Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 22PSCV00257, Date: 2024-12-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22PSCV00257 Hearing Date: December 17, 2024 Dept: 6
CASE NAME: City of El Monte v. Lino James Ibarra, et al.
Defendant Tucker Lincoln’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
TENTATIVE RULING
The Court GRANTS Defendant Tucker Lincoln’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the reduced amount of $141,319.50.
Defendant Lincoln is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.
BACKGROUND
This is a nuisance action relating to illegal sales of cannabis. On March 16, 2022, plaintiff City of El Monte (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Lino James Ibarra (Ibarra), Michael Atencio, Manuel Aquino, Joseph Hernandez, Jung Hsiang Chen, Ya Fen Hsu, Tucker Lincoln (Lincoln), Philip Gonzales, Shane Sapp, H.C. Rue Royale Partner LLC (Rue Royale) (collectively, Defendants) and Does 1 through 100, alleging causes of action for narcotics abatement (Health and Safety Code section 11570 et seq.), public nuisance (Civil Code section 3479 et seq.), violation of El Monte Municipal Code (EMMC Chapters 5.18 and Ch. 1.19), violation of unfair competition law (Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.), and violation of MAUCRSA (Business and Professions Code section 26000 et seq.)
On January 18, 2024, after the Court granted Lincoln’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint against the same Defendants and alleging causes of action for narcotics abatement (Health and Safety Code section 11570 et seq.), public nuisance (Civil Code section 3479 et seq.), violation of El Monte Municipal Code (EMMC Chapters 5.18 and Ch. 1.19), violation of unfair competition law (Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.), and violation of MAUCRSA (Business and Professions Code section 26000 et seq.)
On May 13, 2024, after the Court sustained Lincoln’s demurrer to the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) against the same Defendants, plus defendant Joseph Flores (Flores) who was also added via doe amendment on May 14, 2024, alleging causes of action for narcotics abatement (Health and Safety Code section 11570 et seq.), public nuisance (Civil Code section 3479 et seq.), violation of El Monte Municipal Code (EMMC Chapters 5.18 and Ch. 1.19).
On August 12, 2024, the Court sustained Lincoln’s demurrer to the SAC without leave to amend, and directed Lincoln to submit a proposed judgment for the Court’s review and signature. On August 19, 2024, the Court entered a judgment of dismissal against Lincoln.
On October 14, 2024, Lincoln moved for attorneys’ fees. On December 4, 2024, Plaintiff opposed the motion. On December 9, 2024, Lincoln replied to the opposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)
The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show "the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount." (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)
“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney… involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. [Citation.] The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work. [Citation.]” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)
“The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom [citation], and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus.[Citation.]” (569 E. Cnty. Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-437.)
DISCUSSION
Summary of Arguments
Defendant Lincoln seeks attorneys’ fees under Civil Code section 3496 and under El Monte Municipal Code section 1.19.030. Lincoln contends he is the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees under those code sections because the Court ultimately sustained Lincoln’s demurrer to the SAC without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice in favor of Lincoln. Lincoln contends he may recover attorneys’ fees under Civil Code section 3496 on nuisance abatement claims because the SAC sought to enjoin unlawful narcotics activities at four different properties. Lincoln contends Plaintiff maintained this action in bad faith and violated its own contract and controlling precedent by being represented by a private firm on a contingent fee basis without a neutral government attorney overseeing the case. Lincoln then contends Plaintiff sought to recover attorneys’ fees under its own ordinance, i.e., the El Monte Municipal Code, which in turn enables Lincoln to recover attorneys’ fees under that law.
Lincoln contends the fees incurred were reasonable in light of the work performed over the preceding two years, multiple motions attacking the pleadings despite Plaintiff’s lack of standing, and extensive written discovery exchanges. Lincoln contends this case entailed a significant amount of research on various complex areas of law, and that the extent of work involved was reasonable given how much Plaintiff was demanding in damages. Lincoln further contends the rates requested are reasonable compared to the Laffey Matrix and accounting for a 5% reduction due to differences between rates in the Los Angeles and Washington D.C. legal markets. Lincoln’s attorneys’ rates for this matter were $400.00 for new associates, $510.00 for more experienced associates, and $820.00 for partners.
In opposition, Plaintiff contends that Lincoln is not the prevailing party because the ruling on this motion for attorney fees will be subject to appeal, and the appellate court will review the underlying legal reasoning. Plaintiff contends Lincoln relies on a disputed conclusion that although he may have financed and facilitated the illicit production and sale of marijuana, he is a prevailing party because he did so outside the city limits, and the Court should not find such a person to be a prevailing party. Plaintiff then contends Lincoln cannot recover attorneys’ fees under El Monte Municipal Code section 1.19.030, subdivision (b), because Plaintiff has not incurred any attorneys’ fees, as Plaintiff’s representation is on a contingency fee basis. Plaintiff also contends it did not prosecute this action in bad faith.
Plaintiff further contends the hours spent are unreasonable and excessive. Plaintiff cites billing entries on June 27, 2023, reflecting two attorneys attending the same video conference, and contends too many people worked on researching and drafting a meet and confer letter regarding Plaintiff’s supplemental responses. Plaintiff contends too many people worked on preparing and drafting a motion to compel further responses, totaling over fifty-five hours of work. Plaintiff notes that three attorneys worked on the demurrer to the First Amended Complaint and spent over thirty hours drafting that demurrer. Plaintiff then contends Lincoln’s lodestar should be reduced, as Lincoln’s counsel fails to explain what matters he turned down to work on this case.
