Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 20STCV31783, Date: 2023-11-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV31783 Hearing Date: January 24, 2024 Dept: 6
CASE NAME: Steven Anthony Montoya v. San Dimas Community Hospital, et al.
Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Prime Healthcare Services – San Dimas dba San Dimas Community Hospital
TENTATIVE RULING
The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment.
Defendant Hospital is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.
BACKGROUND
This is a medical malpractice and personal injury action. On August 20, 2020, Plaintiff Steven Anthony Montoya (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants San Dimas Community Hospital, Ralph E. Conner, D.O., Emergent Medical Associates, Dr. Hakak, Crunch Fitness, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, and Does 1 through 200, alleging causes of action for medical negligence, negligence, false imprisonment depravation [sic] of right under color of state law, depravation [sic] of right under Article 1, Section 13 of the California Constitution violation of civil rights eighth amendment [sic], and negligence personal injuries [sic].
On June 23, 2021, the Court sustained a demurrer by the County of Los Angeles to Plaintiff’s third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. On July 26, 2021, the Court entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of County of Los Angeles after Plaintiff declined to amend the complaint.
On February 6, 2023, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Hakak, and entered judgment on February 8, 2023.
On May 9, 2023, Defendant Prime Healthcare Services – San Dimas, LLC, dba San Dimas Community Hospital (erroneously sued as San Dimas Community Hospital) (Hospital), filed the instant motion for summary judgment as to the First Cause of Action for medical negligence, the only cause of action against Hospital. On November 1, 2023, the Court denied Hospital’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice.
On November 7, 2023, Hospital re-filed its motion for summary judgment as to the First Cause of Action for negligence. The motion is unopposed.
Trial is scheduled for June 25, 2024.
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, italics in original and quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)
Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion “shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.; see also Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court GRANTS Hospital’s requests for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d).) However, the Court only takes judicial notice as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted therein. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)
DISCUSSION
Analysis
“The elements of Plaintiff's medical negligence cause of action allege ‘(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.’ [Citation.]” (Belfiore-Braman v. Rotenberg (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 234, 238.) “As in medical malpractice cases, standards of due care and competence are commonly established by the generally accepted practices and procedures within the professional community. [Citations.]” (Milligan v. Hearing Aid Dispensers Examining Com. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1006.)
Hospital moves for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no triable issue of fact regarding Hospital’s compliance with the applicable standard of care, and Hospital’s actions did not to a reasonable degree of medical certainty cause the injuries of which Plaintiff complains. In support of this contention, Hospital recites the events of August 30, 2019 when Plaintiff was presented to Hospital’s emergency department. (SSUMF 1-13.) Hospital’s expert, Ryan M. Klein, M.D. (Dr. Klein), states that:
The standard of care for the nursing staff and/or non-physician staff require [sic] that they monitor and document the patient’s vital signs and overall progress, keep the practitioners involved in the patient’s care and treatment appropriately informed as to the patient’s condition, including any change in condition, and carry out all of the physicians’ orders in a timely manner. In other words, it is the role of the nurses to be the eyes and ears of the practitioner managing the care of the patient and to report any significant changes in condition to the practitioner. It is neither a nurse’s role nor responsibility to order or interpret tests and/or diagnostic studies, order medications, render diagnoses, make treatment recommendations, to determine whether the patient is an appropriate candidate for consultation, or to admit the patient. Those duties are the role of the practitioner managing the care of the patient.
Looking at the allegations of the complaint for medical negligence, it is the duty of the treating physician to properly diagnose a stroke, initiate TPA protocol, and secure appropriate consultations. It is outside the scope of practice in California for registered nurses to perform such duties.
Further, there were no issues which would have required nursing staff to implement the hospital chain of command relative to physician conduct.
(Klein Decl., ¶¶ 20-22.)
Dr. Klein further opines that Hospital complied with the standard of care in its care and treatment of Plaintiff, and that no act or omission by Hospital caused or contributed to the alleged delay in Plaintiff’s diagnosis of ischemic stroke. (Klein Decl., ¶ 28.)
The Court finds that Hospital has met its initial burden in establishing the absence of a triable issue of material fact here. Dr. Klein’s expert testimony clearly identifies the applicable standard of care for the relevant professional community, and states that Hospital did not breach the applicable standard of care, nor did Hospital cause or contribute to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. (Klein Decl., ¶ 28.) “Expert evidence in a malpractice suit is conclusive as to the proof of the prevailing standard of skill and learning in the locality and of the propriety of particular conduct by the practitioner in particular instances because such standard and skill is not a matter of general knowledge and can only be supplied by expert testimony.” (Willard v. Hagemeister (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 406, 412, quoting Starr v. Mooslin (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 988, 999.) Therefore, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact.
Plaintiff did not oppose this motion or present any evidence in opposition. Plaintiff therefore fails to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, the Court finds there is no triable issues of material fact and Defendant Hospital is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment.
Defendant Hospital is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.