Judge Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case Number: 22PSCV00083, Date: 2024-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 22PSCV00083, Date: 2024-03-13 Tentative Ruling

The Court GRANTS Defendant Gloria Mendoza’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff Jose Mendoza’s causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress in both complaints without leave to amend.

Defendant Gloria Mendoza is ordered to lodge a Proposed Dismissal Order within five calendar days of this order.

Defendant Gloria Mendoza is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

These are emotional distress cases arising from the disposition of certain real property. On January 25, 2022, plaintiff Jose Mendoza (Plaintiff) filed this action (LASC Case No. 22PSCV00083) against defendant Gloria Mendoza (Defendant) and Does 1 through 10, alleging causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On October 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a separate action (LASC Case No. 22STCV32136) against Defendant and Does 1 through 10, alleging one cause of action for promissory estoppel. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed another separate action (LASC Case No. 22PSCV01319) against Defendant and Does 1 through 10, alleging causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On November 29, 2022, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the First Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress without leave to amend in LASC Case No. 22PSCV00083.

On December 22, 2022, Defendant filed an answer to the complaint in LASC Case No. 22STCV32136.) On January 4, 2023, Defendant filed an answer to the complaints in LASC Case Nos. 22PSCV00083 and 22PSCV01319.

On February 7, 2023, the Court consolidated all three of these actions, with this action (LASC Case No. 22PSCV00083) being designated as the lead case.

On February 15, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress in both LASC Case No. 22PSCV00083 and LASC Case No. 22PSCV01319. The motion is unopposed.

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1)(B)(ii).)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and is analyzed in all material respects as though it were a demurrer. (Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 725, 738; Kapsimallis v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672.)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [citations omitted].)

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s requests for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d).) However, the Court takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 439, subdivision (a)(1), Defendant was required to meet and confer in person or telephonically with Plaintiff before bringing this motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(1).) The Court finds Defendant’s meet-and-confer efforts sufficient. (Meigs Decl., ¶ 4.)

To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating, “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. [Citations].” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050, internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)

A defendant’s conduct is outrageous “when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051 [internal quotations and citation omitted].) “[T]he defendant’s conduct must be intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result. (Id. at p. 1051 [internal quotations and citation omitted].) Further, “severe emotional distress” means “emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1004, internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) “[F]acts giving rise to a cause of action for injuries resulting from emotional distress must be specifically pleaded.” (Deboe v. Horn (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 221, 224.)

Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the First Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that it is barred by res judicata, and on the grounds that the complaints, i.e., LASC Case Nos. 22PSCV00083 and 22PSCV01319,[1] fail to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to constitute a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims are rooted in a breach of an alleged promise, and do not rise to the level of outrageousness necessary for an IIED claim. The Court agrees the complaints fail to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for IIED. The Court further agrees that the Court previously sustained the demurrer to the IIED cause of action in 22PSCV00083 without leave to amend.

Emotional distress damages are generally unavailable in breach of contract type claims. (See Levy v. Only Cremations for Pets, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 203, 214, internal quotation marks omitted [“[D]amages for mental suffering and emotional distress are generally not recoverable in an action for breach of an ordinary commercial contract in California. [Citation.] There are two exceptions to this rule: (1) when the emotional distress caused by the breach is accompanied by physical injury; or (2) when the breach is of such kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result. [Citation.]”])

The extent of Plaintiff’s allegations are rooted in a breach of contract type claim. (See Compl. (LASC Case No. 22PSCV00083), ¶¶ 10-16; Compl. (LASC Case No. 22PSCV01319, ¶¶ 10-16.) Neither complaint alleges any physical injury or any facts demonstrating that a breach of such a contract or promise is the kind that would lead to serious emotional distress. (See Compl. (LASC Case No. 22PSCV00083), ¶¶ 10-16; Compl. (LASC Case No. 22PSCV01319, ¶¶ 10-16; Levy, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 214.) Additionally, the Court construes Plaintiff’s lack of opposition to this motion as a tacit admission that Defendant’s arguments are meritorious. (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418; C. Opposing the Motion—and Rebutting the Opposition, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(I)-C, ¶ 9:105.10.)

Because the Court finds the complaints fail to allege sufficient facts here, the Court declines to address Defendant’s res judicata arguments. Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the First Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in both complaints without leave to amend.

To state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must allege facts that would otherwise support a claim for negligence, such as duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 708, 729, internal quotation marks omitted and italics in original [“negligent causing of emotional distress is not an independent tort but the tort of negligence.... [Citation.] The traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply.”])

Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the Second Cause of Action for negligent infliction of emotional distress on the grounds of res judicata, and on the grounds that the complaints fail to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendant contends the complaints do not contain a separate negligence cause of action (NIED), nor are there any allegations that would allow for a recovery under an NIED theory of liability. The Court again agrees that the complaints fail to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for NIED.

The complaints do not allege any facts indicating Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff, or that Defendant breached that duty. (See Compl. (LASC Case No. 22PSCV00083), ¶¶ 17-21; Compl. (LASC Case No. 22PSCV01319, ¶¶ 17-22.) As noted above, Plaintiff’s emotional distress claims are based on a breach of contract type of claim, which generally do not permit recovery of emotional distress damages. (See Levy, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 214.) As also noted above, neither of the complaints allege any facts indicating Plaintiff suffered physical injury or that severe emotional distress was the kind of harm that was likely to result here. (See Compl. (LASC Case No. 22PSCV00083), ¶¶ 17-21; Compl. (LASC Case No. 22PSCV01319, ¶¶ 17-22; Levy, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 214.) Furthermore, the Court again construes Plaintiff’s lack of opposition to this motion as a tacit admission that Defendant’s arguments are meritorious, and Plaintiff has not requested leave to amend. (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418; C. Opposing the Motion—and Rebutting the Opposition, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(I)-C, ¶ 9:105.10.)

Because the Court again finds the complaints fail to allege sufficient facts for this cause of action too, the Court declines to address Defendant’s res judicata arguments. Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Second Cause of Action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in both complaints without leave to amend.

Defendant Gloria Mendoza is ordered to lodge a Proposed Dismissal Order within five calendar days of this order.

Defendant Gloria Mendoza is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.

[1] The Court agrees with Defendant that the allegations in both complaints, i.e., LASC Case Nos. 22PSCV0083 and 22PSCV01319, are virtually identical to each other, and therefore the Court will treat the allegations and causes of action between both complaints as one and the same. The Court also notes that although it previously sustained Defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend as to the First Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in LASC Case No. 22PSCV00083, it was not sustained as to the same cause of action in LASC Case No. 22PSCV01319, as the consolidation of these cases occurred after the Court sustained that demurrer.