Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 21PSCV00200, Date: 2024-02-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21PSCV00200 Hearing Date: February 15, 2024 Dept: 6
CASE NAME: Caroline Rodriguez v. Adrian Martinez
Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees
TENTATIVE RULING
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees in the reduced amount of $63,851.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.
BACKGROUND
This is a breach of contract action. On March 9, 2021, plaintiff Caroline Rodriguez (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Adrian Martinez (Defendant) and Does 1 to 50, alleging causes of action for breach of contract and common counts. On April 24, 2023, Defendant filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff and Does 1 through 50, alleging causes of action for usury violation, violation of Civil Code section 1671, reformation of contract, declaratory relief, and accounting. On September 25, 2023, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff on both the complaint and the cross-complaint.
On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees. The motion is unopposed.
LEGAL STANDARD
“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.”
(Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)
The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show "the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount." (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)
“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney… involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. [Citation.] The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work. [Citation.]” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks $118,068 in attorney’s fees based on Plaintiff obtaining judgments in her favor on both the complaint and the cross-complaint. The basis for this recovery of attorney’s fees is the following language from the underlying promissory note:
If any payment under this Note is not received when due, or upon another Event of Default, after the expiration of any notice and grace period required by applicable law, and Lender declares an Event of Default, then, at Lender’s option, the following will become immediately due and payable without notice of dishonor or presentment: … all sums advanced and costs and expenses incurred by Lender in connection with this Loan, including attorneys’ fees and any other costs incurred by Lender in enforcing Borrower’s obligations under this Note.
(Compl., Ex. “A”.)
Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s actions throughout this action substantially increased the cost of litigation and the resolution of this matter, such as unnecessarily protracting Plaintiff’s efforts to effect service of process, making unsubstantiated claims of payment, and delaying the motion for summary judgment on multiple occasions. Plaintiff further contends that the hourly rate of $650.00 for her trial counsel, Mr. William Chapman, is reasonable given his over 40 years of experience in business litigation and handling of trials, and that Mr. Chapman’s rate is comparable to rates of other attorneys in the community. Plaintiff's counsel submitted a summary of time entries from billing records that reflect the actual time and clear descriptions of services performed in connection with litigating this case. (Chapman Decl., ¶ 27 and Ex. E.)
First, the Court notes that Defendant did not oppose this motion, which the Court construes as a tacit admission that Plaintiff’s arguments are meritorious. (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418; C. Opposing the Motion—and Rebutting the Opposition, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(I)-C, ¶ 9:105.10.)
Second, the Court finds Mr. Chapman’s rate and the rates of the others who assisted with Plaintiff’s litigation of this action to be reasonable. (Chapman Decl., ¶¶ 19-26, Ex. E.) A "reasonable" hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) Here, counsel Chapman points to cases where similar hourly rates of other attorneys were approved in cases brought in Los Angeles county. (Motion, p. 5:16-24.) “The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom [citation], and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. [Citation.]” (569 E. Cnty. Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436–437.) “In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 437.) Based on the Court’s own experience, Mr. Chapman’s hourly rate appears a little high but not excessive and in the range of fee awards by Los Angeles County courts for business litigation cases.
Third, after reviewing the billing records, the Court finds that some tasks appear to be duplicative and others primarily clerical or administrative relating to e-filing/serving documents and calendaring matters. In addition, Defendant should not have to pay for 2.9 hours spent on anticipated collection efforts and correcting counsel’s own errors. Finally, the Court finds excessive and unsupported the block billed entry of 73.5 hours referencing counsel’s home computer. Thus, the Court finds that the amount of $54,217 was not reasonably incurred. The Court finds the remainder of the time spent was commensurate with the tasks and/or was reasonably incurred to prosecute this action, having spanned approximately three years, which included, among other things, a motion for summary judgment that was continued multiple times. (Chapman Decl., ¶¶ 10-17.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount of $63,851 was reasonable in light of this litigation.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees in the reduced amount of $63,851.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.