'The agreement references the individuals as 'You' without any explanation as to who 'you' is referring to, whether it is the driver, user of the platform, or both.' (See Decl. of Jane Doe ¶ 4, 5, & 6). However, Plaintiff proffers no explanation as to why 'you' would not have the obvious interpretation of referring to the recipient of the document.

(See DeLeon v. Verizon Wireless, LLC (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 800, 813 There is no dispute that the Terms of Service were sent to Plaintiff, to which she acknowledged and consented. (Simmons Decl. at ¶12.) Accordingly, the reference to 'you' is objectively obvious – Plaintiff, the recipient.

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3001254  54 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  DOE VS LYFT INC [IMAGED]  37-2023-00001936-CU-PO-CTL As to procedure, plaintiff argues that this agreement is an 'adhesion' contract. Plaintiff alleges the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because the TOS were non-negotiable. The fact that an arbitration agreement is not negotiable has never been decisive. Nor are adhesion contracts unenforceable. 'A finding of procedural unconscionability does not mean that a contract will not be enforced, but rather that courts will scrutinize the substantive terms of the contract to ensure they are not manifestly unfair or one-sided.' (Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 443, 469 (2007); see also Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal.4th 899, 915 (2015).) It is difficult to determine that this particular contract shocks the conscience to render it unenforceable.

Plaintiff argues that the AAA rules were not 'attached'. However, as argued in the Reply, AAA's Rules were hyperlinked in the TOS. Plaintiff only needed to tap the words 'Consumer Arbitration Rules' to view the Rules in their entirety. (Ex. 5, p. 20.) The TOS also offered the plain-text website address providing Plaintiff an alternative method of accessing AAA's Rules. (Id.) Based on the above, the Court GRANTS the motion to compel arbitration. The Court also stays this case pending arbitration of the matter.

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