Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 18PSCV00192, Date: 2023-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 18PSCV00192    Hearing Date: October 18, 2023    Dept: 6

CASE NAME:  Troy Trang, et al. v. CC Royal Services, Inc., et al.

1.      Plaintiffs Troy Trang and Ling Yin’s Motion for Order Regarding Judicial Estoppel; and

2.      Cross-Defendants Troy Trang and Ling Yin’s Motion to Dismiss Shu Wang’s First Amended Cross-Complaint 

TENTATIVE RULING

            The Court DENIES the motion for order regarding judicial estoppel. 

 The Court DENIES the motion to dismiss. 

            Defendant Wang is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. 

BACKGROUND

This is a personal property dispute. On December 29, 2018, Plaintiffs Troy Trang (Troy) and Ling Yin (Ling) (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against Defendant Shu Wang (Wang) and other defendants who have since been dismissed from this action. On September 12, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended Complaint, alleging one cause of action for conversion against Defendant Wang and Does 1 through 10. 

On December 11, 2019, Wang filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiffs and Yan Hsing Lin,[1] alleging causes of action for breach of contract, conversion, intentional misrepresentation, and false promise. On February 6, 2020, Wang filed the operative First Amended Cross-Complaint (FACC), alleging the same causes of action against the same parties. 

On July 14, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss Shu Wang’s First Amended Cross-Complaint. On October 5, 2023, Wang opposed. On October 9, 2023, Plaintiffs replied. 

On September 25, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion for order regarding judicial estoppel. On October 5, 2023, Wang opposed. On October 9, 2023, Plaintiffs replied. 

Trial is scheduled for November 14, 2023. 

Plaintiffs Troy Trang and Ling Yin’s Motion for Order Regarding Judicial Estoppel 

LEGAL STANDARD – Judicial Estoppel

“Judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken in the same or some earlier proceeding. The doctrine serves a clear purpose: to protect the integrity of the judicial process. [Citation.]” (Jackson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 181.) Judicial estoppel applies when, “[i]n accordance with the purpose of judicial estoppel, we conclude that the doctrine should apply when: (1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 183.) 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek an order regarding judicial estoppel in connection with positions Wang has taken that are purportedly inconsistent with prior positions taken in this action. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend Wang has taken inconsistent positions regarding:  (1) to whom Wang paid $185,000 for the missing furniture, and; (2) the number of pieces of furniture wrongfully taken from the subject property. The Court declines to grant Plaintiffs’ motion. 

First, it is unclear on what basis Plaintiffs bring this motion. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prohibits a party from taking inconsistent positions; it is not the basis for a separate motion. (Cf. M. Perez Co. v. Base Camp Condominiums Assn. No. One (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 456, 463 [‘‘’Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine aimed at preventing fraud on the courts.’ [Citation.] It prohibits a party from taking inconsistent positions in the same or different judicial proceedings. [Citation.]”) Plaintiffs’ motion is more akin to a motion for issue sanctions or evidentiary sanctions to prohibit Wang from asserting certain arguments regarding the payments for the furniture or number of items missing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subds. (b), (c).) However, issue and evidentiary sanctions are usually ordered in response to discovery abuse and misuse, which is not the context for this motion. (See Id., § 2023.030.) 

Second, even substantively the Court finds the motion to be unpersuasive. The fact that Wang may have taken various positions in court proceedings at this point does not necessarily mean they are inconsistent for purposes of judicial estoppel, i.e., totally inconsistent with each other. (Jackson, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 183.) As noted in the Court’s October 2, 2023 ruling on Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication, the fact the Person Most Qualified (PMQ) for Bank of America was unable to confirm that Yan Hsing Yin received the wire transfer did not necessarily mean it was never paid to or received by Yan Hsing Yin. (Order Tentative Ruling (10/2/23).) Wang’s argument that this deposition testimony was irrelevant is also not inconsistent with the allegation that Wang paid the money to Yan Hsing Yin. (See SSUMF 4, Wang’s Summary Adjudication Separate Statement filed on September 18, 2023.) In fact, the Court notes that Wang specifically said it was “[I]rrelevant for purposes of this motion,” not a categorical statement that it had no relevance to this action at all. (Id.) It is also consistent with the Court’s finding that the PMQ’s deposition testimony had no dispositive impact on the Court’s decision denying Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication. 

