Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 21PSCV00179, Date: 2024-03-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21PSCV00179    Hearing Date: March 7, 2024    Dept: 6

CASE NAME:  Pedro Gonzalez v. General Motors, LLC 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 

TENTATIVE RULING 

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $45,109.50. The issue of costs will be addressed at the hearing Defendant’s motion to tax costs on April 22, 2024. 

              Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. 

BACKGROUND 

This is a lemon law case. On February 9, 2024, plaintiff Pedro Gonzalez (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) and Does 1 through 50, alleging causes of action for violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2, violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2, violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2, Civil Code section 1791.2, breach of express written warranty, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 

On February 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. On February 22, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition. On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

“The following items are allowable as costs under Section 1032:… (10) Attorney's fees, when authorized by any of the following: (A) Contract. (B) Statute. (C) Law.” (Civil Code, § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Id., § 1794, subd. (d).) 

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney… involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. [Citation.] The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work. [Citation.]” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) 

DISCUSSION 

Summary of Arguments 

Plaintiff seeks to recover $79,025.53 in attorney’s fees and costs from Defendant, comprised of $61,995.50 in attorney’s fees, $11,842.53 in costs, additional attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,490.00 incurred in connection with this motion, and attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,697.50 anticipated to be incurred in connection with Defendant’s motion to tax costs. Plaintiff contends that the motion is timely per Rule 3.1702 of the California Rules of Court, and that the parties stipulated Plaintiff is the prevailing party here, thus entitling Plaintiff to an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. 

Plaintiff contends the lodestar fees are reasonable, based on the hourly rates for Plaintiff’s counsel, ranging from $400.00 to $515.00 an hour for attorneys, citing various court decisions throughout Los Angeles County and Orange County, plus a federal district court decision. Plaintiff then contends the hours incurred are reasonable in light of the amount of work required for this case, due to Defendant’s denial of liability and obstruction and delay tactics in connection with discovery matters and Defendant’s refusal to pay fair value for this case until trial approached. Plaintiff further contends the amount of attorney’s fees and costs sought here is consistent with fee awards in other lemon law cases. Plaintiff argues that the paralegal fees are recoverable as attorney’s fees, and that the hourly billing rate for Plaintiff’s counsel’s paralegals ranged from $175.00 to $225.00 an hour. Plaintiff also notes that Plaintiff’s counsel took this case on a contingency basis. 

In opposition, Defendant does not dispute the applicability of the lodestar method or contend that recoverable fees are limited in proportion to Plaintiff’s recovery here. Defendant instead disputes various fees claimed by Plaintiff as being excessive given the duplicative nature of these types of lawsuit and the parties’ regular reliance on templates in handling such lawsuits, citing Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424. Defendant also contends more than one-fifth of Plaintiff’s counsel’s costs are not properly compensable. 

In reply, Plaintiff contends Defendant’s opposition is based on the flawed premise that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover reasonably incurred litigation costs because this is a straightforward breach-of-warranty case. Plaintiff contends Defendant misconstrues Hensley, which only held that billing need only describe the general nature of the general subject of the expenditure. Plaintiff argues Defendant takes no issue with ambiguity or vagueness concerning Plaintiff’s billing entries, but rather only argues that Plaintiff expended time on necessary tasks, or that the time spent on specific tasks was not reasonable. Plaintiff contends all of these hours were incurred because Defendant refused to honor its obligations under the warranty, which necessitated extensive discovery and other work to prepare this case for trial. 

Plaintiff further contends Defendant’s arguments are based on conclusory opinions and conjecture, and that Plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness since Plaintiff submitted itemized fee bills and declarations attesting to their accuracy. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s opposition relies on questionable legal authority, and reiterates that paralegal fees are recoverable as attorney fees. 

Analysis           

            The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees, but not necessarily in the amount requested. The Court first notes that Defendant admits Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees. (Opp., 11:20-21.) The Court also notes that Defendant does not dispute the hourly rates of Plaintiff’s counsel, which the Court construes as a tacit admission that those rates are reasonable. (See Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418; C. Opposing the Motion—and Rebutting the Opposition, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(I)-C, ¶ 9:105.10.) The Court also agrees with Plaintiff that paralegal fees can be recovered as attorney’s fees. (Sundance v. Municipal Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 268, 274.) However, clerical or secretarial tasks performed by paralegals or attorneys cannot be recovered. (Missouri v. Jenkins (1989) 491 U.S. 274, 288, fn. 10.) 

With respect to Hensley, the Court finds that Defendant merely cites to it for the unremarkable proposition that a prevailing party may not recover attorney’s fees against the losing party where the fees billed to the prevailing party were improper from the outset. (See Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 434.) This is already an issue that the Court considers when reviewing a motion for attorney’s fees, so its citation does not add anything new to the Court’s analysis. The Court otherwise agrees with Plaintiff that the cases of Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, Morris v. Hundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, and Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N.Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240 are not dispositive here. The Court of Appeal in Glaviano v. Sacramento Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 755-756 noted that Nightingale stated its holding did not apply to contingency-fee agreements, and that it was called into question by subsequent California Supreme Court precedent. Also, both Morris and Mikhaeilpoor involved issues of overstaffing, which is not an issue here. (See Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38; Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 256.) 

