Judge: Loren G. Freestone, Case: 37-2023-00010591-CU-WT-CTL, Date: 2023-08-18 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - August 17, 2023

08/18/2023  10:30:00 AM  C-64 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Loren G. Freestone

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Civil - Unlimited  Wrongful Termination Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2023-00010591-CU-WT-CTL MAGEE VS OXFORD NANOIMAGING INC [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Oxford Nanoimaging Inc. and Ricardo Bastos's demurrer to Plaintiff Craig Magee's complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendants demur to the complaint in its entirety on the ground that it fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action and is uncertain.

'Because one of the purposes of a complaint is to apprise the defendant of the basis on which the plaintiff seeks recovery, the complaint should set forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action and need not set forth evidence by which the plaintiff proposes to prove those facts. Accordingly, a complaint is adequate so long as it apprises the defendant of the factual basis for the claim.' (Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376–1380.) 'There is no need to require specificity in the pleadings because modern discovery procedures necessarily affect the amount of detail that should be required in a pleading.' (Roger v. County of Riverside (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 510, 533.) Here, Magee alleges that shortly after complaining about changes to his compensation and participating in a sexual harassment investigation concerning his supervisor (Bastos), Bastos unduly criticized him, demoted him, and eventually terminated him under the pretext of performance issues. Magee also alleges that he was not paid all of the compensation he is owed, including minimum wage, overtime, commissions, premium pay, and waiting time penalties. These allegations sufficiently appraise Defendants of the factual basis of his claims. The additional details Defendants demand can be explored in discovery.

Defendants correctly note that the complaint is, at times, inartfully pled. For example, Defendants point to a reference in the introductory paragraph to 'others similarly-situated' despite this not being a class action. Defendants also point to references in the first and second causes of action to FEHA prohibiting retaliation against employees who request a reasonable accommodation or take medical leave despite Magee not alleging any such conduct. To the extent these references are 'irrelevant' or 'improper,' they could have been stricken. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) However, they do not subject the complaint to a general demurrer or special demurrer for uncertainty.

Defendants also demur to the IIED claim on the ground it is barred by workers' compensation exclusivity and does not allege extreme and outrageous conduct. However, when the IIED claim is premised on a FEHA violation, the conduct falls outside the compensation bargain and the claim may be pursued in Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2974351  38 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  MAGEE VS OXFORD NANOIMAGING INC [IMAGED]  37-2023-00010591-CU-WT-CTL court. (See Light v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 96–101.) FEHA retaliation can also constitute extreme and outrageous conduct depending on the specific facts. (See id. at pp. 101–102.) Here, the IIED claim is premised on the allegedly unlawful retaliation, and whether that retaliation was sufficiently extreme and outrageous is a factual issue that cannot be resolved by way of this demurrer.

Finally, Defendants demur to the three wage-and-hour claims on the ground that they are 'applicable only to non-exempt employees.' Defendants do not cite any authority for that proposition. The claim for waiting time penalties based on allegedly unpaid commissions may be viable regardless of how Magee is classified. (See DLSE, Waiting Time Penalty FAQ, available at www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_waitingtimepenalty.htm ['The waiting time penalty applies to all employees regardless of status, exempt, nonexempt, full-time, part-time, temporary, probationary, or otherwise']; see also Morgan v. United Retail Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1147 [proper to consult DLSE website FAQ for guidance interpreting statute].) In any event, whether Magee was exempt or non-exempt cannot be determined from the face of the complaint. Defendants point to allegations that Magee was a 'Sales Executive' and 'manager,' but his job title is not dispositive and he was allegedly demoted from that position. (See United Parcel Service Wage & Hour Cases (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1015 ['A job title alone is insufficient to establish the exempt status of an employee'].) The demurrer is therefore overruled. Defendants shall file an answer within 10 days.

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