As for Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the conflicting number of missing furniture items, these are not totally inconsistent with each other for purposes of judicial estoppel. The fact that Wang may have listed fewer items in a declaration than those alleged in the FACC does not necessarily mean Wang is taking a totally inconsistent position in that regard. Nothing in that declaration states that those items constituted a complete list of items taken from the subject property. (Motion re Judicial Estoppel, Ex. 6, ¶¶ 7, 9.) In fact, this is precisely what Wang argued in her separate statement to which Plaintiffs cite. (See SSUMF 3, Wang’s Summary Judgment Separate Statement filed on September 18, 2023.) 

Moreover, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ summary judgment and summary adjudication motions, as well as Wang’s prior motion for summary judgment. Thus, the Court did not accept Wang’s positions therein as true. “The order denying summary judgment simply establishes the existence of a triable fact when the order was made. No comment may be made at trial (by the parties, witnesses or the court) upon the fact summary adjudication was granted or denied, or that a party failed to seek summary adjudication. [Citation.]… The denial of summary adjudication or judgment is usually irrelevant: the ruling may have been made for a wide variety of reasons, including purely technical ones, and does not establish the merits or legal sufficiency of either party's case….” (H. Entry of Judgment or Order, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 10-H, italics in original; see Code Civ. Proc., § 473c, subd. (n)(3).) 

Furthermore, demurrers only determine the sufficiency of the allegations in the underlying pleading; they do not determine facts. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) The fact the Court overruled Plaintiffs’ demurrer as to Wang’s conversion claim in the FACC also has no effect vis-à-vis judicial estoppel. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for order regarding judicial estoppel. 

Cross-Defendants Troy Trang and Ling Yin’s Motion to Dismiss Shu Wang’s First Amended Cross-Complaint 

LEGAL STANDARD – Compulsory Joinder

“(a) A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. 

(b) If a person as described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed without prejudice, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: (1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff or cross-complainant will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subds. (a), (b).) 

DISCUSSION

            Plaintiffs seek to dismiss the FACC on the grounds that indispensable parties have not been joined to the action, namely Yan Hsing Yin (Yan), Jin Lan Yin (Jin), and Hsiang Yin (Hsiang). Plaintiffs contend Yan and Jin are indispensable parties because they were both the sellers of the furniture pieces at issue, not just Yan as alleged in the FACC. (Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff Ling contends she is in a bitter dispute with Yan and Jin over the furniture as well. Plaintiffs further contend that Hsiang was the recipient of the $150,000 wire transfer from Wang and that Hsiang possesses pertinent information about this case. The Court finds these arguments unavailing. 

            First, Yan is a named cross-defendant in this action, so there is no need to join someone who has already been named. Second, Wang argued, and Plaintiffs did not dispute, that neither Yan nor Jin are subject to service of process because they ostensibly moved back to China following the sale of the subject property. (Opp., 4:7-8; see Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 504, 418; C. Opposing the Motion—and Rebutting the Opposition, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(I)-C, ¶ 9:105.10 [the court may construe the failure to oppose as a tacit admission that the argument is true].) 

Third, whether Hsiang is Plaintiff Ling’s brother does not change whether he is subject to service of process. Plaintiffs’ contention regarding Hsiang being an indispensable party is undermined by the fact that in the very same deposition where Plaintiff Ling identified Hsiang as her brother, she immediately indicated thereafter that she had not spoken to him in almost three years and did not know where he lived, but the last place she was aware of where he lived was either Singapore, Hong Kong, or Taiwan. (Motion to Compel Further Deposition Testimony, filed 9/3/21, Ex. 2, 128:17-129:5.) Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence to show that Yan, Jin, or Hsiang are subject to service of process for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 389. 

Fourth, if the Court were to accept Plaintiffs’ contentions here, then they would apply with equal force to Plaintiffs’ claims in their Third Amended Complaint (TAC). The parties’ respective claims in this lawsuit arise out of the same set of operative facts, i.e., the purchase of the subject real property and certain items of furniture within it. If there is a dispute as to the parties’ respective ownership interests in the FACC, then there is one in the FAC as well. (See Motion to Dismiss, 5:17-19, 6:3-12; Reply, 3:9-20.) Thus, if Yan, Jin, and Hsiang are indispensable parties to the FACC warranting dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (b), then dismissal for the TAC would be warranted as well. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss. 

CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES the motion for order regarding judicial estoppel. 

The Court DENIES the motion to dismiss. 

           Defendant Wang is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.