Analysis
Generally, a prevailing party is one who obtained a net judgment in his or her favor. (See Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal.4th 345, 365, 370, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, fn. 6 (J. Chin, concur. and dissent. opn.).) The Court also looks to who prevailed on a practical level. (Heather Farms Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Robinson (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1574.) The Court finds Lincoln is the prevailing party here, as Lincoln obtained a judgment of dismissal with prejudice from the entire action in his favor. Whether Plaintiff can appeal the ruling on this motion for attorneys’ fees is irrelevant, as Plaintiff cited no authority for that argument. Also, Lincoln correctly contends in his reply that appealing from the ruling on this motion is unavailing since Plaintiff has not appealed from the underlying judgment. (Hersey v. Vopava (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 792, 797; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406 [appeals must be made within 60 days of rendition of judgment or order being appealed].)
The Court also finds that Lincoln is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees under either El Monte Municipal Code section 1.19.030 or Civil Code section 3496, subdivision (c), as this action involved abatement of public nuisance and enjoining use of a building in connection with a controlled substance. (See generally, SAC; El Monte Municipal Code, § 1.19.030; Civ. Code, § 3496, subd. (c).) Plaintiff also requested attorneys’ fees upon initiating this action. (Compl. (3/16/22), p. 18; El Monte Municipal Code, § 1.19.030, subd. (a).) The Court finds unavailing Plaintiff’s argument regarding El Monte Municipal Code section 1.19.030, subdivision (b), which limits the city’s liability for attorneys’ fees to the amount the city incurred. Just because Plaintiff is represented on a contingency fee basis does not mean Plaintiff has not incurred attorneys’ fees for purposes of this motion. (See In re Marriage of Adams (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 911, 914-915.) The fact that a fee has not been paid does not mean it was not earned and that the client is not obligated to pay for it. (W. Coast Dev. v. Reed (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 693, 707.) Moreover, if Plaintiff’s interpretation were correct, it would lead to unilateral recovery of attorneys’ fees by the city, which Government Code section 38733.5 prohibits. (Gov. Code, § 38733.5; City of Monte Sereno v. Padgett (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1537.)
Additionally, as Lincoln correctly notes, Plaintiff is in fact represented by two law firms here, i.e., Enso Law LLP, which is the firm purportedly on the contingency fee basis, and Olivarez Madruga Law Organization, LLP. Plaintiff presented no evidence or argument regarding the fees incurred in connection with this other firm. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Lincoln’s recovery is limited under El Monte Municipal Code section 1.19.030, subdivision (b).
A verified fee bill is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were reasonable. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682). After reviewing the invoices and billing summaries provided by Lincoln and considering the nature and extent of the litigation, the Court finds the hours billed are not reasonable. While this matter implicated various areas of law that may have warranted initial research, the case was simple to a certain extent, in that Lincoln is only one party here and the issues were largely the same throughout the various motions filed. The extent of Lincoln’s involvement in this case was primarily three motions attacking the pleadings, i.e., the motion for judgment on the pleadings to the original complaint, and the demurrers to the First and Second Amended Complaints, along with some written discovery. (Kashfian Decl., Exs. 24-25.) Once the work was done for the motion for judgment on the pleadings, there were only a few new issues to address in the subsequent iterations of the complaint, except for some issues improperly asserted in the SAC, which should have reduced the amount of research and drafting needed on the subsequent motions.
It also appears to the Court this matter was overstaffed and could have been handled more efficiently with fewer attorneys and legal assistants. It is unclear to the Court why fifteen people were needed on this case. (See Kashfian Decl., Exs. 24-25.) The Court notes that there was excessive billing and duplicative work in terms of multiple people billing for attending the same meeting, overlapping and duplicative research, excessive research and hours billed on motions that largely involved the same issues, and excessive hours billed and duplication in preparing and reviewing discovery responses. For example, more than 77 hours were billed by six people on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. More than 50 hours billed by five people drafting initial discovery. More than 30 hours were billed for the demurrer and motion to strike the First Amended Complaint and more than 20 hours were billed for the reply. More than 51 hours were billed for the demurrer and motion to strike the Second Amended Complaint. More than 8 hours were billed drafting the opposition to a notice of related case. Lastly, more than 64 hours were billed for the subject motion for attorney’s fees. Indeed, more than 303 hours were billed on these motions and discovery, that should reasonably have been completed in just over 100 hours.
The Court is also familiar with local rates for the eastern Los Angeles legal community, and finds the rates Lincoln’s attorneys request excessive. (569 E. Cnty. Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 436-437.) The Court declines to consider the Laffey Matrix because it is not specific to Southern California. The rates Lincoln’s attorneys charged for associates approaches rates of partners in this area, and Mr. Kashfian’s rate of $820.00 is much higher than partners in this community. However, because Plaintiff did not challenge the hourly rates, the Court will not reduce the hourly rates.
After reviewing the billing summary, the Court finds that the nearly 600 hours billed on this case is extremely excessive as identified above. The court went through the summary and decided a reasonable amount of hours for reasonably experienced attorneys and paralegals, in similar circumstances, to do the tasks that Tucker’s counsel claims to have done was approximately 400 hours. The Court exercises its discretion to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees requested by 40% (a negative 40% multiplier). (See Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38-40; Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 40 [“when a ‘“voluminous fee application”’ is made … the court may … ‘“make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure”’”]. This amount more accurately reflects the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees in a case which was not particularly complex and which was handled by counsel experienced in this area of law. The Court is not convinced that all of the attorneys, paralegals, and law clerks, at these high rates, were necessary or reasonable to justify the requested billed amount.
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Lincoln’s motion for attorneys’ fees, but reduces the total amount requested by 40% or $94,213.00.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendant Tucker Lincoln’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the reduced amount of $141,319.50.
Defendant Lincoln is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.