            The Court does note, however, that Plaintiff’s reply did not directly address the specific billing entries discussed in Defendant’s opposition. While Plaintiff correctly contends that a verified fee bill is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were reasonable, (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), it overlooks the declaration from Defendant’s counsel, Xylon Quezada, which notes that Plaintiff’s counsel’s work is dedicated to lemon law cases and is comprised of substantially similar issues between each case, (Quezada Decl., ¶ 18). The Court finds this sufficiently persuasive evidence that the work expended by Plaintiff’s counsel on matters such as discovery can be routinized to minimize costs and expenses. 

            As for the specific entries Defendant disputes, the Court finds the following entries subject to reduction, as the Court is persuaded that such matters include clerical/secretarial tasks, routine matters addressed in lemon law cases that can be performed in lesser time than for which Plaintiff seeks recovery, or duplicative entries. 

·         Clerical/Secretarial Tasks – March 4 and 22, 2021, June 22, 2021, October 22, 2021, November 5, 2021, January 20, 2022, March 1 and 14, 2022, April 14 and 19, 2022

o   (reduced by 3.7 hours, multiplied Ms. Astorga’s $175.00 hourly rate = $647.50; reduced by .4 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $400.00 hourly rate = $160.00)

·         Templated Discovery Requests – March 23, 25, 29 and 30, 2021

o   (reduced by 3.6 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $400.00 hourly rate = $1,440.00)

·         Deposition Notices to the Person Most Qualified (PMQ) – March 23, 2021, August 24, 2021, September 28, 2021, January 21 and 25, 2022, February 23, 2022, March 25, 2022, April 14, 2022, May 20 and 25, 2022, June 9, 15, 21, 2022, July 11, 2022; August 10, 12, 16, 24, and 30, 2022, September 21 and 27, 2022, October 4, 5, 14 and 24, 2022, November 15-16, 2022, December 1-2, 2022

o   (reduced by 12.4 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $400.00 hourly rate = $4,960.00)

·         Templated Discovery Responses – May 5 and 9-10, 2021

o   (reduced by 2.8 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $400.00 hourly rate = $1,120.00)

·         Reviewing GM’s Discovery Responses – August 18 and 20, 2021, September 7 and 15, 2021

o   (reduced by 3.5 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $400.00 hourly rate = $1,400.00)

·         Templated Meet-and-Confer Correspondence—March 23, 2021; August 25, 2021; September 7 & 28-29, 2021; October 18 & 27-28, 2021; January 20, 2022; February 23, 2022; July 12, 2022; November 8, 2022

o   (reduced by 4.5 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $400.00 hourly rate = $1,800.00)

·         April 14, 2022 (protective order)

o   (reduced by 1.4 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $400.00 hourly rate = $560.00)

·         Templated Motion to Compel PMQ Deposition—October 21-22 and 26-27, 2021; November 2, 2021; December 21 and 29, 2021; January 6, 2022

o   (reduced by 8.8 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $400.00 hourly rate = $3,520.00)

·         Motion to Compel Further RFP Responses – October 26-27, 2021; November 2, 2021; February 23 and 28, 2022; March 1, 8 and 14, 2022; May 9, 2022; November 8, 2022

o   (reduced by 8.1 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $400.00 hourly rate = $3,240.00)

·         Motion to Compel Compliance – February 21-23, 28, 2022; March 1, 2022

o   (reduced by 3.5 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $400.00 hourly rate = $1,400.00)

·         Duplicate Entry – February 6, 2024

o   (reduced by 1.9 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $415.00 hourly rate = $788.50) 

This leads to a total reduction in attorney’s fees by $21,036.00 (3.7 hours, multiplied by Ms. Astorga’s $175.00 hourly rate; 49 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $400.00 hourly rate; 1.9 hours, multiplied by Ms. Gonzalez’s $415.00 hourly rate.) The Court otherwise finds Defendant’s arguments regarding status updates throughout three years of litigation to be unavailing and unsupported by any references to legal authority. 4.1 hours’ worth of status updates over a span of three years is not an unreasonable amount of fees to incur in keeping a client adequately apprised of litigation. The Court further finds 5 hours each to be reasonable for Plaintiff’s anticipated fees for this fee motion and the motion to tax costs. 

As for the $11,842.53 in costs, the Court declines to address that issue at this time, given Defendant’s pending motion to tax costs set for hearing on April 22, 2024. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $45,109.50, comprised of $40,959.50 ($61,995.50 - $21,036.00) in incurred attorney’s fees, $2075.00 in additional attorney’s fees in connection with this motion, and $2075.00 in attorney’s fees anticipated to be incurred in connection with Defendant’s motion to tax costs. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $45,109.50. The issue of costs will be addressed at the hearing on Defendant’s motion to tax costs on April 22, 2024. 

              Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.