Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 21PSCV00907, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21PSCV00907    Hearing Date: April 12, 2024    Dept: 6

Plaintiff Rebecca Castillo’s Request for Entry of Default Judgment 

Defendant: Lemonshark, LLC 

TENTATIVE RULING

            Plaintiff’s request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice. If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, the amended complaint must be properly served on the Defendant and the Defendant will have an opportunity to respond.           

BACKGROUND

            This is an ADA/Unruh case. On November 5, 2021, plaintiff Rebecca Castillo (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Lemonshark, LLC (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging one cause of action for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. On January 11, 2024, the Court struck Defendant’s answer to the complaint and entered its default. On March 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default judgment.           

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) a proposed form of judgment; (6) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (7) exhibits as necessary; and (8) a request for attorneys’ fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.) 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants in the total amount of $9,074.00, including $8,000.00 in damages, $0.00 in interest, $570.00 in attorney fees, and $504.00 in costs. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA), Plaintiff’s application is DENIED without prejudice. 

“If the complaint does not state a cause of action or the allegations do not support a claim for relief, a default judgment is erroneous and ‘cannot stand.’” (Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1015.) Thus, while all properly pled facts are deemed admitted by the defendant, allegations are not and “plaintiff must prove each essential element of the complaint entitling the plaintiff to a recovery against the defendant.” (Id., at p. 1013.) 

Pursuant to the UCRA, “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state . . . no matter what their . . . disability . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civil Code, § 51, subd. (b).) “A plaintiff can recover under the [UCRA] on two alternate theories: (1) a violation of the ADA [Civil Code section 51, subd. (f)]; or (2) denial of access to a business establishment based on intentional discrimination.” (Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1059 (SDCCU).) 

ADA Violations 

To establish a violation of the ADA, “a plaintiff must show: (1) a covered disability; (2) ‘the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of [the] disability.’” (SDCCU, supra, at p. 1060, quoting Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc. (9th Cir. 2007) 481 F.3d 724, 730.) Websites alone are not considered places of public accommodation under the ADA. (Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026, 1043-1044, 1052-1053 (Cot’n Wash).) However, under the nexus test, courts will “consider whether the alleged website deficiencies impinge on the plaintiff's ability to have equal access to, and enjoyment of, the products and services offered at the physical location.” (SDCCU, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067.) 

For example, the Ninth Circuit found such a nexus between Domino’s website and physical locations where customers could locate nearby restaurants and place orders over the website for home delivery or in-store pickup. (Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (9th Cir. 2019) 913 F.3d 898, 905.) In another case, the Court of Appeal found a nexus where a restaurant’s website included a menu and reservation system that were inaccessible to visually impaired customers. (Thurston v. Midvale Corp. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 634, 638, 646.) A nexus also exists if the website provides a list of locations and services that the customer could use to determine where to go. (SDCCU, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069.) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges the Defendant’s website “provides consumers with access to an array of goods, services, and information related to Defendant’s brick-and-mortar locations which include, but are not limited to, the following: menu item list, online ordering, contact options, franchise options, pricing details, newsletter subscriptions sign-up, loyalty account sign-up, location information, and many other benefits.” (Complaint, ¶ 31.) Plaintiff “was unable to fully and independently access the Website” and vaguely claims to have “encountered multiple unlabeled or mislabeled buttons and links,” “multiple pages containing insufficient navigational headings,” and the inability “to browse the menu” and “to make a purchase because of an inaccessible checkout system.” (Complaint, ¶ 36.) 

Even if there are accessibility issues, “a plaintiff who fails to allege any connection between the website barriers and a physical location does not have an ADA claim.” (Gomez v. Trinitas Cellars, LLC (N.D. Cal. March 9, 2022) 3:21-cv-09006-WHO [2022 WL 704857, at *3], quoting Langer v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2021) 20-cv-06015-DMR [2021 WL 148237, at *5].) Here, Plaintiff does not allege the website was entirely inaccessible. While Plaintiff claims “multiple” barriers, Plaintiff does not specify how those barriers have a connection to Defendant’s physical store locations. The only specifics Plaintiff provides is that Plaintiff was unable to browse the menu and make a purchase. Plaintiff does not show how these products and checkout systems are connected to Defendant’s physical location or a separate online store, an important distinction given purely online retail sites are not covered under the ADA. (Cot’n Wash, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1043-1044, 1052-1053.) Plaintiff does not even allege what kind of goods or services Defendant provides and the Complaint fails to adequately plead how the specific barriers deprived Plaintiff of full and fair enjoyment of or denied her equal access to Defendant’s unidentified business. 

Ultimately, Plaintiff only alleges the barriers “deterred Plaintiff from visiting” Defendant’s brick-and-mortar locations. (Complaint, ¶¶ 38-39.) While Plaintiff lists the benefits provided by the website to consumers, Plaintiff does not describe how the accessibility issues denied these benefits and the benefits mentioned (menu and checkout system) are not pled as connected to Defendant’s physical locations. Thus, Plaintiff has not adequately pled that Defendant’s website is inaccessible to the extent prohibited by the ADA. 

UCRA Violations 

Pursuant to the UCRA, if a claim is not an ADA violation, the plaintiff must prove the discrimination was intentional or willful and affirmative misconduct. (Cot’n Wash, supra, 81 CalApp.5th at p. 1036.) “A claimant may not ‘rel[y] on the effects of a facially neutral policy on a particular group . . . to infer solely from such effects a discriminatory intent.’” (Ibid, quoting Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 854.) 

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts establishing Defendant’s website was intended to discriminate against the visually impaired. While Plaintiff claims Defendant’s actions were intentional discrimination, these allegations are conclusory without any facts pled as support. (Complaint, ¶ 49.) Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of the UCRA. 

Other Defects

The Court further finds Plaintiff has not submitted sufficient evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim for $8,000.00 in damages. Plaintiff cites the case of Johnson v. Guedoir (E.D. Cal. 2016) 218 F.Supp.3d 1096 as the basis for requesting $4,000.00 in deterrence damages plus $4,000.00 for encountering the barriers. (Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 5-6; Summary of the Case, 2:3-10.) Johnson does not support this outcome. The court in Johnson found $8,000.00 in statutory damages was warranted based on two incidents wherein the plaintiff was deterred on one date and then personally encountered the barriers on a different date. (Johnson, supra, 218 F.Supp.3d at p. 1100.) Here, Plaintiff only provides evidence of one visit on October 19, 2021. (Castillo Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff does not provide any evidence of having been deterred from visiting or personally encountering a violation on a later date. Plaintiff does not provide evidence that indicates she alerted Defendant to the barriers she encountered or that she waited a reasonable period of time and then intended to visit the website again but was deterred because she had knowledge that the alleged accessibility barriers still existed.

The Court also notes that Plaintiff did not complete items 4, 5, or 6 of Judicial Council Form CIV-100. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 585.5, 587; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6400 et seq.) 

CONCLUSION