Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 21PSCV00968, Date: 2024-11-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21PSCV00968 Hearing Date: November 4, 2024 Dept: 6
CASE NAME: Imran Haddish v. Scott Warmuth, a Professional Corporation dba Law Offices of Scott Warmuth, et al.
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings of Defendants Scott Warmuth to the Complaint for Legal Malpractice of Plaintiff Imran Haddish
TENTATIVE RULING
The Court DENIES the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Plaintiff Imran Haddish is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.
BACKGROUND
This is a legal malpractice case. On November 23, 2021, plaintiff Imran Haddish (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Scott Warmuth, a professional corporation dba Law Offices of Scott Warmuth (Warmuth), Michael (Che-Yang) Chen (Chen), and Does 1 through 100, alleging causes of action for professional negligence (legal malpractice), breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. On May 20, 2022, Warmuth filed a second amended answer to the complaint.
On September 30, 2024, Warmuth moved for judgment on the pleadings. On October 22, 2024, Plaintiff opposed the motion. On October 28, 2024, Warmuth replied.
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the court lacks jurisdiction over the cause of action or the complaint does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
A motion for judgment on the pleadings tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and is analyzed in all material respects as though it were a demurrer. (Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 725, 738; Kapsimallis v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672.)
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [citations omitted].)
PRELIMINARY ISSUE
The Court notes that the notice for the motion is four pages long and contains many arguments. Notices are not for arguments. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110, subds. (a), (b).) Arguments are reserved for the memorandum of points and authorities. (See Id., rule 3.1113, subd. (b).) The Court admonishes Warmuth to comply with the requirements of the California Rules of Court going forward.
DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
Per Code of Civil Procedure section 439, subdivision (a), Warmuth was required to meet and confer with Plaintiff in person, by telephone, or by video conference before moving for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) The Court finds Warmuth’s efforts to meet and confer insufficient, as Warmuth’s counsel only indicates having sent a letter. (Smith Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) Nevertheless, the Court may not deny the motion for failure to adequately meet and confer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).) The Court will still consider the motion, but admonishes Warmuth to comply with the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure going forward.
Summary of Arguments
Warmuth moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the entire complaint and to each cause of action on the grounds that they fail to state a cause of action against Warmuth. Warmuth contends the complaint does not allege that Warmuth performed any legal services for Plaintiff and states no specific theory of liability against Warmuth. Warmuth contends Plaintiff is trying to hold Warmuth derivatively responsible for the acts of Defendant Chen, but that the complaint does not allege facts supporting such derivative liability. Warmuth contends no facts have been alleged for alter ego liability or that Warmuth and Chen were acting under a partnership or joint venture agreement. Warmuth contends the complaint is devoid of any allegations of an employer/employee relationship or actual agency relationship.
Warmuth contends Plaintiff has failed and is unable to plead ostensible agency because no reasonable person would believe Chen was an agent of Warmuth based upon a few statements on Warmuth’s firm website. Warmuth contends ostensible agency can only be based upon statements Warmuth made. Warmuth contends Plaintiff did not rely upon any 2014/2015 statements from Warmuth’s firm website given his preexisting relationship with Chen dating back to 2012. Warmuth contends Plaintiff hired Chen in 2012, when Chen was a sole practitioner. Warmuth also contends there was no change in position because Plaintiff continued his relationship with Chen through 2021.
In opposition, Plaintiff contends the complaint alleges both Warmuth and Chen served as Plaintiff’s attorneys, that they performed legal services and breached their duty of care to Plaintiff, and caused Plaintiff damages. Plaintiff then argues that Chen cannot work under the Warmuth firm name without Warmuth being potentially liable for Chen’s negligence. Plaintiff contends the law makes clear, specifically the Rules of Professional Conduct, that a solo practitioner cannot use a group trade name to advertise their individual services without identifying themselves as solo practitioners or otherwise mislead people regarding their status as a solo practitioner. Plaintiff references allegations in the complaint regarding Chen’s profile on Warmuth’s website, and that Warmuth represented to Plaintiff that Chen worked for Warmuth. Plaintiff also contends Warmuth is liable under a de facto partnership or partnership by estoppel theory. Plaintiff further contends the complaint alleges facts demonstrating that both Warmuth and Chen were parties to the contract for legal services and breached their obligations thereunder.
Analysis
Whether an ostensible agency relationship exists is generally a question of fact unless there is only one way to view the facts. (Kaplan v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 741, 748; Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 32 Cal.3d 649, 658.) Questions of fact are generally not suitable for resolution on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (See M.F. v. Pac. Pearl Hotel Mgmt. LLC (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 693, 703 (M.F.) [questions of fact generally not suitable for demurrer].)
The Court finds Warmuth’s arguments unavailing. The complaint alleges facts from which an ostensible agency relationship could be found, such as Chen being listed on Warmuth’s firm website, Warmuth representing to Plaintiff that Chen was an attorney working at Warmuth’s firm, and Chen representing to Plaintiff he was an attorney working for Warmuth’s firm. (Compl., ¶¶ 9, 26.) Given this is a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court assumes these allegations to be true. (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777.) These allegations also demonstrate a question of fact not suitable for resolution on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (See M.F., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 703.)
Moreover, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the complaint alleges facts demonstrating a breach of contract claim against Warmuth. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff on the one hand and Warmuth and Chen on the other entered into an agreement for legal services, confirmed by invoices and correspondence, and that Warmuth and Chen breached that contract by failing to perform as agreed, thus causing damage to Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶¶ 8-24, 34-38.) Again, the Court assumes these allegations to be true at this stage of the litigation. (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777.) These same allegations are also sufficient to support Plaintiff’s claims for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Plaintiff Imran Haddish is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.